Van Heerden v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit en 'n Ander

• Jurisdiction: South Africa

Van Heerden v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit en 'n Ander
2014 (2) SACR 346 (NCK)

2014 (2) SACR p346

Citation	2014 (2) SACR 346 (NCK)
Case No	858/2009
Court	Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
Judge	Olivier R
Heard	August 22, 2011
Judgment	September 20, 2011
Counsel	SL Erasmus for the plaintiff.; SE Motloung for the first defendant; ND Khokho for the second defendant.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Vervolgingsgesag — Aanklaer — Aanspreeklikheid van — Vrystelling van aanspreeklikheid waar handelinge te goeder trou gepleeg — Gesindheid en bedoeling waarmee handeling gepleeg is, noodwendig van belang by C beoordeling van vraag of betrokke aanklaer te goeder trou opgetree het — Geen sprake van goeie trou waar animus iniuriandi teenwoordig was nie — Wet op die Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag 32 van 1998, s 42.

Headnote : Kopnota

Die eiser het die Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit en die Nasionale Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings gedagvaar vir skadevergoeding weens kwaadwillige D vervolging en kwaadwillige arrestasie, alternatiewelik onwettige arrestasie. Die eiser was 'n kaptein in die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens en die stasiebevelvoerder by die Delportshoop Polisiestasie. 'n Polisie taakspan is ingestel om bewerings te ondersoek dat sekere mynwerkers, in diens van 'n sekere mnr Visser, deur Visser aangerand is, en dat die polisie versuim het om die bewerings te ondersoek. As deel van sy werk het die taakspan, onder E andere by ander polisiestasies, twee polisiedossiere rakende klagtes van aanranding op die twee klaers by die Delportshoop Polisiestasie nagegaan en daarna die dossier aan die plaaslike kantoor van die DOV oorhandig wat 'n bevel uitgereik het dat die eiser op 'n aanklag van statutêre meineed en regsverydeling aangekla moes word. Die twee ondersoekbeamptes van die taakmag het daarna 'n lasbrief vir die inhegtenisname van die eiser gekry — F deur te verdoesel dat die eiser 'n polisieoffisier was en te suggereer dat dit moeilik was om hom op te spoor — en die eiser daarna gearresteer. Hy is in 'n polisievoertuig na sy eie polisiestasie toe geneem waar sy vingerafdrukke geneem is. Hy is daarna na die landdroskantoor geneem waar hy op borg van R100 vrygelaat is. Ongeveer 'n jaar later is hy in sy verhoor aan die einde van die staat se saak vrygespreek op die klagtes. In die huidige saak het die hof tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die eiser nie op 'n oorwig van G waarskynlikhede bewys het dat die eerste verweerder die vervolging aangestig of in werking gestel het nie. (Paragraaf [80] te 366b.) Insgelyks, was daar geen getuienis dat die tweede verweerder enigiets met die besluit om die eiser te arresteer te doen gehad het nie en hy kon gevolglik nie in hierdie verband aanspreeklik gehou word nie. (Paragraaf [206] te 389e.)

Wat die tweede verweerder betref, het die hof beslis dat die dossier 'n belangrike H verklaring, wat noodsaaklik sou gewees het vir 'n suksesvolle vervolging van die eiser, gekort het en dit duidelik gemaak dat daar nie 'reasonable and probable cause' bestaan het om die eiser op daardie bewerings te vervolg nie. (Paragraaf [99] te 370a.)

Die hof het verder beslis dat die begrip 'te goeder trou' in art 42 van die Wet op die Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag 32 van 1998 noodwendig 'n subjektiewe I element moes hê. Die gesindheid en bedoeling waarmee die handeling begaan is, moes noodwendig van belang wees by beoordeling van die vraag of die betrokke aanklaer te goeder trou opgetree het. Daar kon geen sprake wees van goeie trou waar animus iniuriandi teenwoordig was nie; met ander woorde, waar die aanklaer bedoel het om deur sy optrede die persoon in sy dignitas of geldelik te benadeel, of voorsien het dat die optrede so 'n gevolg kon hê en besef het of voorsien het dat die optrede onregmatig was deurdat J daar nie 'reasonable and probable cause' vir die optrede was nie. Daar was

2014 (2) SACR p347

geen regverdiging vir die houding dat art 42 van die Wet benader moes A word op die basis dat daar 'n sterk vermoede van goeie trou aan die kant van die aanklaer was wat nie maklik weerlê kon word nie. (Paragrawe [116]–[121] te 372g–374a geparafraseer.)

Wat die arrestasie aanbetref, die besluit om die eiser by wyse van arrestasie voor die hof te bring — met die gevolglike vernedering wat dit vir hom as 'n B bekende polisie-offisier en leier ingehou het — was 'unreasonable in the sense that it is beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker'. Die besluit om hier arrestasie te gebruik as 'n metode om die eiser voor die hof te bring, was arbitrêr en nie in goeie trou of rasioneel nie. Dit was gemene saak dat polisiebeamptes wat vervolg word normaalweg, en veral dan op minder ernstige aanklagte, by wyse van dagvaarding voor die hof gebring word. Die eerste verweerder was gevolglik vir die skade C wat voortgespruit het uit die arrestasie aanspreeklik. (Paragrawe [200] en [220] te 388c–e en 392e geparafraseer.)

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Prosecuting authority — Prosecutor — Liability of — Exemption from where D acts in good faith — Attitude and intention with which deed committed important in determining question whether acted in good faith — Could be no question of good faith where there was animus iniuriandi — National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, s 42.

Headnote : Kopnota

The plaintiff instituted action against the Minister of Safety and Security and the E National Director of Public Prosecutions for damages for malicious prosecution and malicious, alternatively unlawful, arrest. The plaintiff was a captain in the South African Police Services and the station commander of the Delportshoop Police Station. A police task team was set up to investigate allegations that certain mineworkers employed by one Mr Visser F had been assaulted by Visser and that the police had neglected to investigate the allegations. Amongst others at other police stations, the task team investigated two police dockets at the Delportshoop Police Station concerning assaults on two complainants. The office of the DPP issued an order that the plaintiff be prosecuted on a charge of statutory perjury and of defeating the ends of justice. The two investigating officers obtained a G warrant of arrest for the plaintiff and arrested him in accordance with the warrant. He was taken in a police vehicle to his own police station where his fingerprints were taken. He was then taken to the magistrates' court where he was released on bail of R100. Approximately a year later he was acquitted of the charges at his trial and discharged at the end of the state's case. The court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not shown on H a balance of probabilities that the first defendant had instigated the prosecution and therefore it could not be held liable for the claim of malicious prosecution. (Paragraph [80] at 366b.) Similarly, there was no evidence that the second defendant had anything to do with the decision to arrest the plaintiff and he could accordingly not be held liable in this regard. (Paragraph [206] at 389e.)

As regards the second defendant, the court held that the fact that the docket I lacked an affidavit that would have been crucial to a successful prosecution of the plaintiff, made it clear that there was no reasonable and probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff. (Paragraph [99] at 370a.)

The court held further that the concept 'in good faith' in s 42 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, that granted an exemption from liability for prosecutors, necessarily embraced a subjective element. The J

2014 (2) SACR p348

A attitude and intention with which the relevant act was committed were, of necessity, important in determining the question whether the relevant prosecutor had acted in good faith. There could be no question of good faith where there was animus iniuriandi, in other words, where the prosecutor intended thereby to harm the person's dignity or to prejudice him financially or foresaw that his actions could result in that and realised B or foresaw that the action was unlawful as there was no reasonable and probable cause for the action. There was no justification for reading into s 42 a strong presumption of good faith on the part of the prosecutor that could not easily be rebutted. (Paragraphs [116]–[121] at 372g–374a paraphrased.)

As regards the arrest, the decision to bring the plaintiff before court by way of an C arrest (with the resultant embarrassment that it held for him as a well-known police officer and leader) was unreasonable in the sense that it was beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. The decision was arbitrary, irrational and had not been made in good faith. It was common cause that normally, when police officials were charged with less serious offences, they were brought before the court by way of summons. The first defendant was accordingly liable for the damages arising from the arrest. D (Paragraphs [201]–[220] at 388c–e and 392e paraphrased.)

Cases cited

Ardecor (Pty) Ltd v Quality Caterers (Pty) Ltd and Others 1978 (3) SA 1073 (N): referred to

Areff v Minister van Polisie 1977 (2) SA 900 (A): referred to E

Atlantic Continental Assurance Co of SA v Vermaak 1973 (2) SA 525 (E): referred to

Avex Air (Pty) Ltd v Borough of Vryheid 1973 (1) SA 617 (A): compared

Benning v Union Government (Minister of Finance) 1914 AD 180: compared

Brand v Minister of Justice and Another 1959 (4) SA 712 (A): compared F

Caldwell v Chelcourt Ltd 1965 (1) SA 304 (N): compared

Du Plooy v Ackerman 1962 (2) SA 581 (A): compared

Gordon Lloyd Page & Associates v Rivera and Another 2001 (1) SA 88 (SCA) ([2000] 4 All SA 241): compared

Groenewald v Minister van Justisie 1973 (3) SA 877 (A): compared

Grundling v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1987 (1) SA 627 (SE)...