S v Ramba

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1990 (2) SACR 334 (A)

S v Ramba
1990 (2) SACR 334 (A)

1990 (2) SACR p334

Citation	1990 (2) SACR 334 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	F H Grosskopf AR
Heard	September 17, 1990
Judgment	September 25, 1990
Counsel	N J Mullins namens die appellant; M L Le Roux namens die Staat

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde D

Moord — Vonnis — Doodvonnis — Strafversagtende faktore — Wat uitmaak — Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 soos gewysig deur Wet 107 van 1990 — Uitdrukking behels wyer begrip as wat voorheen onder versagtende E omstandighede verstaan was — Appellant aan drie klagtes van moord skuldig bevind as gevolg van sy deelname aan verbranding van hut van ene M — Doodvonnis opgelê deur Verhoorhof — Hof op appèl het volgende as strafversagtende faktore in aanmerking geneem: feit dat moorde gepleeg is in groepsverband ten tyde van ernstige onlustoestande en spanning in F Swart woongebiede; dat appellant ouderdom van 36 jaar bereik het sonder enige skuldigbevinding vir geweldsmisdaad; en feit dat hy vaste werk gehad het tot voor sy arrestasie — Ernstige strafverswarende faktore egter feit dat appellant betrokke was by pleeg van wrede en gevoellose moorde en dat twee jong kinders ook doodgebrand het tydens verbranding van M se hut — Hof nie oortuig dat doodvonnis die 'gepaste vonnis' is nie — Doodvonnis verander na 25 jaar gevangenisstraf op elke G moordaanklag.

Headnote : Kopnota

Die appellant het in 'n Provinsiale Afdeling tereggestaan op, onder andere, drie aanklagtes van moord as gevolg van sy groepsdeelname aan die verbranding van 'n hut in 'n Swart plakkersdorp wat bewoon was deur 'n vrou, ene M, waartydens sy en haar twee jong kleinseuns doodgebrand H het. Die appellant is op al drie aanklagte van moord skuldig bevind en ter dood veroordeel aangesien die Verhoorhof van mening was dat daar geen versagtende omstandighede aanwesig was nie. Op appèl teen die skuldigbevindings en die bevinding ten opsigte van versagtende omstandighede, het die Hof bevind dat daar geen meriete was in die appèl teen die skuldigbevindings nie. Wat betref die oplegging van die I doodvonnis, het die Hof opgemerk dat onder die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977, soos gewysig deur die Strafregwysigingswet 107 van 1990, die uitdrukking 'strafversagtende faktore' 'n wyer begrip uitdruk as wat voorheen onder 'versagtende omstandighede' verstaan was en dat 'strafversagtende of -verswarende faktore' alle faktore insluit wat behoorlik deur 'n hof in ag geneem kan word ter versagting of verswaring van vonnis. Met toepassing van hierdie maatstawwe, het die Hof bevind J dat die strafverswarende feite

1990 (2) SACR p335

A van die onderhawige saak was dat die moorde onteenseglik wrede en gevoellose dade was en dat daar in die proses van afbranding van die huis ook twee jong kinders doodgebrand het. Die strafversagtende faktore wat die Hof in aanmerking geneem het was die feit dat die misdade gepleeg is tydens die 1985 onluste in die Oos-Kaap en dat daar ten tyde van die gebeure ernstige onrus en 'n gespanne toestand in die betrokke Swart plakkersdorp geheers het; die feit dat die appellant reeds 36 jaar B oud was toe hy op die moord aanklagtes tereggestaan het en geen vorige veroordeling vir enige geweldsmisdaad gehad het nie, en dit derhalwe die afleiding regverdig het dat die appellant nie inherent gewelddadig was nie maar dat hy die betrokke aand as een van die groep meegevoer was; en die feit dat die appellant voor sy arrestasie 'n vaste werk gehad het en C dus andersins as 'n nuttige lid van die samelewing beskou kon word. Die Hof het opgemerk dat hierdie bevinding met betrekking tot strafversagtende faktore geensins beteken het dat die Verhoorhof fouteer het toe dit bevind het dat daar geen versagtende omstandighede aanwesig was nie aangesien onder die nuwe bedeling die Hof faktore in ag kon neem wat nooit onder die ou bedeling as versagtende omstandighede beskou sou D gewees het nie. Die Hof het na inagneming van al die gemelde versagtende en verswarende faktore beslis dat dit nie oortuig was dat die doodvonnis die gepaste vonnis in die onderhawige geval was nie en het derhalwe sodanige vonnisse tersyde gestel en vervang met 'n termyn van 25 jaar gevangenisstraf op elke moordklagte. E

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Murder — Sentence — Death sentence — Mitigating factors — What constitutes — Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended by Act 107 of 1990 — 'Mitigating factors' a wider concept than was previously encompassed by phrase 'extenuating circumstances' — Appellant convicted of three charges of murder as result of his participation in burning of F hut of one M — Sentence of death imposed by trial Court — Court on appeal taking following into consideration as mitigating factors: fact that murders committed in context of mob action during period of serious unrest and tension in Black residential areas; that appellant had reached age of 36 years without any conviction for violent crime; and fact that he had had fixed employment until time of his arrest — Fact G that murders in question cruel and callous and that two young children had also burnt to death during burning of hut constituting serious aggravating factors — Court on consideration of all these factors not convinced that death sentence 'the proper sentence' — Death sentence set aside and substituted with 25 years' imprisonment on each charge of murder. H

Headnote : Kopnota

The appellant had been charged with, inter alia, three counts of murder as result of his participation, as a member of a group, in the burning of a hut in a Black squatter town, the dwelling of a woman, one M, during which M and her two young grandsons had been burnt to death. The appellant was convicted on all three charges and sentenced to death on each one, the trial Court having found no extenuating circumstances. On I appeal against the convictions and the finding regarding extenuation, the Court found that there was no merit in the appeal against the convictions. As regards the imposition of the death sentence, the Court remarked that under the Criminal Law Act 51 of 1977, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, the expression 'mitigating factors' expressed a broader concept as had previously been understood J by 'extenuating circumstances'

1990 (2) SACR p336

A and that mitigating and aggravating factors included all factors which the Court could properly consider in mitigation or aggravation of sentence. Applying these criteria, the Court found that the aggravating factors of the instant case were that the murders had been undeniably cruel and callous deeds and that two young children had also died during the burning of the hut. The mitigating factors taken into account by the B Court were the following: the fact that the deeds had been committed during the 1985 riots in the Eastern Cape and that serious unrest and tension had reigned in the squatter town at the time; the fact that the appellant had already reached the age of 36 years when he stood trial for the murders and that he had no previous convictions for violent crime, and that this justified the inference that the appellant was not C inherently violent but that he had been swept along as part of a group on the particular evening; and the fact that the appellant had had fixed employment up until the time of his arrest and that he could therefore be otherwise regarded as a useful member of society. The Court remarked that this finding with regard to mitigating factors did not imply that the trial Court had erred when it had found no extenuating circumstances D to have been present, as under the new regime the Court could take into consideration factors which would not have been regarded as extenuation before the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Court, after taking all these mitigating and aggravating factors into account, held that it was not convinced that the death sentence was the proper sentence in the instant case and accordingly set aside such sentences and substituted it with a sentence of 25 years' imprisonment on each of the three counts of murder. E

Case Information

Appèl vanaf 'n beslissing in die Oranje Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling (Van Reenen Wn R). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van F H Grosskopf AR.

N J Mullins namens die appellant het na die volgende gesag verwys: S v F Mokoena 1932 OPD 79 op 80; S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A); S v Adams; S v Werner 1981 (1) SA 187 (A) op 220E-G; Burchell en Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure 2de uitg band I op 335; S v Alfeus 1979 (3) SA 145 (A) op 152H; S v Kubeka 1982 (1) SA 534 (W) op 537D-H; S v Munyai 1986 (4) SA 711 (V) op 715G-J; S v Sauls and Another 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) op 184C-E; S v Mongesi en Andere 1981 (3) SA 204 (A) op G 207F-H; S v Bradbury 1967 (1) SA 387 (A) op 407H; S v Masuku and Others 1985 (3) SA 908 (A); Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 4de uitg op 625; Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases band 2 op 60; R v Zonele 1959 (3) SA 319 (A) op 330F; S v Gqabi 1964 (1) SA 261 (T) op 265A; R v Lambete 1947 (2) SA 603 (A) op 609-10; R v Gray 1947 (4) SA 557 (A) op 559.

M L le Roux namens die Staat het na die volgende gesag verwys: R v H Jolly and Others 1923 AD 176; R v Mahomed 1938 AD 30; R v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A); R v Samuel and Others 1960 (4) SA 702 (SR); R v Dladla and Others 1962 (1) SA 307 (A); S v Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 (A); S v Babada 1964 (1) SA 26 (A); S v Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (A); S v Nkomo and Another 1966 (1) SA 831 (A); S v Manyathi 1967 (1) SA...