S v Adams S v Werner

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Rumpff HR, Jansen AR, Kotzé AR, Joubert AR en Van Heerden Wn AR
• Judgment Date: 11 September 1980
• Citation: 1981 (1) SA 187 (A)
• Hearing Date: 05 September 1980
• Court: Appellate Division

S v Adams S v Werner
1981 (1) SA 187 (A)

1981 (1) SA p187

Citation	1981 (1) SA 187 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Rumpff HR, Jansen AR, Kotzé AR, Joubert AR en Van Heerden Wn AR
Heard	September 5, 1980
Judgment	September 11, 1980

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde F

Strafreg — Persone, aanspreeklikheid van — Verweer van noodtoestand — Kan as 'n feite toestand beskou word waarin 'n beskermingswaardige belang bedreig word.

Strafreg — Persone, aanspreeklikheid van — Verweer van noodtoestand — Statutêre Statutêre misdrywe — Bewyslas op Staat om te bewys dat daar nie 'n noodtoestand was nie of dat die beskuldigde nie redelik opgetree het nie — Maar statuut kan die bewyslas uitdruklik of by noodwendige implikasie op die beskuldigde plaas.

Grond — Wet op Groepsgebiede 36 van 1966 — Oortreding van art 26 (1) — Nie-Blankes het in 'n woonstel in 'n Blanke gebied ingetrek — Verweer van noodtoestand — Geen bewyslas op beskuldigde om dit te bewys nie — Geen getuienis van 'n absolute woningsnood nie.

Grond — Wet op groepsgebiede 36 van 1966 — Oortreding van art 26 (1) — Nie-Blanke het in 'n woonstel in 'n Blanke gebied ingetrek — Verweer dat Prok 83 van 1962 ongeldig was omdat dit onredelik toegepas word — Die nadeel minder onredelik as wat deur die Wetgewer voorsien is.

Headnote : Kopnota

Noodtoestand in die strafreg kan beskou word as 'n feitetoestand waarin daar 'n onmiddellike bedreiging ontstaan vir 'n beskermingswaardige belang.

Die algemene stelling dat by 'n statutêre misdryf daar 'n bewyslas op die beskuldigde is om op oorwig van waarskynlikhede die verweer van noodtoestand te bewys is nie aanvaarbaar nie. Indien die statuut in so 'n geval uitdruklik of by noodwendige implikasie so 'n bewyslas op 'n beskuldigde plaas, is dit natuurlik 'n ander geval. Sonder so 'n uitdruklike of noodwendig geïmpliseerde statutêre oplegging van die bewyslas is die posisie eenvoudig. Indien aan die einde van die saak die verhoorhof twyfel of daar wel 'n noodtoestand was of nie, of dat die beskuldigde wel redelik opgetree het of nie, het die Staat die saak teen die beskuldigde nie sonder redelike twyfel bewys nie. Natuurlik moet daar feite voor die hof gelê word, òf deur die Staat òf deur die beskuldigde, waarvolgens die verhoorhof verplig word om 'n beslissing omtrent die bestaan van 'n noodtoestand te gee, maar daar rus geen bewyslas as sodanig op die beskuldigde nie.

Die appellante is skuldig bevind aan oortredings van art 26 (1) van die Wet op Groepsgebiede 36 van 1966 soos gewysig, gelees met arts 1, 12, 23, 45, 46 en 49 en met Prok 83 van 1962. In Adams se saak is 'n beroep gedoen op noodtoestand as 'n verweer en in Werner se saak op die ongeldigheid van Prok 83 van 1962 omdat dit onredelik toegepas word. 'n Appèl deur Adams aan 'n Provinsiale Afdeling is van die hand afgewys. In die geval van Adams, wat 'n indiër is, het die getuienis gewys dat, as gevolg van 'n nypende behuisingnood in Indiër groepsgebiede in Johannesburg, hy en sy familie in 'n woonstel in 'n Blanke gebied ingetrek het. Werner was 'n Kleurling en hy het ook in 'n woonstel in 'n Blanke gebied ingetrek. Hy het vrywillig van die Kaap na Johannesburg gekom om te werk waar daar 'n ernstige woningnood in die Kleurling gebiede was. In Adams se saak het die Hof a quo bevind dat in die geval van 'n statutêre misdryf daar 'n bewyslas op die beskuldigde rus wat hom op noodtoestand beroep, om op oorwig van waarskynlikhede die beweerde noodtoestand te bewys. In 'n verdere appèl.

Beslis, dat daar geen bewyslas op Adams was om te bewys dat daar 'n noodstand onstaan het nie.

Beslis, egter, dat daar geen getuienis was van 'n absoluut woningsnood nie. Gevolglik kon geen beroep op noodtoestand gedoen word nie.

Beslis, verder in Werner se appèl, dat die nadeel minder onredelik was as die "substansiële ongelykheid" wat in Minister of the Interior v Lockhat and Others 1961 (2) SA 587 (A) genoem is en wat deur die Wetgewer voorsien is: dus kon dit nie gesê word dat die toepassing van Prok 83 van 1962 ongeldig was nie

Beslis, verder, dat die beslissing in Minister of the Interior v Lockhat and Others (supra) nie verkeerd was nie.

Beslis, verder, dat die verweer van noodtoestand vir die redes genoem in Adams se saak nie kon slaag nie.

Die beslissing in die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling in S v Adams 1979 (4) SA 793 en die beslissing in die Witwatersrand Plaaslike Afdeling in S v Werner 1980 (2) SA 313 bevestig.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Criminal law — Persons, liability of — Defence of necessity — Can be regarded as a factual situation wherein an interest worthy of protection is threatened.

Criminal law — Persons, liability of — Defence of necessity — Statutory offences — Onus on State to prove that a state of necessity did not exist or that the accused did not act reasonable — But statute can expressly or by necessary implication, place onus on the accused.

1981 (1) SA p188

Land — Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 — Contravention of s 26 (1) — Non-Whites had moved into a flat in a White area — Defence of state of necessity — No onus on accused to prove it — No evidence of an absolute lack of housing.

Land — Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 — Contravention of s 26 (1) — Non-White had moved into a flat in a White area — Defence that Proc 83 of 1962 was invalid as it was unreasonably applied — Prejudice less unreasonable than that envisaged by the Legislature.

Headnote : Kopnota

A state of necessity in the criminal law can be regarded as a factual stituation wherein there exists an immediate threat to an interest worthy of protection.

The general proposition that in a statutory offence there is an onus on the accused to prove on a preponderance of probabilities the defence of necessity is not acceptable. If the statute in such a case places such an onus on an accused expressly or by necessary implication, it is naturally otherwise. Without such an express or necessarily implied statutory placing of the onus the position is simple. If at the end of the case the trial court is in doubt whether there was a state of necessity, or whether or not the accused had acted reasonably, the State has not proved its case case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Naturally the facts must be placed before the court, either by the State or by the accused, whereby the trial court is bound to give a decision concerning the existence of a state of necessity, but no onus of proof as such rests on the accused.

The appellants had been convicted of contraventions of s 26 (1) of the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 as amended, read with ss 1, 12, 23, 45, 46 and 49 and with Proc 83 of 1962. In the case of Adams a state of necessity was invoked as a defence and in Werner's case the invalidity of Proc 83 of 1962, on the ground that it was unreasonably applied, was invoked. An appeal by Adams to a Provincial Division was dismissed. In the case of Adams, who was an

1981 (1) SA p189

Indian, the evidence had shown that, due to the acute shortage of houses in Indian group areas in Johannesburg, he and his family had moved in to a flat in a White area. Werner was a Coloured man and he too had moved into a flat in a White area. He had voluntarily come from Cape Town to Johannesburg to work where there was a serious shortage of dwellings in the Coloured areas. In Adams' case the Court a quo had found that in the case of a statutory offence there was an onus on the accused who invoked the state of necessity to prove on the balance of probabilities that the alleged necessity existed. In a further appeal,

Held, that there was no onus on Adams to prove that a state of necessity existed.

Held, however, that there was no evidence of an absolute shortage of houses. Accordingly the state of necessity could not be invoked.

Held, further, in Werner's appeal, that the prejudice was less unreasonable than the "substantial inequality" mentioned in Minister of the Interior v Lockhat and Others 1961 (2) SA 587 (A) and which had been envisaged by the Legislature: accordingly it could not be said that the application of Proc 83 of 1962 was invalid.

Held, further, that the decision in Minister of the Interior v Lockhat and Others (supra) was not incorrect.

Held, further, that the defence of a state of necessity could not succeed for the reasons given in Adams' case.

The decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division in S v Adams 1979 (4) SA 793 and the decision in the Witwatersrand Local Division in S v Werner 1980 (2) SA 313 confirmed.

Case Information

Appèlle teen beslissings in die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling (MYBURGH R en KING R) en in die Witwatersrandse Plaaslike Afdeling (LE ROUX R). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van RUMPFF HR.

J Browde SC (bygestaan deur C R Mailer en M Basslian) namens die appellant Adams: For an act to be justified on the grounds of necessity (a) a legal interest of the accused must have been endangered; (b) by a threat which had commenced or was imminent, but (c) which was not caused by the accused's fault, and (d) in addition it must have been E

1981 (1) SA p190

necessary for the accused to avert the danger, and (e) the means used for A this purpose must have been reasonable in the circumstances. Burchell & Hunt South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol 1 at 283 et seq cited in S v Alfeus 1979 (3) SA at 152H. As to (a): What precisely are the limits of the legal interest is not clearly defined. See, eg, Burchell & Hunt (op cit at 285 under the paragraph "A legal interest endangered"; De Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg 3rd ed at 88; R v Mahomed and Another 1938 AD at 34 - B 36. In essence the legal interest need only be a legitimate interest which the ordinary man in our society has to protect, eg, the life or good health of himself and the persons to whom he stands in a protective relationship. See S v Pretorius 1975 (2) SA 85; R v Bourne (1939) 1 KB at 692, and particularly the passage from Puffe...