S v Abrahams

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1979 (1) SA 203 (A)

S v Abrahams
1979 (1) SA 203 (A)

1979 (1) SA p203

Citation	1979 (1) SA 203 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Rumpff HR, Muller AR en Hoexter Wn AR
Heard	August 25, 1978
Judgment	September 14, 1978

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde A

Strafproses — Getuienis — Skuldigbevinding op getuienis van 'n enkele Staatsgetuie — Getuienis van beskuldigde nie deeglik oorweeg of ontleed nie — Daardeur is 'n mistasting begaan — Skuldigbevvinding in hoër beroep ter syde gestel.

Headnote : Kopnota

Die appellant is deur 'n landdros aan openbare geweld skuldig bevind. Sy skuldigbevinding is op die getuienis van 'n enkele Staatsgetuie, B, 'n jong konstabel, gesteun. 'n Appèl teen die skuldig bevinding is van die hand afgewys. In verder hoër beroep, met verlof van die Hof a quo, het die Hof die getuienis van B en appellant ontleed en tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat daar geen rede was om te aanvaar dat die getuienis van die appellant in enige opsig minder oortuigingskrag as dié van B gedra het nie en dat die landdros nie die twispunt deeglik onder oë geneem het nie.

Beslis, aangesien die landdros nie die getuienis in geheel deeglik oorweeg het nie, en hy die getuienis van die enkel getuie B ietwat onkrities genader het en dat hy op 'n onbehoorlike sirkelargument gesteun het om die appellant se weergawe in 'n bedenklike lig te stel, dat hy 'n mistasting begaan het en gevolglik moes die appèl gehandhaaf word.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Criminal procedure — Evidence — Conviction on the evidence of a single Statg vitness — Evidence of accused not thoroughly considered or analysed — Irregularity committed thereby — Conviction set aside on appeal.

Headnote : Kopnota

The appellant had been convicted by a magistrate of public violence. His conviction was based on the evidence of a single State witness. B, a young constable. An appeal against the conviction was dismissed. In a further appeal, with leave of the Court a quo, the Court analysed the evidence of B and appellant and came to the conclusion that there was no good reason for accepting that the evidence of the appellant carried in any respect less conviction than that of B and that the magistrate had not thoroughly faced the point in dispute.

Held, as the magistrate had not considered all the evidence thoroughly, and had approached the witness B in a somewhat uncritical manner and theat he had relied on an improper circuitious reasoning to put the account by the appellant in a critical light, that he had committed an irregularity and accordingly the appeal had to be allowed.

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die Kaapse Provinsiale Afdeling (DE KOCK R en E BURGER R) wat 'n appèl teen 'n skuldigbevinding in 'n landdroshof afgewys het. Feite wat nie van belang is nie is van die uitspraak van HOEXTER WN AR weggelaat.

W H van Staden namens die appellant: Die landdros het fouteer deur te bevind dat die beskuldigde, selfs al word dit aanvaar dat hy 'n klip F gegooi het, die misdaad van openbare gewelde gep, leeg het. Daar is geen aanvaarbare getuienis dat op die relevante stadium daar ander persone was wat hulle aan die genoemde misdaad skuldig gemaak het, en met wie die beskuldigde saamgespan het nie. Die blote feit dat die beskuldigde 'n klip gegooi het terwyl hy deel van 'n groep mense uitmaak wat hard

1979 (1) SA p204

gepraat en skreeu is nie genoeg nie. Sien R v Kashion 1963 (1) SA 723.

S Baker namens die Staat: Accepting that the accused threw a stone (which would entail a acceptance of Const Boards' evidence) the magistrate correctly convicted the accused of the crime of public violence (vide definition of "public violence" in Burchell and Hunt SA Criminal Law and Procedure at 74 - 75 at seq). "Actual violence or an actual invasion of rights needs not have taken place. It is sufficient if acts took place B which had as their object the unlawful disturbance of peace and security." See R v Segopotsi 1960 (2) SA at 433. The requirements that the group must "act in concert" means no more than that a common purpose must exist between the group. The concerted action need not be premeditated; it may evolve spontaneously, even tacityly, among a number of people who have C gathered together. See Burchell and Hunt vol II at 79. The requirement relating to breach of public peace has been defined a a "violation of that quiet and security which is guaranteed by the laws for the personal subjects of this Kingdom". See R v Haddad 1944 SWA 8. The present case is distinguishable from R v Kashion 1963 (1) SA at 723. This evidence should be viewed as a whole. While it is true that there is always need for D special caution in the case of a single witness, the exercise of caution should not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense. See R v J 1966 (1) SA at 90; S v...