S v Sheehama

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1991 (2) SA 860 (A)

S v Sheehama
1991 (2) SA 860 (A)

1991 (2) SA p860

Citation	1991 (2) SA 860 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Hoexter AR, E M Grosskopf AR, M T Steyn AR, F H Grosskopf AR, Goldstone AR
Heard	August 16, 1990; February 15, 1991
Judgment	March 28, 1991

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Strafproses — Getuienis — Toelaatbaarheid — B Van aanwysing — Aanwysing wat onder dwang en onvrywillig gemaak word nie toelaatbaar as C getuienis nie — Inherent onwaarskynlik dat Wetgewer in art 218(2) van Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 getuienis van gedwonge aanwysing wou magtig.

Strafproses — Getuienis — Toelaatbaarheid — Van aanwysing — Aanwysing kan in gepaste gevalle 'n buitegeregtelike erkenning uitmaak — As sodanig vereis gemene reg, soos bevestig deur bepalings van art D 219A van Strafproseswet 51 van 1977, dat dit ongedwonge en vrywillig geskied.

Headnote : Kopnota

'n Aanwysing is in wese 'n mededeling deur gedrag en as sodanig 'n verklaring van die persoon wat iets aanwys. Indien dit 'n relevante aanwysing sonder enige meegaande verontskuldigende verduideliking deur die beskuldigde is, kom dit neer op 'n verklaring deur die beskuldigde E dat hy kennis van relevante feite dra wat prima facie tot sy nadeel strek en dit kan dus in 'n gepaste geval 'n buitegeregtelike erkenning wees. As sodanig moet dit in die lig van die gemene reg, soos bevestig deur die bepalings van art 219A van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977, ongedwonge en vrywillig geskied. Ook is dit 'n kernbeginsel van ons reg dat 'n beskuldigde nie gedwing kan word om selfbeswarende verklarings teen sy wil te maak nie, en dit is dus inherent onwaarskynlik dat die Wetgewer, met die oog op gesonde regsbeleid, ooit die bedoeling kon F gehad het om getuienis van gedwonge aanwysings ingevolge art 218(2) van Wet 51 van 1977 te magtig.

Die beslissings in die sake van S v Tsotsobe and Others 1983 (1) SA 856 (A) en S v Shezi 1985 (3) SA 900 (A) tot die effek dat 'n relevante aanwysing nie op 'n buitegeregtelike aanwysing neerkom nie, is duidelik verkeerd.

Die beslissing in die saak van S v Ismail and Others (1) 1965 (1) SA 446 (N), wat nagevolg is in die sake van S v Bvuure (1) 1974 (1) SA 206 (R), G S v Nyembe 1982 (1) SA 835 (A), en in die Tsotsobe - en Shezi -beslissings supra, dat die getuienis van 'n gedwonge aanwysing regtens toelaatbaar is, is duidelik verkeerd. Die presedente daardeur geskep behoort ook om 'n ander rede nie in stand gehou te word nie, nl die prinsipiële beswaar wat daar bestaan teen die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis van gedwonge aanwysings.

Dit was nooit die bedoeling van die Wetgewer in art 218(2) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 om getuienis van aanwysings wat andersins H ontoelaatbaar is, toelaatbaar te maak sodra sodanige aanwysings deel uitmaak van 'n ontoelaatbare bekentenis of verklaring nie. Die artikel, op die korrekte uitleg daarvan, bepaal dat getuienis van 'n aanwysing wat andersins toelaatbaar is, nie ontoelaatbaar sal wees bloot omdat dit deel uitmaak van 'n ontoelaatbare bekentenis of verklaring nie. Anders gestel: wanneer getuienis van 'n aanwysing andersins ontoelaatbaar is, sal dit nie toelaatbaar wees bloot omdat dit deel uitmaak van 'n ontoelaatbare bekentenis of verklaring nie.

I Met toepassing van die bostaande beginsels, het die Hof in die onderhawige saak bevind dat getuienis van aanwysings wat die appellant aan 'n polisieoffisier gemaak het en wat verband gehou het met die vyf moordklagtes waaraan appellant in die Hof a quo skuldig bevind is, ontoelaatbaar is en wel omdat die aanwysings as sodanig nie vrywillig en ongedwonge gedoen is nie. Die aanwysing is naamlik voorafgegaan deur aanrandings op en dreigemente aan die appellant asook deur 'n waarskuwing deur die polisieoffisier wat egter so verdraai was deur die J tolk dat die appellant

1991 (2) SA p861

A onder die foutiewe indruk gebring is dat hy verplig was om aanwysings te maak soos dit van hom verlang sou word. Die Hof het gevolglik die appèl teen die vyf moordklagtes gehandhaaf.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Criminal procedure — Evidence — Admissibility — Of pointing out — Pointing out not freely and voluntarily made not admissible in evidence B — Inherently improbable that Legislature in s 218(2) of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 intended to authorise evidence of pointing out made as a result of coercion.

Criminal procedure — Evidence — Admissibility — Of pointing out — Pointing out can in appropriate case constitute an extra-judicial admission — As such, common law, as confirmed by provisions of s 219A of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, requiring that it be made freely C and voluntarily.

Headnote : Kopnota

A pointing out is essentially a communication by conduct and, as such, is a statement by the person pointing out. If it is a relevant pointing out unaccompanied by any exculpatory explanation by the accused, it amounts to a statement by the accused that he has knowledge of relevant facts which prima facie operates to his disadvantage and it can thus in an appropriate case constitute an extra-judicial admission. As such, the D common law, as confirmed by the provisions of s 219A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, requires that it be made freely and voluntarily. It is also a basic principle of our law that an accused cannot be forced to make self-incriminating statements against his will, and it is therefore inherently improbable that the Legislature, with a view to sound legal policy, could ever have had the intention in s 218(2) of Act 51 of 1977 to authorise evidence of forced pointings out.

The decisions in the cases of S v Tsotsobe and Others 1983 (1) SA 856 (A) E and S v Shezi 1985 (3) SA 900 (A) to the effect that a relevant pointing out does not amount to an extra-judicial admission are clearly wrong.

The decision in the case of S v Ismail and Others (1) 1965 (1) SA 446 (N), which was followed in the cases of S v Bvuure (1) 1974 (1) SA 206 (R); S v Nyembe 1982 (1) SA 835 (A), and in the Tsotsobe and Shezi decisions supra, that evidence of a forced pointing out is admissible in F law is clearly wrong. The precedents set by these cases should also for another reason not be maintained, viz the objection in principle which exists against the admissibility of evidence of forced pointings out.

It was never the intention of the Legislature in s 218(2) of Act 51 of 1977 to admit evidence of a pointing out which was otherwise inadmissible as soon as such pointing out formed part of an inadmissible confession or statement. The section, on a correct interpretation thereof, provides that evidence of a pointing out which is otherwise G admissible shall not be inadmissible merely by virtue of the fact that it forms part of an inadmissible confession or statement. Put differently: when evidence of a pointing out is otherwise inadmissible, it will not be admissible simply because it forms part of an inadmissible confession or statement.

Applying the above principles to the facts of the instant case, the Court held that evidence of pointings out, which the appellant had made to a police officer and which related to five charges of murder on H which, inter alia, the appellant had been convicted in the Court a quo, was inadmissible as they had not been made freely and voluntarily. The Court found that the pointings out had been preceded by assaults and threats directed at the appellant and by a routine warning issued by the police officer which had however been so inaccurately relayed by the interpreter that the appellant was brought under the impression that he was compelled to make such pointings out as should be required of him. The Court accordingly upheld the appeal against the five charges of I murder.

Case Information

Appèl teen skuldigbevindings en vonnisse in die Kaapse Provinsiale Afdeling (Tebbutt R). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van F H Grosskopf J AR.

1991 (2) SA p862

A D Kuny SC namens die appellant het na die volgende gesag verwys: S v Nyembe 1982 (1) SA 835 (A) op 840H; S v Masilela 1987 (4) SA 1 (A); S v Magwaza 1985 (3) SA 29 (A); S v Gwevu and Another 1961 (4) SA 536 (OK) op 537E - G; S v Shabalala 1986 (4) SA 734 (A) op 748 - 9; R v Blom 1939 AD 188; S v Christie 1982 (1) SA 464 (A) op 479; R v Ndoyana and Another B 1958 (2) SA 562 (OK); R v Nhleko 1960 (4) SA 712 (A) op 720; R v Gumede and Another 1942 AD 398 op 433; S v Chenisso 1983 (4) SA 912 (T); S v Abrahams 1979 (1) SA 203 (A) op 207D - 208; R v Hlongwane 1959 (3) SA 337 (A) op 341A; S v Singh 1975 (1) SA 227 (N); S v Guess 1976 (4) SA 715 (A) op 718A - 719A; Director of Public Prosecution v Hester [1972] 3 All ER 1056 at 1065 - 6; Director of Public Prosecution v Kilbourne [1973] 1 C All ER 440 op 452e - j ; Cross on Evidence 5de uitg op 206 - 8.

C Cilliers namens die Staat het na die volgende gesag verwys: S v Masilela en 'n Ander 1987 (4) SA 1 (A); S v Gwevu and Another 1961 (4) SA 536 (OK); R v Tebetha 1959 (2) SA 337 (A); R v Joseph 1964 (4) SA 768 (A); S v Theron 1968 (4) SA 61 (T); R v Nleko 1960 (4) SA 712 (A); S v Maarman 1976 (3) SA 510 (A). D

Cur adv vult.

Postea (Maart 28).

Judgment

F H Grosskopf AR:

E Die appellant het in Walvisbaai voor Tebbutt R en twee assessore tereggestaan op agt aanklagte wat verband gehou het met drie verskillende bomontploffings op Walvisbaai. Die eerste van hierdie bomontploffings het ongeveer 10:40 op Saterdag 2 Augustus 1986 by 'n slaghuis bekend as die Atlantic Meat Market plaasgevind. Dit het tot gevolg gehad dat vyf persone dood is, verskeie mense ernstig beseer is, F en die slaghuis erg beskadig is. Die Hof a quo het bevind dat die appellant die bom in die slaghuis geplaas het en dat hy gevolglik verantwoordelik was vir die dood van die vyf slagoffers. Dit het gelei tot die appellant se skuldigbevinding aan moord op vyf moordklagtes (klagtes 1 tot 5) waarop hy in hierdie verband tereggestaan...