Neethling v Klopper en Andere

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1967 (4) SA 459 (A)

Neethling v Klopper en Andere
1967 (4) SA 459 (A)

1967 (4) SA p459

Citation	1967 (4) SA 459 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Steyn HR, Van Blerk AR, Botha AR, Holmes AR en Potgieter AR
Heard	August 28, 1967
Judgment	September 11, 1967

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Verkoop — Van grond — Opsegging van 'n koopkontrak — Herinstelling deur afstanddoening van regte wat uit opsegging ontstaan — Voorskrifte van art. 1 (1) van Wet 68 van 1957 nie toepaslik nie.

Headnote : Kopnota

'n Herinstelling van 'n opgesegde koopkontrak ten opsigte van grond deur afstanddoening van die regte wat uit die opsegging van die kontrak ontstaan, hoef nie aan die voorskrifte van artikel 1 (1) van Wet 68 van 1957 te voldoen nie.

Die beslissing in die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling in Klopper en Andere v Neethling, bevestig.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Sale — Of land — Termination of contract of sale — Revival due to the waiver of the rights flowing from the termination — Requirements of sec. 1 (1) of Act 68 of 1957 not applicable.

Headnote : Kopnota

The revival of a contract of sale of land which contract has been terminated, by waiver of the rights which arise from the termination of the contract, does not have to comply with the requirements of section 1 (1) of Act 68 of 1957.

The decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division in Klopper en Andere v Neethling, confirmed. C

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling (HIEMSTRA, R.). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van STEYN, H.R.

A. W. Mostert, namens die appellant: The effect of the agreement contained in the correspondence was the creation of a new and materially different sale, but which lacked enforceability by virtue of the non-compliance with the requirements of the statute. See Abram Steamship D Co v Westville Shipping Co., 1923 A.C. at p. 781, cited with approval in Jaffe v Falante, 1959 (4) SA at p. 363. A revival of the deed of sale entails the creation of mutual rights and obligations of purchaser and seller to pass transfer and pay the purchase price. Such rights and obligations become enforceable only on compliance with sec. 1 of Act 68 E of 1957. Since the statute was not complied with in the correspondence of 6th January, 1966, and the telegram of 7th February, 1966, no enforceable right or obligation could be created by it. It is the effect of the transaction which must be looked at. See Brink v Stadler, 1963 (2) SA 427 at pp. 429H - 430. When sec. 1 of Act 68 of 1957 speaks of F a 'contract of sale', it means the contract in its entirety. The legal acts on which the respondents rely are: (i) the deed of sale of 23rd June, 1962; (ii) the letter of 6th January, 1966; (iii) the letter and telegram of 7th February, 1966. The three acts collectively constitute the 'contract' which the respondents are seeking to enforce. Since acts (ii) or (iii) do not comply with the statute, it cannot be said that the G contract, in its entirety, complies with the section and is, therefore, enforceable. The Judge a quo has confused the appellant's rights after cancellation, with those existing before cancellation. The correct position is to be found in the dicta of INNES, C.J., in Schuurman v Davey, 1908 T.S. 664 at p. 671. The seller is bound by his decision and cannot recall it, nor can he waive it. When a cancellation

1967 (4) SA p460

takes place a new state of affairs supervenes which, as distinct from the right of cancellation, cannot be waived. No acceptance of the seller's cancellation is required in order for the cancellation to take effect. See Schuurman v Davey, supra; Abram Steamship Co v Westville Shipping Co., supra. Tillett v Willcox, 1941 AD 100, is A distinguishable. It is the requirement (statutory compliance) which is the complicating and the distinguishing factor in the present case. Assuming, however, that revival or reinstatement can take place without compliance with sec. 1 of Act 68 of 1957, the respondents face the further difficulty that the acts of 6th January, 1966, and 7th February, 1966, go further than simply providing for a reinstatement of the B agreement. In their letter of 6th January, 1966, the respondents' attorneys tendered immediate payment of the balance of the purhcase price against transfer. This represents a material variation from the provisions of the deed of sale and the offer was designed to induce the appellant to reinstate the cancelled agreement. The agreement to C reinstate and the agreement to make immediate payment are not severable. The existence of the former would not have taken place in the absence of the latter. A variation in the method of payment of the purchase price is one which requires compliance with sec. 1 of the Act. Van der Berg v van Leggelo, 1935 T.P.D. 304 at pp. 305 - 6; du Plessis v van Deventer, 1960 (2) SA 344 at p. 551. The appellant, in the D light of these decisions, would not have had the enforceable right after 7th February, 1966, to enforce the provisions of the later agreement and exact immediate payment. Since the two stipulations - reinstatement and immediate payment - are indivisible and unseverable the unenforceability of the one renders the other equally unenforceable. E See Wessels, Law of Contract in South Africa, 2nd ed., paras. 609, 610. The acts of 6th January, 1966, and 7th February, 1966, constitute a new, or at least different, sale. It incorporates many of the provisions of the old sale, but is materially different from it in the manner in which payment is to be effected.

A. S. Botha, namens die respondente: Vir die doeleindes van die hoof-argument namens die respondente, soos hieronder, word dit veronderstel dat die appellant se kansellasie van die koopkontrak tussen die partye, toe dit plaasgevind het, regmatig en regsgeldig was. Dit gebeur alledaags dat verbintenisse uit 'n kontrak herlewe ná kansellasie G van die kontrak, sonder dat 'n nuwe kontrak met dieselfde inhoud aangegaan word, waar die party wat alreeds gekanselleer het, daarna optree op 'n wyse wat onversoenbaar is met 'n bedoeling anders as om die voortbestaan van die kontrak te erken. Sien United Bioscope Cafés Ltd v Moseley Buildings Limited, 1924 AD 60 op bl. 67 - 8; Witten v. H Singh, 1932 CPD 142 op bl. 414; Tillett v Willcox, 1941 AD 100 op bl. 108, 109; Central Investments Co. (Pty.) Ltd v Shaikjie TPD 428 op bl. 432; van Schalkwyk v Griessel, 1948 (1) SA 460 op bl. 473; Williston, vol V, para. 4283, noot 12. Die reël dat 'n party, wat gekanselleer het, nie daarna van rigting kan verander nie, soos, bv. in Schuurman v Davey, 1908 T.S. 664 op bl. 671, beteken slegs dat hy nie effektiewelik eensydig van front kan verander, sonder die instemming van sy teenparty nie. Waar laasgenoemde wel instem, verloor eersgenoemde sy reg om uitvoering te gee aan die gevolge van F

1967 (4) SA p461

die kansellasie. Sien United Bioscope Café Ltd v Moseley Buildings Ltd., supra. Die appellant se submissie waarvoor geen gesag aangehaal word nie is derhalwe in stryd met die gesag hierbo genoem. Daar bestaan 'n vermoede, wat nie in hierdie geval weerlê is nie, dat die uitgestelde datums vir vereffening van die koopprys, soos in die koopkontrak bepaal, A vasgestel is vir die voordeel van die respondente, en gevolglik was hulle geregtig om te eniger tyd die betaling van die volle balans van die koopprys aan te bied, en terselfdertyd transport te eis. Sien McCabe v Burisch, 1930 T.P.D. 261 op bl. 265 - 6; Bernitz v Euvrard, 1943 AD 595 op bl. 602. Die brief van die respondente se prokureurs van 6 B Januarie 1966 was derhalwe 'n geldige aanbod van prestasie ingevolge die koopkontrak en het geensins 'n wysiging van daardie kontrak behels nie. Dit het slegs verband gehou met die uitvoering van die kontrak. Selfs al word aangeneem dat 'n wysiging van die koopkontrak moes voldoen aan die vereistes van art. 1 (1) van Wet 68 van 1957 is die appellant se submissie, in die omstandighede van hierdie geval, C ongegrond. Sien de Wet & Yeats, 3de uitg., bl. 222. Die respondente se beroep op estoppel is geldig en toelaatbaar, selfs al sou veronderstel word dat art. 1 (1) van die Wet van toepassing is op die gemelde briefwisseling van die prokureurs. Die feit dat die appellant verhinder word om 'n regmatige kansellasie van die koopkontrak te bewys D het nie tot gevolg dat op indirekte wyse effek gegee word aan 'n kontrak wat volgens die statuut van geen krag is nie, maar belet slegs bewys van die verval van die oorspronklike koopkontrak deur kansellasie. Daar word dus nie inbreuk gemaak nie op die beginsels genoem in Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen...