Brisley v Drotsky

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA)

Brisley v Drotsky
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA)

2002 (4) SA p1

Citation	2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA)
Case No	Saaknr 432/2000
Court	Hoogste Hof van Appèl
Judge	Harms AR, Olivier AR, Streicher AR, Cameron AR en Brand AR
Heard	March 7, 2002
Judgment	March 28, 2002
Counsel	B H Pieters (bygestaan deur W A Smit) namens die appellante.; D B du Preez namens die respondent.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde B

Kontrak — Skriftelike kontrak — Beding dat alle wysigings van kontrak aan bepaalde formaliteite moet voldoen — Bevestig dat sodanige klousule bindend is — Mislukking van beroep op beginsels van bona fides ter ondersteuning van betoog dat so 'n klousule nie afgedwing behoort te word nie. C

Verhuurder en huurder — Uitsetting — Artikel 26(3) van Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 van toepassing op eis vir uitsetting — Relevante omstandighede wat in ag geneem moet word soos bedoel in art 26(3) — Moet regtens relevante omstandighede wees — Aangesien art 26(3) geen diskresie aan hof verleen om onder sekere omstandighede te weier om uitsettingsbevel toe te staan aan eienaar wat andersins op so 'n bevel geregtig sou wees nie, is D persoonlike omstandighede van huurder en beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe akkommodasie nie relevante omstandighede nie.

Headnote : Kopnota

Per Harms AR, Streicher AR en Brand AR, Cameron AR samestemmend: Die beginsel in SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy E Bpk v Shifren en Andere1964 (4) SA 760 (A) neergelê dat 'n beding ('n verskansingsklousule) in 'n skriftelike kontrak wat bepaal dat alle wysigings van die kontrak aan bepaalde formaliteite moet voldoen, binded is, is nog steeds van krag. (Paragrawe [6] - [10] gelees met paragraaf [1] op 10H - 12F en 9D/E - E/F.) Verder kan 'n beroep op die beginsels van bona fides, naamlik dat die F verskansingsklousule nie afgedwing behoort te word omdat dit in die omstandighede onredelik, onbillik en in stryd met die beginsels van bona fides is, ook nie slaag nie. (Paragrawe [11] - [34] op 12G - 19B/C.)

Daar is geen rede waarom art 26(3) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 (wat bepaal dat '(n)o one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made G

2002 (4) SA p2

after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions') nie toegepas kan word A (of toegepas behoort te word) op alle natuurlike en regspersone nie. Artikel 26(3) het horisontale werking. Die gevolg is dat in verrigtinge waar 'n verhuurder die uitsetting van 'n huurder eis, art 26(3) van die Grondwet vereis dat die hof, alvorens 'n uitsettingsbevel gemaak word, oorweging moet skenk aan alle relevante omstandighede. (Paragrawe [40] en [41] op 20E - H.) B

Die persoonlike omstandighede van die huurder en die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe akkommodasie is nie sonder meer relevante omstandighede ('relevant circumstances') soos bedoel in art 26(3) van die Grondwet nie. Artikel 26(3) vereis dat alle relevante omstandighede in ag geneem moet word maar bepaal nie self dat enige omstandighede relevant sal wees nie. Daarvoor moet na die algemeen geldende reg gekyk word. Omstandighede kan slegs relevant wees indien C hulle regtens relevant is. Indien die artikel aan 'n hof 'n diskresie verleen het om 'n uitsettingsbevel te weier onder sekere omstandighede, soos byvoorbeeld indien die hof dit reg en billik sou ag, sou alle omstandighede wat relevant is met betrekking tot die vraag of dit in 'n bepaalde geval reg en billik sou wees natuurlik relevant wees by die uitoefening van daardie diskresie. Die artikel verleen egter geen diskresie aan die hof om onder sekere omstandighede te weier D om 'n uitsettingsbevel toe te staan aan 'n eienaar wat andersins op so 'n uitsettingsbevel geregtig sou gewees het nie. Regtens is 'n eienaar geregtig op besit van sy eiendom en op 'n uitsettingsbevel teen 'n persoon wat sy eiendom onregmatiglik okkupeer behalwe indien daardie reg beperk word deur die Grondwet, 'n ander Wet, 'n kontrak of op een of ander ander regsbasis. Waar die verhuurder die eienaar van die verhuurde eiendom is en die huurkontrak gekanselleer het, het die E huurder geen kontraktuele reg om die eiendom te okkupeer nie. In die afwesigheid van enige statutêre reg om die eiendom te okkupeer, het die hof geen diskresie om 'n uitsettingsbevel te weier nie. Derhalwe is die persoonlike omstandighede van die huurder en die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe akkommodasie nie relevante omstandighede wat ingevolge F art 26(3) in ag geneem moet word nie. As eienaar is die verhuurder geregtig op besit. As die verhuurder nie 'n reg op besit het nie en die hof nie 'n diskresie het om, desnieteenstaande, 'n uitsettingsbevel te weier nie is die enigste relevante omstandighede wat 'n hof in ag mag neem die feit dat die eiser die eienaar is en die feit dat die verweerder in besit is. (Paragrawe [41], [42], [43] en [45] op 20H - 21D/E en 22B/C - E.) G

Ross v South Peninsula Municipality2000 (1) SA 589 (K) omvergewerp.

Die beslissing in die Transvaalse Provinsiale Afdeling in Drotsky v Brisley bevestig. H

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Contract — Written contract — Non-variation clause — Term that all amendments to contract to comply with specified formalities — Confirmed that such term binding — Failure of invocation of principles of bona fides in support of contention that such clause ought not to be enforced.

Landlord and tenant — Ejectment — Section 26(3) of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 applicable to claim for I ejectment — Relevant circumstances to be considered in terms of s 26(3) — Must be legally relevant circumstances — As s 26(3) does not confer discretion on court to refuse to grant ejectment order in certain circumstances where owner otherwise entitled to such order, personal circumstances of tenant and availability of alternative accommodation not relevant circumstances. J

2002 (4) SA p3

Headnote : Kopnota

Per Harms JA, Streicher JA and Brand JA, Cameron JA concurring: The principle laid down in SA Sentrale Ko-op A Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere1964 (4) SA 760 (A) that a term (an entrenchment clause) in a written contract providing that all amendments to the contract have to comply with specified formalities is binding still remains in force. (Paragraphs [6] - [10] read with para [1] at 10H - 12F and 9D/E - E/F.) Furthermore, the principles of bona fides, namely that the entrenchment clause ought not to be enforced because it would in the circumstances be unreasonable, B unfair and in conflict with the principles of bona fides, cannot be successfully invoked. (Paragraphs [11] - [34] at 12G - 19B/C.)

There is no reason why s 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (which provides that '(n)o one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant C circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions') cannot be applied (or should not be applied) to all natural and juristic persons. Section 26(3) has horizontal application. The result is that in proceedings where a lessor claims the ejectment of a lessee, s 26(3) of the Constitution requires the court, before making an ejectment order, to consider all the relevant circumstances. (Paragraphs [40] and [41] at 20E - H.) D

The personal circumstances of the lessee and the availability of alternative accommodation are not without more relevant circumstances as intended in s 26(3) of the Constitution. Section 26(3) requires that all relevant circumstances should be considered but does not itself provide that any circumstances will be relevant. For that the generally applicable law should be looked to. Circumstances can be relevant only if they are legally relevant. If the section E had conferred a discretion on a court to refuse an ejectment order in certain circumstances, for example if the court considered it just and fair to do so, all circumstances that would be relevant to the question whether it would be just and fair in a particular case would naturally be relevant to the exercise of that discretion. The section does not, however, confer any discretion on the court to refuse to grant an ejectment order to an owner in certain circumstances where the owner F would otherwise be entitled to such an ejectment order. An owner is in law entitled to possession of his property and to an ejectment order against a person who unlawfully occupies his property except if that right is limited by the Constitution, another statute, a contract or on some or other legal basis. Where the lessor is the owner of the leased property and has cancelled the lease, the lessee has no contractual G right to occupy the property. In the absence of any statutory right to occupy the property, the court has no discretion to refuse to grant an ejectment order. Accordingly the personal circumstances of the lessee and the availability of alternative accommodation are not relevant circumstances which have to be considered in terms of s 26(3). As owner the lessor is entitled to possession. If the lessor does not have H a right to possession and the court, notwithstanding this, does not have a discretion to refuse an ejectment order, the only relevant circumstances that a court may consider are the facts that the plaintiff is the owner and the defendant is in possession. (Paragraphs [41], [42], [43] and [45] at 20H - 21D/E and 22B/C - E.)

Ross v South Peninsula Municipality2000 (1) SA 589 (C) overruled. I

The decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division in Drotsky v Brisley confirmed.

Cases Considered

Annotations

Gerapporteerde sake/Reported cases

Academy of Learning (Pty) Ltd v Hancock and Others2001 (1) SA 941 (K): na verwys/referred to J

2002 (4) SA...