Cous v Henn

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: van Rhyn R
• Judgment Date: 05 December 1968
• Citation: 1969 (1) SA 569 (GW)
• Hearing Date: 24 October 1968
• Court: Griqualand-West Local Division

Van Rhyn, R.:

E In hierdie saak is vonnis by verstek teen verweerder aangevra in 'n saak waarin die eiser uitsetting teen die verweerder geëis het asmede sekere verdere verligting wat spruit uit beweerde verbreking van 'n skriftelike ooreenkoms.

Die uitsettingsbevel en sommige ander bevele is deur my toegestaan. Ek het egter uitspraak voorbehou ten aansien van smeekbedes wat te doen het F met wat bestempel kan word as 'n 'strafbeding' óf wat daarmee in verband staan.

Onder meer eis die eiser by verstek:

'Betaling van die bedrag van R2,000 in terme van klousule 19 van die ooreenkoms.'

Die tersake gedeelte van klousule 19 van die ooreenkoms lees soos volg:

G '. . . Ingeval die verkoper sy reg om die kontrak te kanselleer uitoefen, sal alle betalings wat reeds ten opsigte van hierdie kontrak gemaak was, deur die koper aan die verkoper verbeur word en sal deur die verkoper gehou word as gelikwideerde skadevergoeding en vir huurgeld ten aansien van die koper se

Van Rhyn R

okkupasie van die eiendom. Indien sodanige kansellasie geskied voor of op 30 Junie 1969, sal die koper bo en behalwe die gemelde verbeurdings ook 'n bedrag van tweeduisend rand (R2,000) aan die verkoper betaal as roukoop.'

A Die skuldoorsaak waarop die eiser sy eise gegrond het, is beweerde kontrakbreuk en daaropvolgende kansellasie van 'n skriftelike 'huurkoopooreenkoms', ingevolge waarvan verweerder van eiser erwe teen 'n totale koopprys van R20,000 gekoop het.

Wet 15 van 1962 het die gemeenreg gewysig en die regsposisie ten opsigte van afdwingbaarheid al dan nie van 'gelikwideerde skade' en B 'strafbedinge' op 'n nuwe voetstuk geplaas. Hiervoor laat CANEY, WN - R.P., hom soos volg uit (op bl. 390 in die saak Western Credit Bank Ltd v Kajee, 1967 (4) SA 386 (N)):

'In relation to contracts made after the Act came into operation, but excluding contracts to which the provisions of the Hire-Purchase Act, 36 of 1942, apply (see sec. 5), the effect of this is to displace in its entirety the law as it formerly was in relation to penalties and C liquidated damages for breach of contractual obligations; the prohibitions against and limitations upon recovery under contractual provisions found to be stipulations for penalties or for liquidated damages (and the necessity of construing such provisions for the purpose of discovering whether they fall into one or other of these categories) no longer exists. The law as it was has been replaced by the provisions of the statute, with the consequence that, subject to the provisions of the Act, any stipulation for a penalty or for liquidated damages flowing from breach of a contractual obligation may be enforced in any competent D court, whether the claim be for money or for delivery or performance of anything.

Sec. 4 brings within the law, as enacted in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 1 and the other provisions of the Act, a stipulation for forfeiture by one party to an agreement of the right to restitution of anything performed by him in terms of the agreement when the other party to it withdraws from the agreement; as also a stipulation that, notwithstanding the withdrawal by the one party, the other is to remain liable for E performance of anything under the agreement. This relates particularly to a stipulation for the forfeiture by a buyer of instalments he has paid on account of the price, if the seller is entitled to and does terminate the agreement, as also to undertakings to pay instalments thereafter falling due. The provisions of the Act subject to which enforcement of these stipulations is now competent by virtue of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 1, relevant for present consideration, are those of sec. 3; sec. 2 is not material to the present case. Sec. 3 reads as follows:

'If upon the hearing of a claim for a penalty, it appears to the court F that such penalty is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor by reason of the act or omission in respect of which the penalty was stipulated, the court may reduce the penalty to such an extent as it may consider...