Borgin v De Villiers and Another

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Trollip JA, Corbett JA, Viljoen JA, Van Winsen AJA and Galgut AJA
• Judgment Date: 09 May 1980
• Hearing Date: 21 March 1980
• Court: Appellate Division

Borgin v De Villiers and Another
1980 (3) SA 556 (A)

1980 (3) SA p556

Citation	1980 (3) SA 556 (A)
Court	Appellate Division
Judge	Trollip JA, Corbett JA, Viljoen JA, Van Winsen AJA and Galgut AJA
Heard	March 21, 1980
Judgment	May 9, 1980

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

G Defamation — Defences — Privilege — Professor's conduct at university leading to his enforced resignation — Professor obtaining post overseas H and giving a false account of the affair — Interests of a former colleague and the university thereby placed at risk — Professor at university writing to professor at new university giving his version of the affair which was defamatory — Such professor sued by dismissed professor for defamation — Defence of privileged occasion upheld and accusation of "express malice" found to be of no substance — Principles and test applied by Appeal Court in upholding such decision — Quaere: Whether term "express malice" still an appropriate one when dealing with a plea of lawful publication of defamatory matter.

1980 (3) SA p557

Headnote : Kopnota

Appellant, a Norwegian by birth, had been a professor at Stellenbosch University, second respondent. As the result of certain equipment having disappeared from his department, of which an item was found in the home of the woman with whom appellant had been residing, which he had at first A falsely denied, and as a result of a certain shooting incident, he had been faced with voluntary resignation or facing an enquiry. He had opted for resignation and his notice thereof had been accepted. He had subsequently sought to withdraw it and face the enquiry but this had been refused. Subsequently a Hamburg professor had visited South Africa and been introduced to second respondent in connection with a project of mutual interest. Later this professor had been instrumental in getting B appellant an appointment in his Hamburg university. There the appellant had spread an entirely false account of his treatment at second respondent which tended to show up second respondent in a bad light overseas. Accordingly first respondent, a certain professor at second respondent who had been closely associated with the work of appellant at second respondent, had written a letter to the Hamburg professor concerned in which his version of the occurrences at second respondent had been set out. As a result appellant had sued him for defamation. The respondents C had pleaded that the letter had been published on a privileged occasion but the appellant had alleged that the first respondent had been actuated by "express malice" or animus injuriandi which vitiated this defence. In addition the appellant relied on certain "phrases" "(sinsnedes)" in the letter which he said were not covered by the defence of privilege. The D trial Court had upheld this defence and dismissed the action for damages for defamation with costs. In an appeal,

Held, that the particular category of privilege which applied was that which arose when a statement was published by one person in the discharge of a duty or the protection of a legitimate interest to another person who had a similar duty or interest to receive it.

Held, further, that the test was an objective one. The Court had to judge E the situation by the standard of the ordinary reasonable man, having regard to the relationship of the parties and the surrounding circumstances.

Held, further, that the question was, did the circumstances in the eyes of a reasonable man create a duty or interest which entitled the party sued to speak in the way he did?

Held, further, that in answering this question the Court was guided by the criterion as to whether public policy justified the publication and required it to be found a lawful one.

F Held, further, on the facts, that the interests of the faculty and second respondent had clearly been placed at risk because of appellant's attacks upon them and that the recipient of the letter had clearly had an interest to receive it: accordingly, prima facie, the occasion was privileged and the publication lawful.

Held, further, on an analysis of the "phrases" "(sinsnedes"), that in using them the first respondent could not be said to have exceeded the bounds of reasonableness; nor could it be said that they were not germane to the occasion.

G Held, further, as the evidence did not show that first respondent had deliberately suppressed the full facts or told an untruth, that there was no substance in the allegation of "express malice".

Quaere: Whether the term "express malice" was still an appropriate one to use when dealing with an allegation of lawful publication of defamatory matter.

H Held, accordingly, that the letter had been a privileged communication and, therefore, lawfully published.

The decision in the Cape Provincial Division in Borgin v De Villiers and Another confirmed.

Case Information

Appeal from a decision in the Cape Provincial Division (FAGAN J). The facts appear from the judgment of CORBETT JA.

R S van Riet for the appellant: Die publikasie van lasterlike woorde laat 'n vermoede ontstaan dat die woorde beide opsetlik gepubliseer is en dat die publikasie onregmatig is. SA Uitsaaikorporasie v O'Malley 1977

1980 (3) SA p558

(3) SA te 401 - 2. Publikasie is erken en die lasterlike aard van die woorde is nooit in geskil geplaas nie. Eerste verweerder het dan ook A bevestig dat die brief oa te kenne gee dat eiser skuld erken het aan diefstal. Die vermoede wat so ontstaan plaas 'n volwaardige onus op die verweerders om die afwesigheid van animus iniuriandi te bewys. Naidoo v Vengtas 1965 (1) SA te 20. Verweerders poog om hulself van voormelde onus te kwyt deur oa 'n beroep te doen op 'n gepriviligeerde geleentheid. B Sodanige gepriviligeerde geleentheid sou 'n regverdigheidsgrond daarstel wat onregmatigheid, en nie opset of animus iniuriandi, uitsluit nie. Die toets vir die bestaan van 'n gepriviligeerde geleentheid is derhalwe objektief. Sien De Waal v Ziervogel 1938 AD te 122 - 3; Benson v Robinson & Co (Pty) Ltd and Another 1967 (1) SA te 426E - F, 432E - G; Wentzel v Blanke Motorwerkersvereniging 1967 (3) SA te 98; SA Uitsaaikorporasie v C O'Malley (supra); 'n artikel van R McMillan in die SA Law Journal 1975 (band 92) te 144; P Q R Boberg se artikel in die SA Law Journal 1971 (band 88) te 62; Gatley Libel and Slander 7de uitg paras 513, 516; De Flamingh v Papendorff 1979 (3) SA te 684. Word die beweerde gepriviligeerde geleentheid volgens die objektiewe maatstaf getoets blyk dit duidelik dat D eerste verweerder nie 'n belang gehad het om bew "C" in geheel te publiseer nie, nog het Dr Liese 'n belang gehad om dit so te ontvang. Objektief gesproke was minstens para 2 van die gemelde bew "C" geheel en al oorbodig. Verweerders het in die alternatief gepleit dat eerste verweerder bona fide en redelikerwys geglo het in die bestaan van die privilegie. Die alternatiewe pleit kom daarop neer dat dit beweer word dat E "consciousness of wrongfulness" 'n element van animus iniuriandi is. Indien geldig, sou dit beteken dat 'n geloof in 'n gepriviligeerde geleentheid net so goed sou wees as die privilegie self, en sou dit enige ondersoek na die bestaan van 'n gepriviligeerde geleentheid al dan nie, onnodig maak. Die pleit wil blyk te wees die sogenaamde "new plea" en F gebaseer op sekere uitlatings van RUMPFF HR in 'n reeks Appèlhof uitsprake te wete Jordaan v Biljon 1962 (1) SA 286; Craig v Voortrekkerpers 1963 (1) SA 149; Naidoo v Vengtas (supra); O'Malley se saak supra. Dat die situasie minstens onduidelik is blyk uit die uitspraak van WATERMEYER R in Muller v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1972 (2) SA te 593C - D. Indien G verweerders se alternatiewe pleit as regsgeldig aanvaar word en animus iniuriandi beskou word as die wil om te belaster met die wete van wederregtelikheid, moet dit ook aanvaar word dat sodanige opset dolus eventualis insluit. O'Malley se saak supra te 402H. Ten spyte van RUMPFF HR se obiter dictum te 407D van lg saak dat nalatigheid geen aksie weens laster kon fundeer nie, moet 'n bona fide geloof in 'n gepriviligeerde H geleentheid ook redelik wees ten einde die vermoede van animus iniuriandi te weerlê. Kyk Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 (4) SA te 851; I M Burchell se artikel in SALJ band 95 te 174 - 177; R C Whiting se artikel in SALJ band 95 te 1; 1977 TSAR te 258; Amerasinghe Defamation in the Law of SA and Ceylon te 454 in voetnoot 26; Benson v Robinson (supra). Indien daar bevind word dat sodanige bona fide geloof nie redelik hoef te wees nie, behoort 'n swaar onus op die verklaarder te rus ten einde aan te toon dat sy geloof eerlik was. Indien die vergissing onredelik was, behoort dit te lei tot 'n afleiding dat die verklaarder roekeloos en nie bona fide in sy geloof was nie. (Burchell se artikel

1980 (3) SA p559

supra te 178.) Indien die uitlating van WESSELS AR in Nasionale Pers v Long 1930 AD te 99, 100 nie beskou word as ondersteuning van die vereiste van redelikheid van geloof nie, is dit minstens 'n aanduiding dat, indien A 'n persoon roekeloos optree, dit hom nie sal baat dat hy "did not intend to do wrong" en dat ten einde aanspreeklikheid vry te spring "it must be quite clear that the libel is the result of accident". London Association for Protection of Trade and Another v Greenlangs Ltd (1926) 2 AC 15 is onderskeibaar. Selfs al sou daar aanvaar word dat 'n subjektiewe geloof in B die bestaan van 'n gepriviligeerde geleentheid genoegsaam is om 'n gebrek aan animus iniuriandi te bewys, sou eerste verweerder steeds nie daarin geslaag het om die gedeelte met betrekking tot die "onreëlmatighede" in bew "C" te regverdig nie. Dit sou immers redelikerwys verband moet hou met sodanige privilegie (soos geglo). By oorweging van die beslissing, naamlik C of verweerders daarin geslaag het om te bewys dat eerste verweerder wel sodanige bona fide geloof gehad het, moet die...