Jordaan v Van Biljon

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Hoexter Wn - HR, Ogilvie Thompson AR, Rumpff AR, Holmes AR en Wessels Wn AR
• Judgment Date: 07 November 1961
• Citation: 1962 (1) SA 286 (A)
• Hearing Date: 27 September 1961
• Court: Appellate Division

Jordaan v Van Biljon
1962 (1) SA 286 (A)

1962 (1) SA p286

Citation	1962 (1) SA 286 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Hoexter Wn - HR, Ogilvie Thompson AR, Rumpff AR, Holmes AR en Wessels Wn AR
Heard	September 27, 1961
Judgment	November 7, 1961

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde E

Laster — Versoekskrif deur ouers van skoliere opgestel — Bewering dat onderwyser nie in sy beroep bekwaam is nie — Dat onderwyser nie belangstelling in vordering van skoliere toon nie — Bevoorregte geleentheid — Bewyslas op eiser om animus injuriandi te bewys.

Headnote : Kopnota

Die appellant, 'n onderwyser, het skadevergoeding vir laster van die respondent geëis weens 'n versoekskrif wat hy opgestel het en wat deur andere ouers van skoliere geteken was en wat aan die skoolkommissie gestuur was en waarin bewerings teenoor hom in sy beroep as onderwyser gemaak was deurdat hy nie belangstelling in die vordering van die kinders vir wie hy klas gee getoon het nie en nie in sy beroep bekwaam was nie. Die Verhoorhof het die eis van die hand gewys. In 'n appèl,

Beslis, dat die geleentheid waarop die versoekskrif getoon was 'n bevoorregte geleentheid was en, daar die appellant hom nie van die bewyslas om animus injuriandi te bewys gekwyt het nie, dat die appèl van die hand gewys moet word.

Die beslissing in die Oranje-Vrystaat Afdeling in Jordaan v van Biljon, bevestig.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Defamation — Petition drawn up by parents of pupils — Averment that teacher unsuited for his calling — That the teacher shows no interest in progress of the pupils — Occasion privileged — Onus on plaintiff to prove animus injuriandi.

Headnote : Kopnota

The appellant, a teacher, had claimed damages for defamation from the respondent arising out of a petition which he had drawn up and which had been

1962 (1) SA p287

signed by other parents of scholars and which had been sent to the school committee and in which allegations had been made against him in regard to his calling as a teacher, in that he had displayed no interest in the progress of the pupils he was teaching and was not fit for his calling. The trial Court had dismissed the claim. In an appeal,

Held, that the occasion on which the petition had been shown was a privileged occasion and, as the appellant had failed to discharge the onus of proving animus injuriandi, that the appeal should be dismissed.

The decision in the Orange Free State Provincial Division in Jordaan v van Biljon, confirmed.

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die Oranje-Vrystaat Provinsiale Afdeling (POTGIETER, R.). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van RUMPFF, A.R.

C. E. L. Beck, namens die appellant: The onus of proving that the occasion is privileged and the communication germane thereto, is on the A defendant and the test is an objective one. Would a normal, right-thinking person, armed with the information which motivated the defendant to speak, have thought it his duty or in his interest, to speak to the persons to whom the defendant spoke? See Stuart v Bell, 1891 (2) Q.B. at p. 350; de Waal v Ziervogel, 1938 AD at pp. 122 - 3; Findlay v Knight, 1935 AD at pp. 70 - 3; Kriek v Gunter, 1940 B O.P.D. at p. 142; Meyer v de Jager, 1934 E.D.L. at p. 90; Duvenage v Duvenage, 1936 E.D.L. at pp. 153 - 4; King v Neale, 1936 E.D.L. at pp. 247 - 9; Gray and Others v Young, 1940 E.D.L. at p. 93; Kemsley and Others v Young, 1940 AD at p. 276. This involves, inter alia, consideration of the question whether a reasonable person would, on the C strength and nature of the information which was at the defendant's disposal, have decided to state what the defendant in fact stated; see Holzgen v Woollwright, 1928 T.P.D. at p. 11; Adam v Ward, 1917 A.C. at p. 320; Martin v Strong, (1836) SA & E. at p. 538; Odgers, Libel & Slander, 4th ed., at p. 269 and authorities there cited. Purely on the D information which, according to the respondent, motivated him into publication of the objectionable matter in question, no right-thinking person would have conceived it to be either his duty or a legitimate step in the protection of his interest, to publish to anyone an assertion that appellant's pupils were daily deteriorating in their English and that appellant was not interested in their progress. Assuming, however, that a right-thinking person would have decided to E publish this defamatory matter to someone, no right-thinking person would have decided to give to it the wide form of publication employed. To hold that, on grounds such as those deposed to by respondent, a reasonable person may publish statements defaming a man in the exercise of his profession, and publish them as widely as was the case here, F would open the door to oppressive abuse of the limits of qualified privilege; see Toogood v Spyring, (1834) 1 Cr. M. & R. 181. If respondent discharged his onus of proving a qualified privilege, the onus was on appellant to show 'malice', meaning thereby, not necessarily personal animosity, but some improper motive. Here the test is G subjective; see Mankowitz v Pienaar, 1957 (4) SA at pp. 202 - 3. Although the test is subjective, 'the absence of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the matter stated does not amount to, or necessarily prove, malice, but it provides cogent evidence that there was, in fact, no such belief, which, in turn, will generally lead to the inference of malice and so

1962 (1) SA p288

defeat the privilege'; see Basner v Trigger, 1946 AD at p. 106. This is particularly true when positive assertions of the communicator's belief in the truth of the defamatory matter are published. In the light A of the circumstances deposed to by respondent as having weighed with him, no reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the defamatory matter stated, are to be found. At the least, respondent must be taken to have shown 'a reckless indifference to the truth of the imputation and the harm it might do'; see Naude v Whittle, 1958 (1) SA at pp. 604, 607; Rhodes University College v Field, 1947 (3) SA at p. 467; B De Klerk v Union Government, 1958 (4) SA at p. 505; Clark v Molyneux, 47 L.J.Q.B. 230. And where the publication is unnecessarily extensive (even to the extent of publishing to parents whose children were not yet in appellant's class, and who could thus form no judgment of their own as to his competence and conscientiousness), this may also be taken as evidence of malice.

H. R. Jacobs, namens die respondent: Waar 'n verklaring gemaak word deur 'n persoon in verband met 'n aangeleentheid waarin so 'n persoon 'n regmatige belang het, aan 'n persoon wat 'n ooreenstemmende belang het, die geleentheid bevoorreg is; sien Ehmke v Grunewald, 1921 AD op bl. 581; de Waal v Ziervogel, 1938 AD op bl. 121; Molepo v Achterberg, D 1943 AD op bl. 97. Daar kan geen twyfel bestaan dat respondent as ouer 'n regmatige belang gehad het in die aangeleentheid en dat elke ander ouer 'n ooreenstemmende belang gehad het nie; vgl. Tromp v McDonald, 1920 AD 1; Perl v Shapiro, 1926 AD 121; van Nes v du Toit, 1916 T.P.D. 336; Odel v Friday en Andere, 1915 OPD 50; E Harrison v Bush, 25 L.J.Q.B. 25; R v Rule, 1937 (2) A.E.R. 772; Gatley, Libel and Slander, 4de uitg. bl. 225. Die omvang van die publikasie mag, in gepaste gevalle, gebruik word om kwaadwilligheid te toon, maar, mits die persoon aan wie publikasie geskied, se belang nie te vaag is nie, is dit moeilik om te sien hoe dit privilegie kan F vernietig. In elk geval was publikasie in die onderhawige geval van uiters beperkte omvang. 'n Persoon wat geregtig is om by 'n ander persoon of liggaam te kla in verband met die optrede of gedrag van 'n amptenaar is geregtig om die steun van ander persone met 'n gemeenskaplike belang te nader teneinde hulle steun te verkry in verband met sy besware en dit kan nie as bewys van kwaadwilligheid geneem word G nie; sien Gatley, ibid bl. 228. Afgesien van die feit dat daar geen bewys van kwaadwilligheid was nie, is daar heelwat faktore wat so bewys dien dat daar inderdaad geen kwaadwilligheid was nie. Die feit dat die klagte moontlik op 'n ander wyse aan die skoolkommissie oorgedra kon word, is op sigself nie bewys van kwaadwilligheid nie; sien Clark v. H Molyneux, 3 Q.B. 244; McClean v Terry, 1923 AD op bl. 418. C

Beck, in repliek.

Cur adv vult.

Postea (November 7).

Judgment

Rumpff, A.R.:

Appellant, wat 'n onderwyser aan die Hoërskool van Theunissen was, het respondent aangespreek weens beweerde laster. Die Vrystaatse Hooggeregshof het uitspraak tengunste van respondent

1962 (1) SA p289

Rumpff AR

gegee en teen hierdie uitspraak kom appellant in hoër beroep.

Appellant se klagte teen respondent is dat hy gedurende November 1958 'n versoekskrif opgestel het wat hy aan persone in die dorp en distrik Theunissen getoon het met die doel dat die persone hul met die inhoud daarvan vereenselwig en dit onderteken.

A Die versoekskrif is deur respondent en sewe-en-twintig ander persone onderteken en die inhoud lui soos volg:

	Theunissen.
	12.11.1958.
Die Skoolkommissie,; Theunissen, O.V.S. B Waarde here, Graag wens die ondergetekende ouers hiermee beswaar te maak teen die aanstelling van mnr. Jordaan 'as Engels doserende onderwyser van die Hoërskool Theunissen. Dit het onder die aandag van die ouers gekom, dat hulle kinders daagliks swakker vaar in Engels. Hulle was dus genoodsaak om mej. Ford te nader C i.v.m. ekstra klasse, aangesien mnr. Jordaan geen belangstelling toon in die vordering van die kinders nie. Die ouers doen 'n ernstige beroep op die kommissie om die saak a.u.b. hulle onmiddellike aandag te skenk, sodat dit nie nodig sal wees om die Departement van Onderwys te nader nie. Drie dae nadat die saak aan die Kommissie voorgelê is, eis die ouers 'n onderhoud. D Strenge geheimhouding word vereis i.v.m. die name van die ondergetekende ouers. Kennisgewing i.v.m...