Invasion of privacy: Common law v constitutional delict — does it make a difference?
Jurisdiction | South Africa |
Author | David McQuoid-Mason |
Published date | 29 May 2019 |
Citation | 2000 Acta Juridica 227 |
Date | 29 May 2019 |
Pages | 227-261 |
Invasion of privacy: Common law v constitutional delict —
does it make a difference?
2000 Acta Juridica 227
David Mcquoid-Mason *
University of Natal, Durban
I Introduction
The right to privacy has been variously defined as 'the right to be left alone,' 1 'the
right to live one 's own life with the minimum degree of interference,' 2 and the right
to de cide 'when and under what conditions private facts ma y be made public.' 3 It
includes the right to be free from i ntrusions and interference by the state and others
in one's personal life as well as unauthorized disclosures of information about one's
private life. 4 However, a person's right to privacy i s not unlimited. It has been said,
for instance, that a person' s 'inn er sanctum' such as his or her family life, sexual
preference and home environment is 'shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of
the community', but a s a person 'moves int o communal relations and a ctivities such
as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks
accordingly'. 5 The right extends to natural and juristic persons. 6
A common law right to privacy under the actio injuriarum has
* B Comm LLB (Natal) LLM (London) PhD (Natal), Professor of Procedural and Clinical Law, University of
Natal, Durban.
2000 Acta Juridica 228
existed for many years, 7 but more recently the right has been protected in the
1996 Constitution 8 which provi des for a general right to pri vacy that includes the
right of everyone not to ha ve (a) their p erson or home searched; (b) their property
searched; (c) thei r possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications
interfered with.' 9 The constitutional right to privacy, howe ver, is not absolute and
may be limited in terms of the limitation clause. 10
The question arises whether there are now two potential delictual actions for
invasion of privacy — a common law action and a constitutional action — o r whether
1 Per Brandeis Jss, dissenting in Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 478, 48 S Ct 564 (1928).
2 International Commission of Jurists Conclusions of the Nordic Conference on the Right to Privacy (1967)
2 et seq.
3 National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) at 271; cf D J McQuoid-Mason 'Privacy' in M
Chaskalson, J Kentridge, J Klaaren, G Marcus, D Spitz and S Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South
Africa (1996) 18-1; J Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio
Injuriarum (1998) 365.
4 Chaskalson et al (n3) 18-1; cf D J McQuoid-Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1977) 99. Cf J
Neethling, J M Potgieter and P J Visser Neethling's Law of Personality 4ed (1996) 243 who state that
'privacy can be infringed only by an acquaintance with personal facts by outsiders contrary to the
determination and will of the person whose right is infringed, and such acquaintance can take place in
two ways only, namely through intrusion (or acquaintance with private facts) and disclosure (or
revelation of private facts)'.
5 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 67.
6 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) at 464; Janit v Motor Industries Fund
Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 293 (A). The rights of juristic persons are also protected by s 8(4)
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. In Bernstein v Bester NO Ackermann
J made an obiter dictum observation that the right to privacy did not extend to 'the carrying on of
business activities', but this view does not seem to be correct (cf Hayes v Commissioner for Inland
Revenue 2000 (6) BCLR 596 (Tk) at 613; Burchell (n 3) 388-9). See, however, Deutschmann NO v
Commissioner for SARS 2000 (2) SA 106 (E) at 107, where the court blindly followed Ackermann J's
dictum.
7 McQuoid-Mason (n 4) 86.
8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter cited as 'the Constitution').
9 Section 14.
10 Section 36(1); cf Case v Minister of Safety & Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 106.
2000 Acta Juridica 227
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the common law action shoul d subsume the constitutional action without creating a
new delict. There has been support for the latter approach 11 for two reasons:
Firstly, because the Constitution, like the common law, operates both vertically
between the state and private individuals and horizontally between p rivate
individuals. 12 An d, secondly, because th e Constitution will have a direct impact on
the development of the common law because, when interpreting the former, the
courts must promote the spirit, purport or objects of the bill of rights.' 13 It has also
been suggested that a subjective right i s different from a fundamental ri ght as the
latter is a publi c law concept primarily aimed at giving the individual rights against
the stat e, and therefore it would be wrong to speak of a breach of a fundamental
right as giving rise to a 'constitutional tort'. 14
It is intended to discuss the impact of the Constitution on the common law
development of the law of privacy before consi dering whether a ne w constitutional
delict of invasion of privacy should be created.
II Common law right to privacy
(1) Essentials for liability
As a general rule at common law in order to prove a claim for invasion of privacy
under the acti o injuriarum the plaintiff has to show that there has been an
infringement of the person's right to pri vacy which was unlawful and intentional, 15
or, in the case of the
2000 Acta Juridica 229
mass media, unlawful and negl igent. 16 The elements that have to be alleged and
proved are: (a) an invasion of privacy; (b) wro ngfulness; and (c) fault in the form of
intention or animus injuriandi for ordinary individual s, or negligence in the case of
publications by the press.
(a) Invasion of privacy
At common law invasion of privacy is regarded as an aspect of impairment of
dignitas 17 which includes 'those rights relating to . . . dignity'. 18 It has been
suggested th at invasion of privacy could be accommodated under the broad
definition of 'dignity'. 19 However, the fact that the Constitution mentions 'dignity'
and 'privacy' separately, 20 as does the Uni versal Declaration of Human Rights, 21
seems to indicate that they can be regarded as separate righ ts 22 — although, as the
Constitutional Court has pointed out, they are linked. 23 Invasions of privacy can be
broadly divided into (i ) intrusions and (ii) publi cations of private facts. 24 Further
11 Cf Burchell (n 3) 118.
12 Cf Burchell (n 3) 93 and 95-102.
13 Section 39(2) of the Constitution.
14 J C van der Walt and J R Midgley Delict: Principles and Cases 2ed (1997) para 5. See also the
discussion below, [27 et seq].
15 Chaskalson et al (n 3) 18-2.
16 National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1209, where the Supreme Court of Appeal
emphasized the importance of freedom of expression as an essential element of democracy. In the past
strict liability was imposed on the press in defamation cases by the Appellate Division (Pakendorf v De
Flamingh 1982 (3) SA 146 (A)).
17 Cf Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) at 849: 'The actio injuriarum protects a person's
dignitas and dignitas embraces privacy'.
18 O'Keeffe v Argus Printing & Publishing Co 1954 (3) SA 244 (E) at 246.
19 Burchell (n 3) 374.
20 Sections 10 (dignity) and 14 (privacy).
21 Articles 1 (dignity) and 12 (privacy).
22 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser (n 4) 242n40: 'Of course, the express constitutional recognition of
the right to privacy . . . independent of the right to dignity . . . finally lays to rest the possible equation
of, and thus confusion between, these two personality rights'.
23 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (CC) para 28.
24 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd (n 6) at 462.
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