Van der Merwe v Minister van Justisie en 'n Ander

JurisdictionSouth Africa
Citation1995 (2) SACR 471 (O)

Van der Merwe v Minister van Justisie en 'n Ander
1995 (2) SACR 471 (O)

1995 (2) SACR p471


Citation

1995 (2) SACR 471 (O)

Court

Oranje-Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling

Judge

Lichtenberg RP

Heard

May 2, 1995

Judgment

May 3, 1995

Counsel

C H G van der Merwe SC namens die applikant
W H Olivier namens die respondente

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

B Deursoeking en beslaglegging — In terme van arts 20 en 21 van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 — Dringende aansoek vir tersydestelling van visenteringslasbriewe en teruggawe van goedere waarop beslag gelê — C Vereistes waaraan geldige visenteringslasbrief moet voldoen uiteengesit — 'Redelike gronde' in art 21 nie objektief beregbaar nie — Mening van uitreikende amptenaar, gevorm op grond van beëdigde verklarings, wat deurslag gee — Diskresie — Uitoefening van diskresie deur uitreikende amptenaar slegs beregbaar in uitsonderlike omstandighede — Sodanige omstandighede aanwesig as dit blyk dat aandag nie behoorlik aan die D aangeleentheid bestee is nie — Bewyslas op applikant om aan te toon dat behoorlike aandag nie aan die aangeleentheid bestee is nie.

Getuienis — Hoorsê — Getuienis in beëdigde verklaring voorgelê as basis vir aanvra van visenteringslasbrief — Kan inaggeneem word deur die E uitreikende amptenaar — Hoorsê-getuienis, vervat in beëdigde verklaring, wel 'inligting' soos bedoel in art 21 (1)(a) van Strafproseswet 51 van 1977.

Deursoeking en beslaglegging — Lasbrief — Uitleg van — Geargumenteer dat F eng uitleg gevolg moet word — Aansoek om lasbrief het nie na 'vermoedelik gesteelde voertuie' verwys nie terwyl magtiging wel daarna verwys het — Beslis dat magtiging deurslag gegee het, nie aanvraag daarvoor nie — Aansoek om tersydestelling van die hand gewys.

Headnote : Kopnota

G Die applikant het aansoek gedoen om die tersydestelling van twee visenteringslasbriewe en teruggawe van alle goedere waarop beslag gelê is. Die applikant was 'n paneelklopper en handelaar in tweedehandse motorvoertuie. Van die voertuie waarop beslag gelê is was klaarblyklik gesteelde voertuie. Die applikant het aangevoer dat die lasbriewe ongeldig was as synde dit nie aan die voorgeskrewe vereistes voldoen het nie. Die Hof het die vereistes waaraan 'n geldige visenteringslasbrief H moet voldoen uiteengesit en dit op die feite toegepas.

Beslis, dat die 'redelike gronde' van art 21 van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 nie objektief beregbaar is nie. Dit is die mening van die landdros, as uitreikende amptenaar, wat die deurslag gee. Die Hof sou nie inmeng met die beslissing van 'n landdros nie, behalwe as die Hof van oordeel is dat die landdros nie sy aandag behoorlik aan die I aangeleentheid bestee het nie. Dit sou blyk as daar byvoorbeeld mala fides, onbehoorlike motief of arbitrêre besluitneming was. Ook 'n beswarend onredelike beslissing sou tot so 'n gevolgtrekking aanleiding gee. Die lys is egter nie uitputtend nie.

Beslis, verder, dat die applikant die bewyslas dra om op 'n oorwig van waarskynlikhede aan te toon dat die uitreikende amptenaar nie sy aandag behoorlik aan die aangeleentheid bestee het nie. Die weerlegging van J hierdie onus sal nie ligtelik bevind word nie.

1995 (2) SACR p472

A Beslis, verder, dat die landdros sy regterlike diskresie korrek uitgeoefen het, en dat daar voldoende inligting voor hom was om die uitreiking van die twee visenteringslasbriewe te regverdig.

Die applikant het verder aangevoer dat die beëdigde verklaring wat aan die landdros voorgelê is, en waarop beslis moes word of die lasbriewe uitgereik kon word, hoorsê-getuienis bevat het en derhalwe dat die B landdros nie hierdie getuienis in ag moes neem by sy beslising nie.

Beslis, dat hoorsê-getuienis nog steeds 'inligting' is soos omskryf in art 21(1)(a) van die Strafproseswet en dat die landdros wel ag kon slaan daarop. Die landdros, by die uitoefening van sy diskresie, hoef nie soos 'n geregshof in 'n verhoor op te tree nie. Selfs die voorlegging van 'n mening onder eed sou kon kwalifiseer as 'inligting' in terme van die Strafproseswet.

C Beslis, verder, dat die magtiging van die lasbrief, en nie die aansoek daarom nie, bepalend is by die uitleg daarvan. Waar die aansoek om die uitreiking van die lasbrief nie na 'vermoedelik gesteelde voertuie' verwys het nie, maar die magtiging wel, het dit nie beteken dat die lasbrief eng uitgelê moes word nie. Die respondent is dus nie verplig om dié voertuie, wat slegs 'vermoedelik gesteel' was, terug te besorg nie.

D Die Hof het bevind dat, in die lig van bogenoemde, dit nie nodig is om te beslis of die applikant se eiendomsreg of besitsreg aangetas is nie. Met verwysing na gesag word bevind dat die besitsontneming regmatig was, en dat daar dus geen spoliasie was nie.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

E Search and seizure — In terms of ss 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 — Urgent application for setting aside of search warrants and return of goods which had been confiscated — Requirements for valid warrant of arrest set out — 'Reasonable grounds' in s 21 not objectively F justiciable — Opinion of issuing official, formed on the basis of affidavits, decisive — Discretion — Exercise of by issuing officer only justiciable in exceptional circumstances — Such circumstances present if it appears that issuing official had not directed his mind to the matter — Onus on applicant to show that issuing officer's mind had not been directed to the matter.

G Evidence — Hearsay evidence — Evidence in affidavit submitted as basis for request for search warrant — Can be taken into account by the issuing officer — Hearsay evidence contained in affidavit constitutes 'information' as intended by s 21(1)(a)of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.

Search and seizure — Search warrant — Interpretation of — Argued that H strict interpretation had to be applied — Application for search warrant did not refer to 'suspected stolen vehicles' whereas the authorisation referred thereto — Held that the authorisation was decisive and not the request for the warrant — Application for setting aside dismissed.

Headnote : Kopnota

The applicant applied for the setting aside of two search warrants and I the return of all goods which had been seized in terms of the warrants. The applicant was a panel beater and dealer in secondhand motor vehicles. Some of the vehicles which had been seized were apparently stolen vehicles. The applicant contended that the warrants were invalid as they did not comply with the prescribed requirements. The Court set out the requirements for a valid search warrant and applied them to the facts.

Held, that the 'reasonable grounds' in s 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act J 51 of

1995 (2) SACR p473

A 1977 were not objectively justiciable. It was the opinion of the magistrate, as issuing officer, which was decisive. The Court would not interfere with the decision of a magistrate except where the Court was of the opinion that the magistrate had not brought his mind to bear on the matter. This would be the case where for instance there had been mala fides, an improper motive or arbitrary conduct. A grossly unreasonable decision would also give rise to such a conclusion. The list of B circumstances was, however, not exhaustive.

Held, further, that the applicant bore the burden of showing on a balance of probabilities that the issuing officer had not brought his mind to bear on the matter. The rebuttal of this onus would not lightly be found.

Held, further, that the magistrate had correctly exercised his discretion and that there was sufficient information before him to justify the C issuing of the two search warrants.

The applicant contended further that the affidavit which had been submitted to the magistrate and on which it had to be decided whether the search warrants ought to have been issued, contained hearsay evidence and that the magistrate ought not to have taken this evidence into account.

Held, that hearsay evidence was 'information' as described in s 21(1)(a) D of the Criminal Procedure Act and that the magistrate could take note thereof. The magistrate, in exercising his discretion, did not have to act as he did in a trial. Even the submission of an opinion under oath could qualify as 'information' in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Held, further, that the authorisation of the warrant and not the E application for it was decisive in the interpretation of the warrant. Where the application for the issuing of the warrant did not refer to 'suspected stolen vehicles' and the authorisation did, this did not mean that the warrant had to be interpreted strictly. The respondent was therefore not obliged to return the vehicles which were 'suspected to have been stolen'. The Court held further that in the light of the above circumstances it was not necessary to decide whether the applicant's ownership or possession had been affected. With reference to authority F it was found that the taking into possession was lawful and that there had been no spoliation

Aansoek om die tersydestelling van twee visenteringslasbriewe en 'n bevel vir die teruglewering van artikels waarop beslag gelê is kragtens die G lasbriewe.

C H G van der Merwe SC namens die applikant.

W H Olivier namens die respondente.

H Cur adv vult.

Postea (23 Mei 1995).

Judgment

Lichtenberg RP:

Op 3 en 4 April 1995 het daar 'n beslaglegging plaasgevind in Kroonstad op sekere voorwerpe wat die applikant beweer sy eiendom is of waarop hy die regmagtige reg van besit het. Die I beslaglegging is gedoen deur lede van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens en hulle het dit gedoen uit hoofde van twee visenteringslasbriewe wat aanhangsels A en B tot die applikant se funderende beëdigde verklaring is.

Die applikant vra nou by wyse van 'n dringende aansoek vir die tersydestelling van beide hierdie lasbriewe en vra ook verder dat die tweede...

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