A critique of search and seizure in terms of a search warrant in South African criminal procedure

AuthorVinesh Basdeo
DOI10.10520/EJC197700
Published date01 January 2015
Date01 January 2015
Pages153-175
A critique of search and seizure in terms of
a search warrant in South African criminal
procedure
Vinesh Basdeo*
Abstract
The requirements and safeguards for a valid search warrant in South African criminal procedure
are critically analysed in this article. The existence of safeguards to regulate the way in which
law enforcement officials may enter the private sphere of ordinary citizens is one of the features
that distinguish a constitutional democracy from a police state. South African experience has
been notoriously varied in this regard. Many generations of systemised and egregious violations
of personal privacy established norms for citizens that seeped generally into the public
administration and promoted amongst a great many officials habits and practices inconsistent
with the standard of conduct now required by the Bill of Rights. Today, law enforcement officials
must be highly skilled in the use of investigative tools and extremely knowledgeable about the
intricacies of the law. One error in judgment during initial contact with a suspect can, and often
does, impede the investigation and could affect the fairness of the trial. For example, an illegal
search may so contaminate evidence obtained that it will not be admitted as evidence in court.
In addition to losing evidence for prosecution purposes, failing to comply with constitutional
mandates often leads to liability on the part of the law enforcement official.
1 Introduction
The primary objective of this article is to determine whether the search and seizure
measures employed in the South African criminal justice system are in need of any
reform and/or augmentation in accordance with the ‘spirit, purport and obj ect’ of
the Constitution. This article analyses ‘search and seizure’ in the South African
1
BA (Hons) LLB LLM LLD, Associate Professor in the Department of Criminal and Procedural Law, Uni-
*
versity of South Africa. This article is based on an LLD degree completed at the University of South Africa.
A substantial part of this article was completed during a visiting scholarship at the University of Cape
Town. I remain indebted to the University of Cape Town for accommodating me and availing its facilities.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter either the 1996 Constitution or the
1
Constitution). See also Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe 2011 2 SACR 301 (CC). All
154 (2015) 30 SAPL
criminal justice system as is made possible by chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977, which provides for search warrants, the entering of premises, and
2
the seizure of property connected with offences. It determines whether the required
judicial scrutiny provides a real control upon the exercise of search and seizure
powers. Relating to this, but a distinct issue, is the sufficiency of information provided
by the applicant to the issuer of the warrant. Proof of reasonable grounds to believe
not only that an offence has been committed, but also that there will be evidence of
it on the premises to be searched may be necessary to comply with the derogation
from the right to privacy contained in section 14 of the South African Constitution.
Search and seizure legal principles extracted from American criminal procedure will
also be analysed for comparative purposes.
A search warrant judicially authorises and legitimises searches and seizures.
In South Africa the eventual outcome of constitutionalism was that South African
courts have now succeeded in imposing strict constraints upon the circumstances
when a warrant may be issued and requires that the issuance itself should
generally be a judicial act. By prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
3
and through regulation of the warrant process the Constitution imposes important
limits on the powers of police and law enforcement officials in the prevention and
investigation of crime. Because of the fetters placed upon the granting of
4
warrants, the warrant procedure can now be viewed as a due process safeguard
rather than a coercive means of obtaining incriminating evidence through
exceptional intrusion into a person’s privacy.5
The Constitution affects a fundamental balance between the interests of society
in bringing offenders to justice and the rights and liberties of persons suspected of
crime. There was an inherent need for clear and certain rules within which the state
should operate. A person’s right to be free from being searched and having his goods
confiscated has its origin in common law in the context of eighteenth century English
law-abiding citizens of this country are deeply concerned about the scourge of crim e. In order to
address this problem effectively, every lawful means must be employed to enhance the capacity of
the police to root out crime or at least reduce it significantly. Warrants issued in terms of s 21 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51of 1977 are im portant weapons designed to help the police to carry out
efficiently their constitutional mandate of, amongst others, preventing, com bating, and investigating
crime. In the course of employing this tool, they inevitably interfere with the equally important
constitutional rights of individuals who are targ eted by these warrants.
Hereafter the Criminal Procedure Act. Chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act is entitled ‘Search
2
Warrants, Entering of Premises, Seizure, Forfeiture and Disposal of Property Connected with Offences’.
In addition to s 19, it also accommodates the following provisions, dealing with search and seizure with
a warrant, which are detailed in this chapter: s 20 (the state may seize certain articles); s 21 (an article
to be seized under a search warrant); s 25 (power of the police to enter premises in connection with
state security or any offence); s 27 (resistance against entry and search); section 28 (wrongful search
an offence, and award of damages); s 29 (search to be conducted in a decent and orderly manner).
Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 1 SACR 468 (D).
3
Id 487.
4
Ibid.
5

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