The Role of Resource Constraints in State Liability for Omissions
DOI | 10.25159/2522-6800/9081 |
Pages | 1-22 |
Author | Mila Harding |
Date | 01 December 2021 |
Published date | 01 December 2021 |
Article
Southern African Public Law
https://doi.org/10.25159/2522-6800/9081
https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/SAPL
ISSN 2522-6800 (Online), 2219-6412 (Print)
#9081 | 22 pages
© Unisa Press 2022
The Role of Resource Constraints in State Liability
for Omissions
Mila Harding
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0749-1274
University of the Witwatersrand
harding.mila.d@gmail.com
Abstract
The ambit of delictual liability against the State for negligent omissions
resulting in physical harm has extended dramatically since the Constitutional
Court case of Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele. In such expansion,
the courts have often mentioned that considerations regarding resource
constraints play a role in the imputation of liability on the State, as well as in
determining whether the State has been negligent. In examining four
Constitutional Court cases from the period of 2013–2017, this article argues that
the Constitutional Court’s approach to the State alleging resource constraints
has largely been correct. Although many have seen the rapid expansion of
liability as cause for concern (as public funds are increasingly being spent
paying damages instead of improving public services) the Constitutional Court
is correct in refusing to allow bald statements of resource constraints to defeat
delictual claims or reduce damages in cases where the negligent omissions of
the State have resulted in physical harm. In accordance with the value of
accountability, where the State alleges it does not have the resources to fulfil its
duties and prevent harm, the State must prove it.
Keywords: Constitutional law; State liability; resource constraints; feasibility
constraints; delict; common law; negligent omissions
Harding
2
Introduction*
It is clear that the number of delictual claims against the State have increased over the
past several years.
1
There are many possible reasons for this,
2
which include the
inadequate standard of health services, particularly in the public sector.
3
Another
possible reason is the trend of the courts to find liability on the part of the State, where
it may not have been found before the infusion of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) into the common law of delict.
4
This trend has
raised concerns because when damages are awarded against the State, resources may be
redirected from potentially fixing the problems at the root of the claims, thus making
future claims more likely.
5
The purpose of this article is to provide a broad evaluation
of the Constitutional Court’s (CC) engagement with resource constraints in several
high-profile cases regarding State omissions resulting in physical harm.
Davis and Klare described the extension of delictual liability to the State from 1996 to
2010 as generally ‘resource-lite’,
6
meaning that the solutions to the root causes of the
delictual claims would not require a large amount of resources to address. However, the
courts were not unaware of the potential hazard in terms of resources in extending
delictual liability for State failures. In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a
Metrorail,
7
O’Regan J recognised that the translation of public -law rights into private-
law damages may place ‘… heavy financial burdens on the [S]tate’.
8
In a time of increasing austerity,
9
and increasing delictual claims against the State, the
State may find itself caught in a destructive cycle.
10
State intervention may be in the
best interest of the public.
11
In this regard, the most immediate change could be the
enactment of legislation regulating claims against the State—such as the State Liability
* I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Emile Zitzke, whose guidance and support has b een
invaluable to me in writing this article.
1
AB Wessels, ‘The Expansion of the State's Liability for Harm Arising from Medical Malpractice:
Underlying Reasons, Deleterious Consequences and Potential Reform’ (2019) TSAR 1.
2
ibid.
3
Centre for Economic and Social Rights, Institute for Economic Justice, SECTION27 & SPII,
‘Austerity in the Midst of Inequality Threatens Human Rights’ (CESR, November 2018)
<https://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/FACTSHEET-Artwork-Online-
Nov%206%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 29 July 2020.
4
Christopher Roederer, ‘The Transformation of South African Private Law after Ten Years of
Democracy: The Role of Torts (Delict) in the Consolidation of Democracy’ (20 06) 37 Columbia
Human Rights Law Review 520–521.
5
Wessels (n 1) 8.
6
Dennis Davis and Karl Klare, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary
Law’ (2010) 26 SAJHR 484.
7
2005 (2) SA 359 (CC).
8
ibid para 30.
9
CESR (n 3).
10
Wessels (n 1) 9.
11
ibid 9–10.
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