M & v Tractor & Implement Agencies BK v Vennootskap D S U Cilliers & Seuns en Andere (Kelrn Vervoer (Edms) Bpk Tussenbeitredend); M & v Tractor & Implement Agencies BK v Hoogkwartier Landgoed (Edms) Bpk (Kelrn Vervoer (Edms) Bpk Tussenbeitredend); M & v Tractor & Implement Agencies Bk v Olierivier Landgoed (Edms) Bpk (Kelrn Vervoer (Edms) Bpk Tussenbeitredend)

• Jurisdiction: South Africa

M & v Tractor & Implement Agencies BK v Vennootskap D S U Cilliers & Seuns en Andere (Kelrn Vervoer (Edms) Bpk Tussenbeitredend);
M & v Tractor & Implement Agencies BK v Hoogkwartier Landgoed (Edms) Bpk (Kelrn Vervoer (Edms) Bpk Tussenbeitredend);
M & v Tractor & Implement Agencies Bk v Olierivier Landgoed (Edms) Bpk (Kelrn Vervoer (Edms) Bpk Tussenbeitredend)
2000 (2) SA 571 (N)

2000 (2) SA p571

Citation	2000 (2) SA 571 (N)
Case No	1208/99, 1209/99, 1210/99
Court	Noord-Kaapse Afdeling
Judge	Olivier Wn R
Heard	November 11, 1999
Judgment	November 19, 1999
Counsel	A Bester namens die applikant.; F W A Danzfuss namens die respondente.; P G Robinson SC (saam met hom G R Wynne) namens die tussenbeitredende skuldeiser.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Insolvensie — Sekwestrasie- en likwidasie-verrigtinge — Toetreding van derdes in insolvensie-aansoeke — Aard van goed gevestigde praktyk herhaal — H Prosedure sui generis - Kom neer op selfstandige aansoek wat, anders as gewone aansoek, aangelê word deurdat skuldeiser op keerdag by Hof opdaag met eie getuienis.

Praktyk — Aansoeke en mosies — Funderende eedsverklaring — Grond vir aansoek nie vervat in funderende eedsverklaring nie, maar vir eerste keer geopper in I repliserende eedsverklaring — Applikant moet staan of val by funderende eedsverklaring — Hoewel soms toegelaat om funderende eedsverklaring aan te vul, is wesenlike feite-grondslag van aansoek te vinde in funderende eedsverklaring omdat respondent daardie feite moet beantwoord by wyse van erkenning of ontkenning.

Praktyk — Partye — Ongemagtigde verrigtinge — Maatskappy — Besluit van J

2000 (2) SA p572

direkteure om verrigtinge te magtig — Besluit bestaan nie ten tyde van instel A van verrigtinge nie — Deponent namens maatskappye ontbreek aan bevoegdheid om verrigtinge in te stel — Sodanige gebrek aan bevoegdheid nie aangevul deur latere besluit van direkteure nie — Latere besluit ratifiseer nie en gee nie terugwerkende effek aan deponent se bevoegdheid nie. B

Headnote : Kopnota

Die beginsels van toepassing op 'n aansoek om toetrede in insolvensie aangeleenthede is soos volg: 'n Skuldeiser kan op enige stadium tussenbei tree om (a) 'n voorlopige sekwestrasie- of likwidasiebevel opgehef te kry of (b) waar 'n applikant nie voortgaan met die saak nie, of sy voete sleep, 'n vars sekwestrasie- of likwidasiebevel in sy eie reg en naam verkry. C Waar die applikant nie voortgaan nie kan die bestaande sekwestrasie- of likwidasiebevel nie bekragtig word op aandrang van enige tussenbeitredende skuldeiser nie. Dit moet opgehef word en 'n vars bevel kan uitgereik word met die skuldeiser as applikant en nie as mede-applikant nie. Hy alleen word dus dominus litis en die oorspronklike applikant val heeltemal weg. Die tussenbeitredende skuldeiser moet 'n saak vir sekwestrasie of likwidasie op sy eie uitmaak, sekuriteit verskaf, ens, asof hy aanvanklik die applikant was, maar D hy kan steun op feite wat blyk uit die stukke in die bestaande verrigtinge. Die Hof neem 'n praktiese standpunt in in hierdie tipe sake en hou die belange van die skudeisers in die algemeen in gedagte. Die praktyk is 'n unieke een wat heelwat verskil van konvensionele toetrede. Dit is nòg 'n suiwer toetreding nòg substitusie van applikante, en is sui generis uit 'n prosesregtelike oogpunt gesien. Dit is 'n selfstandige aansoek wat, uiteraard anders as 'n E gewone een, aangelê word deurdat die skuldeiser slegs opdaag by die Hof met sy eie getuienis, gewoonlik op die keerdag. (Op 577A/B-F.)

Die dictum in Fullard v Fullard 1979 (1) SA 368 (T) op 371H-372C toegepas.

Dit is herhaaldelik in ons Howe neergelê dat 'n applikant moet staan of val by sy funderende eedsverklaring en die feite daarin beweer. Alhoewel hy soms toegelaat word om sy aanvanklike verklarings aan te vul, is die grondslag van F die feite van die aansoek te vind in die bewerings in die funderende stukke, omdat dit daardie feite is wat die respondent moet beantwoord by wyse van erkenning of ontkenning. Dus, waar die deponent se bevoegdheid om namens 'n applikant maatskappy sekwestrasie- of likwidasie-verrigtinge in te stel ontbreek, en die respondent daarteen beswaar maak, kan die gebrek nie later G aangevul word by wyse van 'n direksiebesluit van die maatskappy wat nie bestaan het op die stadium toe die aansoek gebring is nie. So 'n latere besluit sal ook nie dien as 'ratifikasie' van die bevoegdheid om so aansoek te bring, en dus retrospektiewe effek daaraan verleen nie. (Op 579H/I-580D/E, geparafraseer).) H

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Insolvency — Sequestration and liquidation proceedings — Intervention of third parties in insolvency applications — Nature of well-established practice reiterated — Sui generis procedure — Amounting to substantive application which, other than in case of ordinary applications, launched by arrival of creditor at Court with own evidence on return day. I

Practice — Applications and motions — Founding affidavit — Ground for application not contained in founding affidavit but raised for first time in replying affidavit — Applicant to stand or fall by founding affidavit — Although sometimes permitted to supplement founding affidavit, essential factual basis of application has to be found in founding affidavit because respondent to answer those facts by admission or denial.

Practice — Parties — Unauthorised proceedings — Company — Resolution of directors authorising proceedings — Resolution not existing at time of launching of proceedings — J

2000 (2) SA p573

Such lack of capacity not cured by subsequent decision of directors — Subsequent decision not ratifying or giving retroactive effect to A deponent's capacity.

Headnote : Kopnota

The principles applicable to an application for intervention in insolvency matters are as follows: A creditor can intervene at any stage (a) to secure the discharge of a provisional sequestration or liquidation order or, (b) where an applicant does not proceed with a matter or drags his feet, to obtain a fresh sequestration or liquidation order in his own right and B name. Where the applicant does not proceed, the existing sequestration or liquidation order cannot be confirmed at the instance of any intervening creditor. It has to be discharged and a fresh order has to be issued with the creditor as applicant and not as co-applicant. He therefore becomes the sole dominus litis and the original applicant falls away completely. The intervening creditor must make out his own case for sequestration or C liquidation, must furnish security, etc, as if he were the original applicant, although he may rely on facts which appear from the papers in the existing proceedings. The Court takes a practical view in these matters and also bears in mind the interests of the general body of creditors. The practice is a unique one which differs substantially from conventional intervention. It is neither true intervention, nor a substitution of applicants, and from a procedural point D of view is sui generis. It is a substantive application which differs from ordinary applications in that it is launched when the creditor merely arrives at court with his own evidence, usually on the return day. (At 577A/B-F.)

The dictum in Fullard v Fullard 1979 (1) SA 368 (T) at 371H-372C applied.

It has repeatedly been laid down by our Courts that an applicant must stand or E fall by his founding affidavit and the facts therein alleged. Although he is sometimes permitted to supplement his original statements, the basis of the facts of the application is to be found in the allegations in the founding papers because it is those facts that the respondent must answer by way of admission or denial. Therefore, where the deponent acting on behalf of an applicant company lacks the capacity to launch sequestration or liquidation F proceedings on behalf of the company, and the respondent objects thereto, that want of capacity cannot later be remedied by a decision of the directors of the company which did not exist at the stage when the application was launched. Such a later decision will also not serve as a ratification of, and give retrospective effect to, the capacity to launch such an application. (At 579H/I-580D/E, paraphrased.) G

Cases Considered

Aantekeninge/Annotations

Gerapporteerde sake/Reported cases

Baeck and Co SA (Pty) Ltd v Van Zummeren and Another 1982 (2) SA 112 (W): nie gevolg nie/ not followed H

Courier Townhouse (Pty) Ltd v Myers 1986 (4) SA 1038 (K): na verwys/referred to

Ex parte Cyrildene Heights (Pty) Ltd 1966 (1) SA 307 (W): na verwys/referred to

Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530: na verwys/referred to I

Flax v Berliner: Houndsditch Warehouse (Pty) Ltd Intervening 1950 (2) SA 259 (W): dictum op/at 261-2 toegepas/applied

Fullard v Fullard 1979 (1) SA 368 (T): dictum op/at 371H-372C toegepas/applied

Ilic v Parginos 1985 (1) SA 795 (A): na verwys/referred to J

2000 (2) SA p574

Interboard SA (Pty) Ltd v Van den Berg 1989 (4) SA 166 (O): dictum op/at 168B-D toegepas/applied A

Jhatam and Others v Jhatam 1958 (4) SA 36 (N): dicta op/at 38A and 38H-39G toegepas/applied

Ex parte Lomati Landgoed Beherende (Edms) Bpk; Ex parte Lomati Landgoed (Edms) Bpk 1985 (2) SA 517 (W): na verwys/referred to

Nowak v Rosano International Restaurant (Pty) Ltd 1968 (1) SA 93 (O): dictum op/at 94C-E toegepas/applied B

South African Milling Co (Pty) Ltd v Reddy 1980 (3) SA 431 (SOK): toegepas/applied

The Mine Workers' Union v J J Prinsloo; The Mine Workers' Union v J P Prinsloo; The Mine Workers' Union v Greyling 1948 (3) SA 831 (A): na verwys/referred to C

United Methodist Church of South Africa v Sokufundumala 1989 (4) SA 1055 (O): dictum op/at 1057E-I toegepas/applied

Wellington Board of Executors Ltd and Another v Perlman 1954 (1) SA 546 (K): na...