In Joint Matrimony We Share: Controlling the Powers to Use the Trust to Limit Matrimonial Property Rights in South African Law

Published date22 October 2021
Pages89-111
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v33/i1a4
AuthorManthwa, A.
Date22 October 2021
89
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v33/i1a4
* LLB LLM (Unisa).
BCom LLB (Unisa) LLM (UCT).
IN JOINT MATRIMONY WE SHARE:
CONTROLLING THE POWERS TO USE THE
TRUST TO LIMIT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
AUBREY MANTHWA*
Senior Lecturer, University of South Africa
PAUL NKOANE
Lecturer, University of South Africa
Abst rac t
e deceitful use of trusts has created a fair amount of controversy,
specically where it has appeared that a trust has been employed to limit
the rights of third parties. is article argues that it is in the interests of
the law to ensure that rights are vindicated when unlawfully limited.
Similarly, it is in the interest of the common good that legitimately
acquired rights are protected. Trust laws state that there must be a
separation between control and enjoyment and, in cases where there is
no separation, the courts may scrutinise the aairs of a trust. Recent
developments have illustrated that measures that provide relief to
spouses upon the dissolution of the marriage may not be readily invoked,
especially for marriages in community of property. Family trusts have
provided spouses with avenues for hiding assets that would otherwise
fall into the joint estate. Courts need to adopt a robust approach when
dealing with trust assets upon the dissolution of a marriage, particularly
to protect the rights of competing spouses.
Keywords: trust, matrimonial property, fraud, spouse, property rights
I INTRODUCTION
e law must be constructed and construed to advance the common
interests of society. us, the law is a vehicle for creating societal har-
mony, limiting inequality, and protecting rights. As interpreters of the
law, courts in a constitutional dispensation must not only interpret the
law, but must also ensure that social and political rights are protected.
is creates a dual task for the courts, which involves the interpretation
(2021) 33 SA Merc LJ 89
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v33/i1a4
90 (2021) 33 SA MERC LJ
and protection of constitutional rights. Consequently, when the courts
construe any law, they must do so with the main purpose of vindicating
rights.1 is is a constitutional mandate that can be neither denied nor
avoided.2 Every rule of law must work in harmony with the spirit of the
Constitution, otherwise the rule must be revised or struck down.3
In recent years, the task of the courts in protecting rights arising from
the conclusion of a marriage has been made dicult through a strict
interpretation of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. It is common cause that
the conclusion of a marriage, whether in community of property or out
of community of property, results in certain consequences.4 Various
rights and responsibilities accompany marriages — the duty to support,
parental responsibilities and rights, property rights, etc. e Matrimo-
nial Property Act 88 of 1984 aords spouses the right to approach a
court to seek the protection of these rights. It would not be consistent
with the constitutional goal of achieving equality if a party were able to
create avenues for alienating assets simply to prevent the other party
to a marriage from claiming a portion thereof when the marriage is
terminated.5
e use of trusts to limit or defeat the right to property has recently
proved to be problematic. A trust can be used to hide property that
would otherwise form part of the joint estate. e South African courts
have been approached to determine whether a trust was used to limit
the right to property in marriage.6 e courts generally determine
whether the trust was used for the purpose for which it was created,
or whether it was used as an alter ego of one of the spouses to a mar-
riage.7 e right to property can be acquired through marriage, and
this right should be constitutionally protected. It is quite strange that
in a constitutional democracy that seeks to promote and protect rights,
the issue of enforcement of rights does not enter the picture when the
court construes the law. We argue that the courts’ approach to such mat-
ters should not only focus on evidential facts, but must also focus on
constitutional and property law. e courts must determine whether
the limitation of the right to property is acceptable in a constitutional
1 Sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996.
2 Section 2 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996.
3 Section 39 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996.
4 De Jong & Pintens, ‘Default matrimonial property regimes and the principles of Euro-
pean family law — A European-South African comparison (Part 2)’ (2015) TSAR 551 at 552
and 557.
5 Heaton, ‘Family law’ (2014) Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law (3)(b) 2.1.
6 Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C); Van der Merwe v Van der Merwe 2010 (5) SA 555
(SCA) and WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA).
7 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) All SA 363 (SCA).
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