Girdwood v Girdwood

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: van Zyl J
• Judgment Date: 04 November 1994
• Docket Number: A1100/93
• Court: Cape Provincial Division
• Hearing Date: 26 August 1994
• Citation: 1995 (4) SA 698 (C)

Van Zyl J:

This is an appeal against the ruling and order of the magistrate's court, Cape Town, sitting as a maintenance court for purposes D of hearing an application in terms of s 5 of the Maintenance Act 23 of 1963.

The application was brought by the appellant for an increase in the amount of maintenance payable to her by the respondent in terms of an agreement incorporated in an order of divorce granted by the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court on 11 April 1989.

E At the hearing of the application the respondent raised a point in limine on the basis that the appellant had, by virtue of the provisions of the said agreement, waived her right to apply for an increase in the maintenance provided for her therein.

The learned magistrate, sitting as a maintenance officer for purposes of F the maintenance enquiry, upheld the point in limine and dismissed the application.

The aforesaid agreement (termed a 'deed of settlement') provides, in clause 1.1 hereof, that custody of the three minor children born of the marriage between the parties be awarded to the respondent, subject to the appellant's right of reasonable access to them.

G Maintenance in the amount of R3 100 per month is provided for the appellant in clause 2.1 of the agreement, such amount to be payable until her death, remarriage or permanent cohabitation with another man.

Clause 10 of the agreement reads thus:

'Save for the provisions hereof, this agreement shall be in full and final H settlement of all issues in dispute between the parties and neither party shall have any claim against the other from whatsoever cause and howsoever arising.'

In his judgment the learned maintenance officer accepted the submissions made on behalf of the respondent, namely that the said clause 10 excluded an application by the appellant for an increase in maintenance and that I such exclusion was not in conflict with public policy, as held in Schutte v Schutte 1986 (1) SA 872 (A).

Mr Möller, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the Schutte decision was distinguishable, as was the judgment in Polliack v Polliack 1988 (4) SA 161 (W), in which reliance was placed on the Schutte decision. He found support for his argument in the cases of Davis v Davis 1993 (1) SA 621 (C) J and Luttig v Luttig 1994 (1) SA 523 (O).

Van Zyl J

A Ms Weyer, appearing for the respondent, relied strongly on the ratio of Van Heerden JA in the Schutte judgment to the effect that it was not incompetent, unlawful or contra bonos mores for parties to contract out of the provisions of s 8(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. An agreement not to apply for an increase (or decrease) of maintenance was hence valid and B binding.

Ms Weyer likewise found support for her argument in the Polliack case. Insofar as the Davis and Luttig matters were inconsistent with the reasoning in Schutte and Polliack, she submitted that they had been wrongly decided. She hence argued that, in the present matter, clause 10 of the agreement constituted an unequivocal waiver by the parties of their rights to claim further relief pertaining to matters such as maintenance C payable by the one to the other.

In Schutte v Schutte 1986 (1) SA 872 (A) clause 2 of the agreement provided for maintenance in the following terms (at 878I-J):

'Die eiser betaal aan die verweerderes onderhoud in die bedrag van R1 000 per maand, welke onderhoudsbetaling onderworpe is aan die volgende bepalings:

2.1

D gemelde onderhoud is nie aan verhoging of verlaging onderworpe nie;

2.2

gemelde onderhoud word betaal tot en met dood of hertroue van die verweerderes;

2.3

gemelde onderhoud word verhoog met 'n persentasie, jaarliks op 1 Januarie, gelykstaande aan die amptelike (Reserwe Bank) inflasiekoers E soos vasgestel in Januarie ten aansien van die voorgaande jaar;

2.4

gemelde onderhoud is betaalbaar vanaf 7 April 1984 en maandeliks daarna.'

There is no indication that the agreement contained any general clause relating to full and final settlement of all claims between the parties and to the exclusion of future litigation in this regard. If there had been such a clause, the Court would doubtless have referred to it.

F At the hearing of the divorce action on an unopposed basis, the Transvaal Supreme Court (per Van Dijkhorst J) excluded clause 2.1 of the agreement from his order, apparently on the basis that it was invalid. The question to be decided on appeal was whether the parties to a divorce action could validly waive their respective rights to apply for variation of the maintenance order (incorporated in the divorce order) in terms of s 8(1) G of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.

The Appellate Division (per Van Heerden JA) dealt with the argument that the waiver of a right to claim variation of a maintenance order was in conflict with public policy and held (at 882J-883A) that the relevant provisions of both Act 70 of 1979 and its predecessor, Act 37 of 1953, were not indicative of a general concern of the Legislature with the H future needs of ex-spouses (''n algemene besorgdheid aan die kant van die Wetgewer oor die toekomstige behoeftes van voormalige gades'). The learned Judge expounded this observation (at 883A-D) as follows:

''n Vrou wat om een of ander rede nie ten tyde van die egskeiding onderhoud aangevra het nie, met die gevolg dat 'n bevel nie verleen is I nie, kan glad nie daarna op onderhoud aanspraak maak nie. Die vrou wat wel 'n onderhoudsbevel aangevra het maar dit nie verkry het nie omdat sy na die Hof se oordeel nie bystand benodig het of waarskynlik in die toekoms sou benodig nie, bevind haar in dieselfde bootjie. En die vrou wat op betaling van onderhoud geregtig geword het ingevolge 'n kontraktuele bepaling wat nie by die egskeidingsbevel ingelyf is nie, kan J nie ingevolge art 8(1) van die 1979 Wet daarna verhoogde onderhoud

Van Zyl J

A verkry nie. In al drie bogenoemde gevalle kan die vrou se finansiële posisie na die egskeiding weens onvoorsiene omstandighede net soseer versleg as dié van die vroulike gade wat wel 'n onderhoudsbevel verkry het, maar die 1979 Wet (net soos die 1953 Wet) verleen nie aan 'n Hof die bevoegdheid om eersgenoemde te hulp te kom nie. Dit kon dus nie 'n beleidsoorweging van die Wetgewer gewees het dat 'n geskeide vrou na ontbinding van die huwelik in beginsel op onderhoud, of verhoogde B onderhoud, aanspraak moet kan maak nie, of dat, in die woorde van Didcott R in die Claassens-saak op 370, "divorcees should not, as a class, become a financial burden on the community".'

The judgment of Didcott J, to which reference is made in this dictum, is that reported as Claassens v Claassens 1981 (1) SA 360 (N). In that C matter the parties agreed on a fixed monthly sum to be paid as maintenance and expressly stipulated that the wife (applicant in the matter before Didcott J) would 'not be entitled to apply for an increase in this amount'. It was held that such a stipulation constituted a waiver and was not in conflict with public policy.

D In the Schutte matter Van Heerden JA took cognisance of English law, which does regard a waiver of this nature as contra bonos mores. The learned Judge held, however, (at 884A), that other considerations apply in England from those applicable in South Africa, including the fact that, in England, a divorcee has a statutory right to claim maintenance even if she E was not granted maintenance at the time of dissolution of the marriage.

Van Heerden JA then concluded (at 884B) that the waiver incorporated in the agreement was valid and binding on both parties. The question whether a unilateral waiver of this nature was valid or not, was left open by the learned Judge (at 884E), since it was not relevant to the appeal. F Needless to say, the appeal succeeded and clause 2.1, excluded by the Court a quo, was made an order of Court.

In the case of Polliack v Polliack 1988 (4) SA 161 (W) the agreed maintenance was subject to annual escalations on the basis of a fixed formula. The concluding general clause of the agreement provided, G however, that the agreement was 'in full and final settlement of all property and other issues and claims' between the parties and that neither would have any further claims against the other except as provided for in the agreement. An application for an...