Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO

• Jurisdiction: South Africa

Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO
1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA)

1997 (4) SA p302

Citation	1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA)
Case No	650/93
Court	Hoogste Hof van Appèl
Judge	Streicher Wn AR, Hefer AR, Vivier AR, Olivier AR, Zulman AR
Heard	May 5, 1997; May 6, 1997
Judgment	May 30, 1997
Counsel	A J Smit (bygestaan deur M H Van Heerden) namens die appellant; J Van Der Berg (bygestaan deur D J Van Der Walt) namens die respondente

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde E

Kontrak — Partye tot kontrak — Handelingsbevoegdheid — Verstandelike bevoegdheid — Curatrix bonis van M (haar moeder) het in Verhoorhof teruggawe van F aandelesertifikate bekom wat M gesedeer het toe sy borg gestaan het vir haar seun se skuld — Verhoorhof het bevind dat M handelingsonbevoeg was toe sy borgooreenkoms en sessie onderteken het — Op appèl bevind meerderheid van Hof in lig van deskundige en feitlike getuienis dat M inderdaad nie nodige insig ten opsigte G van transaksies gehad het nie en dus wel handelingsonbevoeg was, en wys gevolglik appèl van die hand — Minderheid van Hof bevind egter dat handelingsonbevoegdheid nie bewys is nie maar dat beginsels van bona fides in omstandighede verg dat ooreenkomste nie teen M afgedwing word nie.

Kontrak — Wettigheid — Beginsels van bona fides — Hedendaagse rol van openbare belang en bona fides by kontraksluiting in minderheidsuitspraak heroorweeg. H

Prinsipaal en borg — Borgooreenkoms — Wettigheid — Beginsels van bona fides — In minderheidsuitspraak opgemerk dat waar borg opsigtelik liggaamlik swak is en laat blyk dat hy of sy verward is en moontlik nie implikasies van borgooreenkoms goed verstaan nie, of waar borg tot kennis van skuldeiser 'n eggenote is wat vir eggenoot I borg staan of bejaarde ouer is wat vir kind borg staan, verg openbare belang dat skuldeiser seker maak dat borg volle en werklike betekenis en implikasies van borgkontrak en enige gevolglike sessies goed begryp — Dit kan gedoen word deur aan te dring daarop dat borg onafhanklike regsadvies kry of deurdat skuldeiser self volle en werklike implikasies van borgkontrak en ander dokumente aan borg verduidelik. J

1997 (4) SA p303

Headnote : Kopnota

Die respondente het, in haar hoedanigheid as curatrix bonis van haar moeder, mev M, 'n A bevel in 'n Provinsiale Afdeling verkry wat die appellant ('ENB') beveel het om sekere aandelesertifikate wat mev M op 2 Mei 1989 aan ENB gesedeer het om haar seun se skulde te verseker, aan haar te oorhandig. Die Hof het ENB se teeneis, gebaseer op 'n borgakte van die bogenoemde sessie, afgewys op grond daarvan dat sy geestesongesteld en dus handelingsonbevoeg was toe sy die gewraakte dokumente onderteken het. ENB het teen die B beslissing geappelleer.

Die meerderheid van die Hoogste Hof van Appèl het by monde van Streicher Wn AR beslis dat dit in die lig van die deskundige en feitelike getuienis inderdaad waarskynlik was dat mev M nie by die ondertekening van die borgakte en sessie oor die vermoë beskik het om te verstaan C wat sy besig was om te doen of wat die moontlike gevolge van haar handelinge was nie, en dus die appèl van die hand gewys. (Op 315A–C, opgesom.)

Olivier AR het in 'n samestemmende minderheidsuitspraak aangedui dat hy nie kon saamstem dat mev M handelingsonbevoeg was toe sy die dokumente onderteken het nie. Hy het egter beslis dat die appèl afgewys moes word op grond van die toepassing van die bona fide D beginsel. (Op 318G/H–I.) Die Regter het die hedendaagse rol van die openbare belang en die bona fides by kontraksluiting in heroorweging geneem en opgemerk dat die Appèlafdeling reeds vroeg in die eeu die voortou geneem het om die beginsel te erken en te gebruik om nuwe en billike regsreëls te skep en regverdige oplossings vir probleme te vind waar die streng toepassing van bestaande regsreëls tot onbillikheid aanleiding sou gee. (Op 319B/C en E 320D/E–E.) In die onderhawige geval was mev M 85 jaar oud, hardhorend en amper blind toe sy gevra is om die gewraakte dokumente te onderteken. Baie dae was sy verward. Klaarblyklik het haar lieflingseun haar om sy pinkie gedraai om een na die ander uiters benadelende dokumente te onderteken. Sy was onder die indruk dat sy slegs besig was om die aandele aan hom beskikbaar te stel, sonder benadeling van haar regte, en dat sy maar slegs F teruglewering daarvan moes vra om hulle terug te kry. Sy het die dokumente onderteken sonder dat die inslag daarvan aan haar verduidelik is en sonder om hulle te lees. In hierdie omstandighede het die Regter gevoel dat die openbare belang nie vereis dat die algemene beginsel, dat 'n handelingsbevoegde kontraktant aan die ooreenkoms gebonde gehou moet word, strak deurgevoer moes word nie. Waar 'n borg, soos in die onderhawige geval, G opsigtelik liggaamlik swak is en laat blyk dat hy of sy verward is en moontlik nie die implikasies van die borgooreenkoms goed verstaan nie, of waar die borg tot die kennis van die skuldeiser 'n eggenote is wat vir die eggenoot borg staan of 'n bejaarde ouer is wat vir 'n kind borgstaan, verg die openbare belang dat die skuldeiser seker maak dat die borg die volle en werklike betekenis en implikasies van die borgkontrak en enige gevolglike sessies goed begryp. Dit kan H gedoen word deur aan te dring dat die borg onafhanklike regsadvies kry of deurdat die skuldeiser self die volle en werklike implikasies van die borgkontrak en ander dokumente aan die borg verduidelik. Wat in die onderhawige geval gebeur het, het ver tekort geskiet aan hierdie vereistes. (Op 330I/J–331H.)

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Contract — Parties to contract — Contractual capacity — Mental capacity — Curatrix bonis of M (her I mother) having in trial Court obtained return of shares ceded by M when she stood surety for her son's debts — Trial Court having found that M had lacked mental capacity when she had signed deed of suretyship and agreed to cession of shares — On appeal, majority of Court finding on basis of expert and factual evidence that M had indeed lacked mental capacity to understand nature J

1997 (4) SA p304

of agreements she had entered into, and dismissing appeal — Minority of Court of view A that insufficient evidence adduced to establish lack of contractual capacity but of opinion that enforcement of agreements would in circumstances contravene principles of bona fides.

Contract — Legality — Principles of bona fides — Role of public policy and bona fides in modern law of contract reconsidered in minority judgment. B

Principal and surety — Deed of suretyship — Legality — Principles of bona fides — Minority judgment pointing out that where surety obviously physically weak and apparently confused and possibly unable properly to understand contents of agreement, or where surety to knowledge of creditor debtor's spouse or elderly parent, public policy requiring that creditor ensure that surety understands full import and implications of agreement and any consequent cessions — This achievable by C insisting that surety obtain independent legal advice or by ensuring that creditor explain to surety full implications of agreement and any related documents.

Headnote : Kopnota

A Provincial Division had granted the respondent, acting in her capacity as curatrix bonis of her mother, Mrs M, an order directing the appellant ('FNB') to deliver to her certain share D certificates that her mother had on 2 May 1989 ceded to FNB to secure her son's debts. The Court had dismissed FNB's counterclaim based on a deed of suretyship and the abovementioned cession on the basis that she had been mentally ill and had accordingly lacked contractual capacity when she had signed the said documents. FNB appealed against the decision of the Court a quo.

In the Supreme Court of Appeal the majority, per Streicher AJA, concluded on the expert and E factual evidence that the probability was that Mrs M had indeed lacked the capacity to understand the nature or the consequences of her actions when she had entered into the said agreements, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. (At 315A–C, paraphrased.)

Olivier JA, in a concurring minority judgment, disagreed with the view that Mrs M had lacked contractual capacity when she had signed the agreements in question. He however concluded F that the appeal had to be dismissed on the basis of the application of the bona fide principle. (At 318G/H–I.) He reconsidered the role of public policy and bona fides in the modern law of contract, remarking that the Appellate Division had since the early years of the century taken the lead in recognising and applying the principle to establish new and equitable rules of law and to find equitable solutions where the strict application of the existing rules of law would have G resulted in injustice. (At 319B/C and 320D/E–E.) In the instant case Mrs M had been 85 years old, hard of hearing and almost blind when she was asked to sign the documents in question. At the time she had often been confused and disoriented. She had clearly been persuaded by her beloved son to sign one utterly prejudicial document after the other while H under the impression that she was merely making the shares available to him, without any prejudice to her rights, and that she needed only to ask for their return in order to get them back. She had signed the documents without having their import explained to her and without having read them. In these circumstances the Judge of Appeal felt that public policy did not require the strict application of the general rule that a contractor was bound by the contents of I the agreement. Where a surety was, as in the instant case, obviously physically weak and confused and possibly unable to understand fully the contents of the agreement, or where the surety was, to the knowledge of the creditor, the debtor's spouse or elderly parent, public policy required that the...