Aspects of minimum sentence legislation: Judicial comment and the courts' jurisdiction

JurisdictionSouth Africa
AuthorStephan Terblanche
Published date24 May 2019
Citation(2001) 14 SACJ 1
Date24 May 2019
Pages1-19
ARTICLE • ARTIKELS
Aspects of minimum sentence
legislation: judicial comment
and the courts' jurisdiction
STEPHAN TERBLANCHE*
Introduction
Few pieces of legislation affecting the criminal justice system have lately
received as much judicial comment as ss 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1997.
1
It is assumed that most readers are aware of the basic
content of this legislation. It contains mandatory and minimum sentences
2
for
most of the more serious crimes,
3
provides an escape clause when
'substantial and compelling circumstances' are present,
4
and has been
intended as a temporary measure
s
, mainly to alleviate the serious crime
*
B lur (PU vir CHE) LLD (SA),
Professor of Law in the Department of Criminal and Procedural
Law, University of South Africa.
1
Act 105 of 1997 — hereafter referred to as the Act'.
2
According to Davis J in
S v Jansen
1999 (2) SACR 368 (C) at 374f the Act does not create a
system of minimum sentencing
per se,
because of the escape clause; see also
S v Blaauw
1999
(2) SACR 295 (W) at 302i. However, there is little doubt that the minimum (or mandatory)
sentences prescribed in the Act provide the point of departure—the escape clause would
generally be employed in isolated instances only. It is submitted that, even if exceptions are
allowed, this is clearly a mandatory and minimum sentencing system.
3
It applies to offences committed after the date on which the Act came into operation (see n 5
below) —
S v Willemse
1999 (1) SACR 450 (C) (no clear indication of retroactive operation in
the Act). For more detail on the offences involved, see n 55 and 59 below.
4
See s 51(3)(a) and n 50 below.
5
The relevant sections were brought into operation by Proclamation R43 dated 1 May 1998. It
was initially intended to expire after 2 years (s 53(1)), but its operation was extended for
another year
by Prodamation R23 dated 28 April 2000, as provided for in s 53(2). It will
probably be extended again with effect from 1 May 2001. Section 53(2) has been amended by
the Judidal Matters Amendment Act 62 of 2000 (which has not come into operation at the time
of writing), to permit the President to extend the provisions for 2 years at a time.
1
(2001) 14 SACJ 1
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2
SACJ •
(2001) 14 •
SAS
problem in South Africa.
6
The sentences that have be imposed for many of
the offences have been increased quite dramatically.
7
The escape clause has taken up most of our courts' time. A substantial
amount of jurisprudence has, therefore, developed on the meaning of
'substantial and compelling circumstances'. This jurisprudence justifies an
article by itself. The present article will, therefore, be restricted to a discussion
of other aspects of the legislation that have drawn judicial comment.
General judicial comment
Mandatory and minimum sentences
8
are not new or unfamiliar phenomena
in the South African criminal justice system. Nor has either ever been
accepted without displeasure from our judiciary. The Act is no different.
9
The
courts' basic objection against such sentences is that they reduce the courts to
6
See 3 below for a discussion of the purpose(s) of this legislation.
Cf
S v Blaauw
8
Our courts have generally not distinguished mandatory from minimum sentences, and it is
not uncommon to find them referring to 'mandatory minimum' sentences— cf
S v Gibson
S v Toms
1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 822C (Corbett CJ);
S v Likuwa
1999 (2) SACR 44 (Nm) at 47;
S v Montgomery
2000 (2) SACR 318 (N) at 324. The main
reason for distinguishing mandatory and minimum sentences is that the former can be totally
suspended, whereas the latter cannot — s 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977;
S
v Toms
1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 828I-829G, 831H-J; see also SS Terblanche
The Guide to
Sentencing in South Africa
(1999) 63, 66. However, this distinction has no real significance
with respect to the Act, since s 51(5) specifically prohibits any suspension of the prescribed
sentences—see also
S v Homareda
1999 (2) SACR 319 (W) at 321d. Logically speaking,
however, the Act contains both mandatory and minimum sentences: the prescribed life
imprisonment in Part I of Schedule 2 does not allow for more than the minimum to be
imposed and, therefore, has to be seen as mandatory (cf the difference of opinion in
S v
Toms
1990 (2) SA 802 (A) 828I-829G, 831H-J in this regard). However, this is not the kind of
mandatory sentence referred to in
S v Toms
1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 806J if as a 'sentence
prescribed by the Legislature which leaves the court with no discretion at all— either in
respect of the kind of sentence to be imposed or, in the case of imprisonment, the period
thereof.'
9
Cf
S v Mofokeng
1999 (1) SACR 502 (W) at 525g (legislation unjust) and also: '...I find my
conscience and my sense of justice to have been challenged by the provisions of [the Act]';
S v
Budaza
1999 (2) SACR 491 (E) at 506 ('...I might well have been constrained to condude that
to implement the provisions of s 51 of the Act would be in conflict with my oath of office');
S v
Montgomery
2000 (2) SACR 318 (N) at 322f-g (most judges regard section 51 as
'disconcerting'). In contrast, and while acknowledging that the courts do not like mandatory
sentences,
S v Boer
2000 (2) SACR 114 (NC) at 121a ff appears to justify the provisions of the
Act (our country is plagued by serious crime, the legislature has been placed under increased
pressure by sodety to deal with this problem; it has temporarily prescribed drastic measures
that will be taken away when the situation is normalised; abnormal times require abnormal
measures to ensure the protection of democracy and the freedom of individuals).
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