The suitability and unsuitability of ubuntu in constitutional law - inter-communal relations versus public office-bearing

• DOI: 10.10520/EJC166192
• Pages: 231-257
• Date: 01 January 2014
• Author: Koos Malan
• Published date: 01 January 2014

231

The suitability and unsuitability of

ubuntu

in constitutional law – inter-communal

relations versus public office-bearing

Koos M alan

BA Hons (Pret)BIur LLB LLD (Unisa)

Professor of Public Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa

OPSOMMING

Die Toepaslikheid en Ontoepaslikheid van

Ubuntu

in die Staatsreg – Inter-

gemeenskapsbetrekkinge Teenoor Openbare Ampsbekkleding

In hierdie artikel word aangevoer dat ubuntu in bepaalde kontekste in die

staatsreg van besondere waarde kan wees, maar dat die toepaslikheid

daarvan op ander gebiede onder verdenking is. Wat die toepaslikheid

daarvan betref, word geredeneer dat daar ’n korpus van reg, genaamd die

reg van inter-gemeenskapsbetrekkinge aan die ontwikkel is. Die grondslag

hiervan is in die wesensaard van die staat self. Op die keper beskou is die

staat die beliggaming van, en waarborg vir die openbare vrede (of behoort

dit ten minste so te wees). Die openbare vrede is op sy beurt afhanklik van

die instandhouding van gesonde betrekkinge tussen gemeenskappe, by

gebreke waarvan die veiligheid van die gemeenskappe in die gedrang kom

en die stabiliteit, en trouens die voortbestaan van die staat self, in die

gedrang kom. In die bespreking word met verwysing na die beskouing in

Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor ubuntu aangevoer dat ubuntu saam met die

verbod op haatspraak en dergelike verbiedinge wat die openbare vrede

kan ontwrig, sowel as die internasionale reg rakende volksmoord en

verwante internasionale misdade, die ontluikende reg van inter-

gemeenskapsbetrekkinge, beliggaam. Daarenteen kan ubuntu egter

treffend ontoepaslik wees naamlik op die gebied van openbare

ampsbekleding. Die kernvraag by openbare ampsbekleding is of die

ampsbekleër vir die openbare amp waarin sy/haar aangestel is, geskik is

en die pligte wat met die amp vereenselwig word, soos dit in die

toepaslike reg beskryf word, getrou (kan) uitvoer. Openbare

ampsbekleding hang juis nie primêr van die persoonlike verhoudings van

die ampsbekleër met die publiek of met die hoofde of ondersgeskiktes van

die ampsbekleër af nie. Inteendeel, warm verhou dings kan j uis

verkeerdelik voortspruit uit oorwegings wat allermins met die betrokke

amp vereenselwigbaar is. Dit kan voorkom omdat die kunsmatige

identiteit van openbare ampsbekleding met vermeende ubuntu-

geïnspireerde knusse betrekkinge wat niks met die nakoming van

openbare ampspligte te doen het nie, verwar word. Om hierdie rede is die

aanwending van ubuntu-geïnspireerde goeie verhoudings in die konteks

van openbare ampsbekding bevraagtekenbaar.

1Introduction

The value of ubuntu, among other things encapsulating the notions of

humaneness, human dignity, reconciliation, group solidarity,

compassion, the establishment and the maintenance of warm relations

and restorative justice is autochthonous to South African law, more in

232 2014 De Jure

particular South African constitutional law. Lately it has come to play an

increasingly important part in South African constitutional jurisprudence.

It is not possible to measure exactly how prominent the place is that

ubuntu occupies in the public order and in the public service. However,

judging by the Constitutional Court, who observed that the spirit of

ubuntu is part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the

population,1 ubuntu might be far more important than one might

generally tend to assume. This article assesses the relevance or otherwise

of ubuntu in constitutional law. The discussion proceeds from the

jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on ubuntu, thus begin ning in

section 2 with an overview of the judicial pronouncements on ubuntu.

This discussion casts light on the definition and the field of application of

ubuntu as viewed by the courts. There is a corpus of South African

academic literature on ubuntu.2 In this corpus ubuntu is generally very

favourably viewed. However, there is also stinging critique against

ubuntu as for example in the thoroughly researched article by Ilze Keevy,

who argues that ubuntu is fundamentally at odds with the values of

equality and tolerance as endorsed by the South African constitution.3

Moreover, even those who generally praised ubuntu as a lofty ethical-

legal value complex, encounter serious difficulties in their attempts to

offer a workable core-definition of ubuntu.4 Moreover, some attempts to

define ubuntu were to my mind so airy-fairy that they fail to

communicate anything of value about ubuntu.5 For that reason, but for a

few exceptions such as the discussion by Bilchitz, the academic

commentary is mainly left aside in this article. The focus instead is on

ubuntu as assessed by the courts. In the next two sections of the article

the rightful place that ubuntu should occupy in constitutional law is

considered. Hence, if there is a place for ubuntu, as the affirming dicta of

the courts clearly suggest, the question is how to delineate the

1Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 517; 2004 (12)

BCLR 1258 (CC) par 37.

2 See in this regard for example Bennett “Ubuntu: an African equity” 2011

Potchefstroomse Elektronoese Regsblad (PER/PELJ) (14); English “Ubuntu: the

quest for an indigenous jurisprudence” 1996 SAJHR 641-648; Keevy

“Ubuntu versus the c ore values o f the South African Constitution” 2009

Journal for Juridical Science 34(2) 19-58; Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the law in

South Africa” 1998 Buff Hum Rts L Rev (4) 15-23; Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the

law in South Africa” 1998 Potchefstroomse Elektronoese Regsblad (PER/PELJ)

15-26; Cornell “Ubuntu, pluralism and the responsibility of legal academics

to the new South Africa” 2009 (20) Law and Cri tique 43-58; Cornell “A call

for a nuanced constitutional jurisprudence: Ubuntu, dignity and

reconciliation” 2004 SAPR/PL 666-675; Bilchitz “Citizenship and

community: explaining the right to receive basic municipal services in

Joseph” 2010 Constitutional Court Review 45-78.

3 Keevy 2009.

4 Mokgoro 16.

5 The definition offered by Cornell 2009 47 is a striking example of, to my

mind, such failed attempt which reads: “For now we may define ubuntu as

the African principle of transcendence through which an individual is pulled

out of himself or herself back towards the ancestors, forward towards the

community, and towards the potential each one of us has”.