The Misuse and Abuse of Section 80J of the Income Tax Act

JurisdictionSouth Africa
Date01 March 2023
Published date01 March 2023
DOI10.10520/ejc-btclq_v14_n1_a2
Pages1-12
AuthorEd Liptak
1
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
The Misuse and Abuse of
Section 80J of the Income Tax Act:
TIME TO GET BACK TO THE BASICS
ED LIPTAK*
ABSTRACT
Section 80J of the Income Tax Act was introduced in 2006 as part of the
then new General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR). This section requires the
Commissioner to notify a taxpayer at the point in an audit when he/she
f‌i rst comes to believe that the GAAR may be applicable to an arrangement
entered into or carried out by the taxpayer. It was enacted in response to
concerns that the new GAAR might be automatically relied upon by SARS
as a ‘catch-all’ section of last resort without due and proper consideration.
Commentators also expressed concerns about conduct of audits under
former s103, particularly with respect to delays they encountered and the
time and expensed they incurred.
Section 80J attempted to address these concerns by providing a logical
framework for the timeous conduct of audits under the new GAAR.
Subsection (1) requires the Commissioner to notify the taxpayer if he/she
believes the GAAR may be applicable to an arrangement and state his/her
reasons therefor; sub-s (2) gives the taxpayer an opportunity to respond to
that notice; sub-s (3) requires the Commissioner to take further action within
a specif‌i c statutory time frame; and sub-s (4) permits the Commissioner to
revise or modify his reasons for applying the GAAR in light of any additional
information that may come to his knowledge.
Two recent judgments have raised concerns about the current approach
being taken to s 80J by taxpayers and, to a certain extent, SARS itself. In
particular, taxpayers appear to be taking the position that section 80J(1),
read together with the statutory def‌i nition of ‘arrangement’, have imposed a
burden upon the Commissioner to identify and describe a transaction, opera-
tion or scheme with an exacting degree of precision never before required
under the former s103 or its predecessors. This approach cannot be support
by a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the provisions
involved, and, in fact, would severely frustrate both the overriding purpose of
the current GAAR and the specif‌i c purposes of s80J itself.
Introduction
Two recent judgments, one by the High Court and one by the Tax Court,
have raised two important questions regarding notice requirements intro-
duced by s 80J (‘section 80J notice’) of the Income Tax Act (‘the Act’).
The f‌i rst concerns the basic nature and purpose of those requirements.
The second concerns the meaning of the term ‘arrangement’, as used in
* Independent Tax Person Extraordinaire.

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