The Constitutional Court of Uganda: Blurring/misunderstanding its jurisdiction

AuthorMujuzi, J.D.
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a2
Published date21 April 2022
Date21 April 2022
Citation(2022) 9(1) Journal of Comparative Law in Africa 24
Pages24-66
24
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA:
BLURRING/MISUNDERSTANDING ITS
JURISDICTION
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi*
Abstract
Article 137 of the Constitution of Uganda (the Constitution) provides for the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court (the Court) to interpret the Constitution
and to determine whether any law or conduct—act or omission—is contrary to the
Constitution. The drafting history of art 137 shows that the court’s jurisdiction to
interpret the Constitution is different from that of declaring whether any law or
conduct is inconsistent with the Constitution. However, the jurisprudence of the
Court shows that it has blurred the distinction between these two mandates. In this
article, the author relies on the drafting history of art 137 to argue, inter alia, that
the Court’s approach in this regard is debatable. It is also argued that, although
the intention of the drafters of the Constitution was that the Court was not to
be the first and final court in matters of constitutional interpretation, the literal
interpretation of art 137 and the jurisprudence on art 137 show the opposite. It is
further argued that in some instances the Court has misunderstood its jurisdiction
under art 137(5) and (6) and that the Court does not have the power to declare
legislation unconstitutional under art 137(5). It is also submitted that the Court’s
argument that its jurisdiction is limited to interpreting the Constitution or that any
petition before it cannot be resolved without first interpreting the Constitution is
erroneous. It is further argued that Uganda may have to follow the South African
model in which other courts, such as the High Court and the Supreme Court of
Appeal, are also empowered to declare legislation unconstitutional.
Keywords: Uganda; constitutional court; jurisdiction; interpretation;
art 137; drafting history
Résumé
L’art 137 de la Constitution de L’Ouganda (la Constitution) prévoit la compétence
de la Cour Constitutionnelle (la Cour): interpréter la Constitution et déterminer
si une loi ou un comportement – acte ou omission – est contraire à la Constitution.
L’historique de la rédaction de l’art 137 montre que la compétence de la Cour pour
interpréter la Constitution est totalement différente de celle de déclarer si une loi
ou un comportement est contraire à la Constitution. Cependant, la jurisprudence
de la Cour montre qu’elle a brouillé la distinction entre ces deux mandats. Dans
cet article, l’auteur s’appuie sur l’historique de la rédaction de l’art 137 pour
soutenir, entre autres, que l’approche de la Cour a cet égard est discutable. Il affirme
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa.
Email: djmujuzi@gmail.com. I am grateful to Prof Joe Oloka-Onyango, Makerere University,
for the comments on the draft of this article. The usual caveats apply.
(2022) 9(1) Journal of Comparative Law in Africa 24
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA: BLURRING/
MISUNDERSTANDING ITS JURISDICTION 25
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a2
également que, bien que l’intention des rédacteurs de la Constitution fût que la
Cour ne soit pas la première et la dernière juridiction en matière d’interprétation
constitutionnelle, l’interprétation littérale de l’art 137 et la jurisprudence sur
l’art 137 montrent le contraire. Il est également avancé qu’il existe des cas où la
Cour a mal compris sa compétence au titre de l’art 137, paragraphes 5 et 6, et que
la Cour n’a pas le pouvoir de déclarer une législation inconstitutionnelle au titre de
l’art 137, paragraphe 5. Il est également soutenu que l’argument de la Cour selon
lequel sa compétence est limitée à l’interprétation de la Constitution ou que toute
requête devant elle ne peut être résolue sans interpréter d’abord la Constitution est
erroné. Il est également avancé que l’Ouganda pourrait devoir suivre le modèle sud-
africain dans lequel d’autres tribunaux tels que la Haute Cour et la Cour suprême
d’appel sont également habilités à déclarer la législation inconstitutionnelle.
Mots-clés : Ouganda; Cour constitutionnelle; compétence; interprétation;
art 137; historique de la rédaction
Introduction
In 1995, Uganda adopted a new constitution. Article 137 of the
Constitution provides for the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
(the Court). It states that:
(1) Any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution shall be
determined by the Court of Appeal sitting as the constitutional court.
(2) …
(3) A person who alleges that— (a) an Act of Parliament or any other
law or anything in or done under the authority of any law; or (b) any
act or omission by any person or authority, is inconsistent with or in
contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may petition the
constitutional court for a declaration to that effect, and for redress where
appropriate.
(4) Where upon determination of the petition under clause (3) of this
article the constitutional court considers that there is need for redress
in addition to the declaration sought, the constitutional court may—
(a) grant an order of redress; or (b) refer the matter to the High Court to
investigate and determine the appropriate redress.
(5) Where any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution
arises in any proceedings in a court of law other than a field court martial,
the court— (a) may, if it is of the opinion that the question involves a
substantial question of law; and (b) shall, if any party to the proceedings
requests it to do so, refer the question to the constitutional court for
decision in accordance with clause (1) of this article.
(6) Where any question is referred to the constitutional court under
clause (5) of this article, the constitutional court shall give its decision on
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26 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN AFRICA VOL 9, NO 1, 2022
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the question, and the court in which the question arises shall dispose of
the case in accordance with that decision.
The above provisions show that the Constitutional Court has the
following five mandates: to interpret the Constitution; to decide whether
any Act of Parliament is inconsistent with or in contravention of the
Constitution; to determine whether ‘any other law’ other than an Act of
Parliament is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution;
to determine whether ‘anything in or done under the authority of any
law’ is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution; and to
determine whether ‘any act or omission by any person or authority’ is
inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution. The drafting
history and a literal interpretation of art 137 also show that the Court
has the above five mandates. However, its jurisprudence shows that it
has taken the view that its only mandate is to interpret the Constitution
and that, in doing so, it must follow the guidelines in art 137(3). In this
article, the author argues that the drafting history of art 137 and its literal
interpretation show that the mandate of the Court is not limited to
interpreting the Constitution. The jurisprudence of the Court also shows
that, although it has held that it does not have the mandate to enforce
human rights unless the issue of human rights enforcement is incidental
to interpreting the Constitution, many of its decisions show that the
Court has blurred the distinction between its jurisdiction to interpret the
Constitution and its mandate to enforce human rights. The author argues
that the Court will have to take into consideration the drafting history
of art 137 in order to ensure that its jurisprudence does not go against
the letter and spirit of art 137.1 The author also argues that, although the
intention of the drafters of the Constitution was that the Court was not
to be the first and final court in matters of constitutional interpretation,
a literal interpretation of art 137 and the jurisprudence on art 137 show
the opposite. The author also argues that, although the word ‘may’ is used
in art 137(5), once another court comes to the conclusion that there is a
need for the Constitution to be interpreted, it must refer the case to the
Constitutional Court. It is further argued that in some cases the Court
has misunderstood its jurisdiction under art 137(5) and (6) and that the
Court does not have the power to declare legislation unconstitutional
under art 137(5). The author will consider the drafting history of art 137
before discussing the jurisprudence of the Court.
1 Although in some instances the Court states that it relies on the drafting history of the
Constitution to exercise its jurisdiction under art 137, it never refers to the Constituent Assembly
debates. See, for example, Nampongo and Anor v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 43 of
2012) [2021] UGCC 37 (9 February 2021) at 11.
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