States of emergency and the rule of law under contemporary African constitutions: A comparative analysis

• Author: Abdulrauf, L.A.
• Published date: 30 June 2021
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a3
• Date: 30 June 2021
• Pages: 67-101

https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a3

67

STATES OF EMERGENCY AND THE RULE OF

LAW UNDER CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN

CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS*

Lukman Adebisi Abdulrauf†

Abstract

Emergencies, whether natural or man-made, are inevitable in contemporary societies.

Although the nature and magnitude of such emergencies are usually unpredictable,

governments across the world must adopt measures to mitigate and control the

emergency while securing the lives and properties of the people. Since emergencies

envisage exceptional circumstances, there may be the need for the suspension of the

normal legal order and its temporary replacement with an extraordinary regime

to help restore the normal legal order. During the subsistence of the extraordinary

regime, the question that has always concerned modern-day constitutionalists is

how the rule of law can be maintained in such a regime which is characterised

by the suspension of the normal legal order. This concern is even more apparent

in Africa considering the general attitude of political leaders who will want to

take advantage of every opportunity to abuse human rights, consolidate powers

and remain in government. All these concerns therefore centre on the nature and

scope of state of emergency provisions in constitutions and their implementation.

Therefore, in this article, I will comparatively analyse the nature and scope of state

of emergency provisions under modern African constitutions to determine the extent

to which they are inclusive and embrace the basic tenets of the rule of law. I will

further interrogate the applicability of the rule of law in states of emergency using

recent practices in selected African countries.

Keywords: state of emergency; rule of law; constitutionalism; African

constitutions; comparative analysis

Résumé

Les situations d’urgence, qu’elles soient naturelles ou causées par l’homme, sont

inévitables dans les sociétés contemporaines. Bien que la nature et l’ampleur de

* The first draft of this article was presented at the 10th World Congress of Constitutional Law

held in Seoul, South Korea between 18–22 June 2018. I thank Prof C.M. Fombad for initiating the

ideas upon which this article is based and for shaping my thoughts in this regard and Prof Erika

de Wet for generously providing the necessary financial support. I also thank all the participants on

the session on ‘states of emergency’ and the anonymous reviewers for the insightful comments. All

errors are however mine.

Although, the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted on the discussions on state of

emergency recently, I have deliberately omitted it from this paper for two reasons. First, most African

states relied on emergency power in public health legislation rather than declare a state of emergency

based on their constitutions. Secondly, other works have specifically considered emergency powers

and COVID-19 in the African context.

† Senior Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. Fellow, Institute for

International and Comparative Law in Africa. E-mail: abdulrauf la@unilorin.edu.ng

(2021) 8(1) Journal of Comparative Law in Africa 67

© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

68 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN AFRICA VOL 8, NO 1, 2021

https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a3

telles situations d’urgence soient généralement imprévisibles, les gouvernements du

monde entier doivent adopter des mesures pour atténuer et contrôler ces situations,

tout en protégeant la vie et les propriétés des personnes. Étant donné que les

urgences présagent des circonstances exceptionnelles, celles-ci peuvent requérir la

suspension de l’ordre juridique normal et son remplacement temporaire par un

régime extraordinaire. Au cours de l’application du régime juridique extraordinaire,

la question qui a toujours été posée par les constitutionnalistes modernes est celle

de savoir comment l’état de droit peut être maintenu et respecté dans un régime

qui se caractérise par des violations des droits de l’homme et par une suspension de

l’état de droit. Cette préoccupation est encore plus pertinente en Afrique, compte

tenu de l’attitude générale des dirigeants politiques qui cherchent à profiter de

toutes les occasions possibles pour abuser des droits de l’homme, consolider leurs

pouvoirs et rester au gouvernement. Toutes ces préoccupations sont donc au cœur

de la nature et de la portée des dispositions portant sur l’état d’urgence contenues

dans les constitutions. Par conséquent, l’objectif de cet article est d’analyser de

manière comparée la nature et la portée des dispositions sur l’état d’urgence dans

les constitutions africaines modernes afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure elles

intègrent les principes de base de l’état de droit. L’article tente de concilier la théorie

et la récente pratique de l’état d’urgence en Afrique.

Mots-clés : état d’urgence; état de droit; constitutionnalisme;

constitutions africaines; étude comparative

Introduction

One of the major causes of the dictatorships during post-independence

Africa was the ease with which governments arbitrarily abused emergency

powers to suppress dissenting voices and entrench themselves in power.

This phenomenon formed one of the critical issues that constitutional

designers contended with during the post-1990 constitutional reforms

that is, determining how and when governments should act when faced

with any crisis that threatens the future and stability of the country.1

Most African post-independence constitutions focused mainly on the

process of declaring states of emergency and the powers exercisable

thereof without making corresponding provisions ensuring that the rule

of law prevails during such states of emergency. This made it convenient

for African leaders to violate human rights and the rule of law under

the pretence of restoring the legal order. Therefore, it was considered

that the rule of law is incongruous with states of emergency. In most

African constitutions, there was hardly any clear legal definition of the

term “emergency” or similar concepts such as “state of siege”, yet there

1 Fombad, C.M. & Abdulrauf, L.A. ‘Comparative overview of the constitutional framework for

controlling the exercise of emergency powers in Africa’ (2020) 20 African Human Rights Law Journal

376–411 at 378.

© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

STATES OF EMERGENCY AND THE RULE OF LAW UNDER CONTEMPORARY

AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 69

https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a3

are infinite kinds of emergencies or crises that can be thought of and that

should be legally defined. Not every threat, regardless of its magnitude,

deserves to warrant the declaration of a state of emergency. Has this

changed with the sweeping post-1990 constitutional reforms?

In this article, I will review the situation under the new or revised

post-1990 constitutions that operate in Africa today to see the extent to

which constitutional provisions now balance state security and public

order on the one hand against the rule of law on the other. After this

introduction, I will briefly consider the common terms in use besides a

state of emergency, such as ‘state of exception’ and ‘state of siege’ in the

next part of the article. I will examine the scope of provisions on states

of emergency under contemporary African constitutions. Then, I will

consider the questions: who declares a state of emergency, under what

circumstances, by what methods this is done, which are the institutions

involved, and what checks are provided to guard against any abuse of

emergency powers. In part 4, I will review a few case studies of the

use of emergency powers in the last two decades. The critical issue I

will interrogate here is the extent to which the rule of law is taken

into consideration during the exercise of emergency powers in Africa.

I conclude the article in the last part with some reflection on states of

emergency in contemporary Africa.

For the purpose of this article, I will focus on states of emergency norms

which are constitutionally entrenched – usually referred to as “emergency

constitution”.2 This, therefore, excludes other regimes of emergencies

such as those contained in legislation and other legal instruments like

decrees promulgated during a state of emergency. The reason for this

being the general assumption that a constitution is the most appropriate

legal instrument to guarantee rights and, of course, promote the rule of

law. The idea is therefore to analyse the extent to which constitutions

incorporate the rule of law principles in emergency provisions.

Overview of terms used for state of emergency under modern

African constitutions

The constitutions of African countries, as with most countries in

the world, have adopted a series of terms/phrases to depict a state of

emergency. This, according to Andrej Zwitter, leads to ambiguity and lack

2 See for example, Ackerman, B. ‘The emergency constitution’ (2004) 113 The Yale Law Journal

1029–1091. According to ChristianBjørnskov and StefanVoigt, emergency constitution is “the set

of formal legal provisions encoded in the constitution that specify who can declare an emergency,

under which conditions an emergency can be declared, who needs to approve the declaration, and

which actors have which special powers once it has been declared that the constitution does not

assign to them outside emergencies…”. Bjørnskov, C. & Voigt, S. ‘The architecture of emergency

constitutions’ (2018) 16(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 101–127 at 103.

© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd