S v Stanfield

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1997 (1) SACR 221 (C)

S v Stanfield
1997 (1) SACR 221 (C)

1997 (1) SACR p221

Citation	1997 (1) SACR 221 (C)
Court	Kaapse Provinsiale Afdeling
Judge	Traverso R
Heard	September 13, 1996
Judgment	September 26, 1996
Counsel	N Louwrens en A Mopp namens die Staat; A H Veldhuizen en W A King namens die appellant

Flynote: Sleutelwoorde

B Borg — Aansoek om — Faktore wat in aanmerking geneem moet word — Beskuldigde aangekla van oortreding van art 5(b) van Wet op Dwelms en Dwelmsmokkelary 140 van 1992 vir handeldryf in Mandrax — Behels misdryf in terme van Bylae 5 van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 — Artikel 60(11) C gevolglik van toepassing — By die vraag of sy vrylating strydig met die belange van geregtigheid was moes oorweging daaraan geskenk word of een van die faktore genoem in art 60(4) vasgestel is — Hof a quo het uit die oog verloor dat slegs indien 'n hof tevrede is dat enige van die vier gronde genoem in art 60(4) waarskynlik is, dit 'n bevinding regverdig dat die voortgesette aanhouding in die belang van geregtigheid is — Borg op appèl toegestaan. D

Headnote: Kopnota

Die appellant is aangekla van 'n oortreding van art 5(b) van Wet 140 van 1992 deurdat hy handel gedryf het in Mandrax tablette. Sy borg aansoek is in die landdroshof van die hand gewys en is op appèl geneem. Dit was gemene saak dat die E misdryf waarvan die appellant aangekla was 'n misdryf is soos bedoel in Bylae 5 van die Strafproses- wet 51 van 1977 (die Wet) en dat die bepalings van art 60(11) van die Wet gevolglik van toepassing was. Die Hof het beslis dat al wat die appellant moes aantoon is dat sy vrylating nie strydig met die belang van geregtigheid is nie, en by die oorweging van hierdie vraag moet oorweging daaraan geskenk word of die F getuienis een of meer van die faktore genoem in art 60(4) van die Wet vasgestel het. Om hierdie artikel anders te interpreteer sou tot gevolg hê dat hierdie bepalings strydig is met die beskuldigde se fundamentele reg soos verskans in art 25(2)(d) van die Grondwet 200 van 1993, want dit sou 'n haas onmoontlike bewyslas op die beskuldigde plaas. G

Gedurende die verhoor het die appellant die polisiedossier aan die Hof ingehandig. Die Hof het beslis dat as daar nie oorweging daaraan geskenk word sou dit kon lei tot 'n kennelike misbruik van die bepalings van art 60(11), want dan kon die Staat slegs 'n klagstaat saamflans wat voldoende bewerings daarstel om 'n misdryf soos omskryf in Bylae 5 van die Wet daar te stel en sodoende die bewyslas op 'n beskuldigde plaas. H Daar moes dus voldoende feitelike bewerings in die klagstaat gemaak word om aan te toon dat die Staat ten minste 'n prima facie saak teen die beskuldigde het. Die karige bewerings in die bestaande klagstaat het nie aan daardie vereiste voldoen nie en derhalwe moes die bewerings wat daarin vervat word oorweeg word saam met die I inhoud van die dossier. Die inhoud van die dossier was per slot van sake verskaf in die plek van verdere besonderhede.

Die Hof het bevind dat die getuienis wat die Staat teen die appellant gehad het uiters karig was. Die ondersoek is afgehandel en daar is J

1997 (1) SACR p222

geen getuienis aangebied in die hof a quo van enige verdere ondersoeke wat moontlik A mag geskied nie. Ingevolge art 25(3)(b) van die Grondwet is die beskuldigde geregtig om in voldoende besonderhede van die aanklag verwittig te word. Waar, soos in hierdie geval, dit nie gedoen word nie en aangevul word deur die verklarings wat die inhoud van die dossier vorm, word die inhoud van die dossier voor die hand liggend B relevant en moet in aanmerking geneem word by oorweging van die vraag of die voortgesette aanhouding van die appellant in die belang van geregtigheid is. Dit was gemene saak dat die wel en wee van die appellant vir meer as 'n jaar aan die Staat bekend was. Desnieteenstaande is hy nooit gearresteer nie en geen getuienis is voor C die hof geplaas om die Staat se bewerings te bewys dat die appellant die openbare veiligheid sal bedreig, dat hy verder misdrywe sal pleeg, dat hy getuies sal intimideer en dat hy getuienis sal verberg nie.

By die vraag of die appellant hom van sy bewyslas gekwyt het, het die Hof in D aanmerking geneem dat die Staat nie aangevoer het dat die appellant nie sy verhoor sal staan nie. Die appellant het geen vorige veroordelings ten opsigte van dwelmverwante misdrywe gehad nie en al het die hof aanvaar dat die appellant 'n bendelid was, was daar geen getuienis dat hy aktief deelgeneem het aan dwelmhandel nie. Ten opsigte van die vraag of die appellant aangehou mag word as 'n voorkomende maatreël het die E Hof beslis dat daar geen getuienis is wat sou aandui dat die appellant 'n geneigdheid het om verdere misdrywe te pleeg nie.

Die Hof het beslis, op 'n oorwig van waarskynlikhede, dat geeneen van die faktore genoem in art 60(4)(a), (b), (c) of (d) bewys is nie. Die hof a quo het voorts uit die F oog verloor dat slegs indien 'n hof tevrede is dat enige van die vier gronde genoem in art 60(4) waarskynlik is, dit 'n bevinding regverdig dat die voortgesette aanhouding in die belang van geregtigheid is.

Gevolglik is die beskuldigde vrygelaat op borg op sekere toepaslike voorwaardes. G

Flynote: Sleutelwoorde

Bail — Application for — Factors to be taken into account — Appellant charged with dealing in drugs in contravention of s 5(b) of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 — Constitutes offence in terms of Schedule 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 — Section 60(11) accordingly applicable — In H determining whether release will prejudice interest of justice consider whether one of factors set out in s 60(4) has been established — Court a quo lost sight of fact that denial of bail would be in interest of justice only if one of the factors set out in s 60(4) was probable — Bail accordingly granted on appeal.

Headnote: Kopnota

I The accused was charged with dealing in Mandrax tablets in contravention of s 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. Bail was denied in the magistrate's court and the matter was then taken on appeal. It was common cause that the crime with which the appellant was charged constituted an offence in terms of Schedule 5 of the J

1997 (1) SACR p223

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and that the provisions of s 60(11) of the Act A were accordingly applicable. The onus was on the appellant to prove that his release would not prejudice the interest of justice and that in assessing this question consideration had to be given to whether any of the factors set out in s 60(4) of the Act had been established. It was held that to interpret this section any differently would conflict with the appellant's fundamental rights as entrenched in s 25(2)(d) of the B Constitution Act 200 of 1993 as it would result in an almost impossible burden of proof being placed on the accused.

During the trial the appellant handed the police docket in to the court. The Court held that if consideration was not given thereto it could lead to a recognisable breach of s C 60(11) in that the State could then knock together a charge sheet with sufficient allegations amounting to an offence in terms of Schedule 5, thereby placing the onus on the accused. There should accordingly be sufficient factual allegations in the charge sheet to show that the State at least had a prima facie case against an accused. As the D paltry allegations in the present charge sheet did not satisfy this condition consideration had to be given to the statements in the docket. The contents of the docket took the place of further particulars.

The Court found that there was little evidence against the appellant. The investigation was completed and there was no evidence that the investigation was to be extended. E The appellant was entitled to be informed with sufficient particularity of the charge. As this was not done and the lack thereof was supplemented with the contents of the docket, the docket became relevant to the question whether the continued detention of the accused was in the interest of justice. It was common cause that the State had been F aware of the whereabouts of the appellant for more than a year. Despite this, he was never arrested and no evidence was placed before the court to support the State's allegations that his release would be prejudicial to the security of the State, that he would commit further crimes, that he would interfere with State witnesses and that he would conceal evidence. G

In deciding whether the appellant had discharged the onus of proof, regard was had to the fact that the State did not contend that the accused would not stand trial, that he did not have any previous convictions of a similar nature, and that even if the court accepted that the accused was a member of a gang there was no evidence that he was involved in dealing in drugs. As to the question of whether the appellant could be H further detained as a preventative measure, the Court held that there was no evidence that he had a propensity to commit the crime for which he was charged.

The Court held, on consideration of all the evidence and on a balance of probabilities, that none of the factors in s 60(4)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act were proven. The I court a quo had lost sight of the fact that the denial of bail would be in the interests of justice only if one of the four grounds set out in s 60(4) of the Act were probable.

The appellant was accordingly granted bail on appropriate conditions. J

1997 (1) SACR p224

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n beslissing in 'n landdroshof waar borg geweier is. A

N Louwrens en A Mopp namens die Staat.

A H Veldhuizen en W A King namens die appellant.

Cur adv vult. B

Postea (1996 September 26).

Judgment

Traverso R:

Op 4 September 1996 het die appellant aansoek gedoen om borg in die Landdroshof te Kaapstad. Die aansoek is van...