S v L

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Mullins J, Jennett J and Erasmus J
• Judgment Date: 13 June 1991
• Hearing Date: 28 January 1991
• Court: Eastern Cape Division

Mullins J:

The appellant is the mother of a ten-year-old daughter, L. She B alleges that respondent is the father of the child. Since the birth of the child, respondent has from time to time paid maintenance to appellant for the said child, at first voluntarily, and subsequently in terms of a maintenance court order.

Respondent alleges that, despite these payments of maintenance, he has C at no time admitted paternity of the child. Although he admits that he had intercourse with appellant at about the time L was conceived, he contends that he was not the only one to do so. He also alleges that appellant had stated that L was not his child.

During 1988 appellant brought an application in the maintenance court D for an increase in the amount of maintenance payable by respondent from R100 per month to R250 per month. The application was opposed by respondent, who through his attorneys requested that appellant and L subject themselves to blood tests in order to establish whether respondent was the father of the child. Despite having previously been prepared to consent to such tests, appellant has now refused to do so. The application E for the increase in maintenance was thereupon postponed to enable respondent to bring an application in this Court for an order requiring appellant and L to subject themselves to the required tests.

The matter came before my Brother Burger, Mr Kingsley having, at the instance of respondent, been appointed as curator ad litem to L. After F hearing argument on behalf of both appellant and respondent, as well as by the curator ad litem, Burger AJ made an order as prayed. The full order reads as follows:

'(1)

Dat respondent en haar minderjarige dogter L hulle moet onderwerp aan die neem van 'n monster ten einde bloed- en weefseltoetse te laat doen.

(2)

G Dat applikant die koste van die respondent en haar dogter wat vir die doel in para 1 aangegaan word, moet betaal.

(3)

Dat applikant sy koste en dié van die kurator ad litem moet betaal.

(4)

Dat respondent haar koste moet betaal.'

Leave to appeal to the Full Bench of this Division having been granted, H appellant now appeals against the said order. The curator ad litem was not joined by the appellant as a party to the appeal, but Mr Kingsley, as curator ad litem, deemed it his duty to appear before us to argue the appeal on behalf of L. In doing so, Mr Kingsley adopted a very correct and proper course, and the Court commends him for his attitude. Unfortunately the respondent was not represented by counsel in the appeal, but he I appeared before us in person, and made certain submissions, which do not, however, assist in resolving the issues presently before us.

It will be convenient at the commencement to set out the basis upon which the respondent claimed the relief he sought. He states that he unsuccessfully sought the consent of appellant to subject herself and her child to blood tissue tests ('bloedweefseltoetse') in order to determine I the

Mullins J

A paternity of the child. He says that he required such tests in order to place medical evidence before the court to support his denial of paternity. He offers to pay for such tests and, of course, to provide whatever blood and other samples might be required from him.

In regard to the possible effect on the child of the results of such tests, he says that it will provide certainty whether he is the father or B not, and that if he is shown not to be the father, appellant will still have a claim against one Lottering, whom respondent alleges also to have been intimate with appellant during the relevant period. Respondent states baldly that the 'bloedweefseltoetse' ought not themselves to have any harmful or prejudicial effects on the child.

C The papers are totally lacking in any information regarding the precise nature of the proposed tests, whether samples of only blood or also of other tissue are required, the quantity of such samples, the method of obtaining such samples, and the pain and other consequences attendant thereon. Furthermore the respondent merely makes the bald allegation that D such tests will determine whether he is the father of the child or not. Respondent's occupation is not apparent from the papers, but I am satisfied that he has no expert knowledge to support such an allegation. We were referred in argument to various authorities and articles in which the value of such tests is discussed, and these certainly suggest that modern technology is able with a high degree of probability to exclude a E particular individual from being the father of a child and, with a lesser degree of probability, to confirm whether he is the father.

In this regard Burger AJ stated in his judgment as follows:

'Die applikant het nie enige verklarings ingehandig om te bewys wat met bloed- en weefseltoetse bereik kan word nie, maar betoog dat die Hof F geregtelike kennis daarvan kan neem. Daar was in die saak Van der Harst v Viljoen 1977 (1) SA 795 (K) volledige getuienis gelei oor hierdie aangeleentheid, dié getuienis was nie betwis nie. Dieselfde inligting verskyn ook in handboeke (sien Schafer Family Law Service J78, en Boberg The Law of Persons and the Family op 332 voetnota 31), en dit word tans na my mening algemeen aanvaar. Die applikant se aansoek is op hierdie veronderstelling baseer en indien die respondent nie saamstem nie kon sy G dit maklik in geding gestel het. Hierdie feite is so welbekend in die moderne samelewing dat 'n hof geregtelike kennis behoort te neem dat bloed- en weefseltoetse bewyswaarde het.

Dit is welbekend dat as gevolg van die navorsing wat met orgaanplantings gepaard gaan, daar voortdurend gevorder word met die tipering van 'n persoon se bloed en weefsel. In die verlede voor [00 f1] 1950 kon die H bloedtoetse net in beperkte gevalle die vermeende vader uitskakel. Maar die toetse was in 1977 sover gevorder dat tot in 99,85% van die gevalle die vermeende vader, as hy verkeerd aangewys is, uitgesluit kan word (sien Van der Harst v Viljoen 1977 (1) SA 795 (K) en Family Law Service deur Schafer J78 op 30, vir 'n meer volledige uiteensetting).

Omrede dat die persentasie van die gevalle wat die vermeende vader weens I die verbeterde tegnieke uitgeskakel kan word, so hoog is, volg dit dat, as hy nie uitgesluit kan word nie, daar 'n waarskynlikheid is dat hy wel die ware vader is. Hoe groter die persentasie, hoe groter is die waarskynlikheid. Anders as in die verlede waar die toetse net in belang van die vermeende vader was en gedien het om uit te sluit, het dit nou positiewe bewyswaarde en kan die ander party ook bevoordeel. Hierdie feit regverdig heroorweging van die riglyne wat in vroeëre beslissings neergelê J is.'

Mullins J

A I have my doubts whether the learned Judge a quo was correct in taking judicial notice of the fact that there has been such development in the technique of blood testing that blood tests can now exclude a man as the father of a child with a 99,85% probability of correctness, and the corollary that, if he is not excluded as the father, he probably is the father. While such evidence may well have been adduced in other cases, or B have appeared in legal or scientific articles, I am doubtful whether such technique has 'advanced to a certain degree of general recognition (that its) trustworthiness may be judicially noticed as too notorious to need comment'. Wigmore on Evidence 3rd ed vol III at 190; S v Mthimkulu 1975 (4) SA 759 (A) at 763H-765B. That the results of blood tests are C admissible in evidence is clear. But details of the whole process of the taking of the samples, the process of testing such samples, the potential results of such tests, and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, should in my view be properly proved in each specific case.

A similar view was adopted in Nell v Nell 1990 (3) SA 889 (T), where, at 894F-I Le Roux AJ stated: D

'Op die stukke voor my is daar geen aanduiding oor wat hierdie sogenaamde weefseltoetse behels nie. Ek weet gevolglik nie hoeveel van die menslike liggaam verwyder word of vanwaar dit verwyder word nie. Moontlik behels dit slegs 'n bloedtoets maar hieroor kan ek nie seker wees nie. Om onder hierdie omstandighede die applikant sy spreekwoordelike pond vleis E toe te laat, kom vir my kras voor. Geen bevel word deur die applikant gevra teen die minderjarige nie. (Ek mag hier meld dat dit om daardie rede is dat ek nie aangedring het op die aanstelling van 'n kurator ad litem nie.) Gesien die respondente se houding, is ek tevrede dat die applikant 'n Hofbevel sal benodig om die minderjarige te onderwerp aan hierdie klas van toets. Indien daardie regshulp later geweier word, dien hierdie bevel, indien ek dit sou toelaat, geen doel nie. Verder is daar geen mediese F getuienis voor my, dat dit nodig is ten einde vaderskap te bepaal, om toetse op die moeder uit te voer nie. Ek is verwys na sekere getuienis gelewer in die saak van M v R 1989 (1) SA 416 (O) op 425H-J. Vir soverre ek geregtig is om my te vereenselwig met getuienis gelewer in 'n ander saak, blyk dit allermins daaruit dat die moeder enige rol te speel het in die vergelyking tussen die bloed- of veselgroepe van die vader en die kind.'

G I should mention that in Nell's case it appeared from the papers that the mother had been requested by the applicant to arrange to take a day's leave from her employment, as it was anticipated a day would be required to complete the necessary tests. This suggests that the taking of the necessary samples may not consist of merely a pin-prick to draw a small quantity of blood, as is suggested in other cases. H

I am, however, for the purposes of the present appeal, prepared to assume that the respondent has established that the blood tests he seeks will provide evidentiary material which will assist the maintenance court in determining whether the respondent is the father of L or not. This...