R v Chizah

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1960 (1) SA 435 (A)

R v Chizah
1960 (1) SA 435 (A)

1960 (1) SA p435

Citation	1960 (1) SA 435 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Steyn HR, Beyers AR, Van Blerk AR, Ramsbottom AR en Botha Wn AR
Heard	October 29, 1959
Judgment	November 26, 1959

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Naturelle — Stadsgebiede — Wet 25 van 1945 — Ras — Bewys en vasstelling van ingevolge die Wet — Oortreding van art. 12 (1) — Kroon het bewys dat daar 'n redelike moontlikheid bestaan het dat beskuldigde van inboorlingsafkoms was — Beskuldigde het nie geslaag om die bewyslas op hom te kwyt nie — Geboortes en huwelike — Sertifkate van — Getuieniswaarde van — Wet 17 van 1923, art. 40 (2).

Headnote : Kopnota

Dit is onjuis om te beweer dat inskrywings op 'n geboorte - of huweliksertifikaat bykans waardeloos word sodra hul deur getuienis betwis word. Luidens artikel 40 (2) van Wet 17 van 1923 geld 'n behoorlik ondertekende sertifikaat in alle regshowe as prima facie bewys van die besonderhede daarin vermeld. Dit beteken dat 'n regterlike beampte die besonderhede as juis moet aanvaar totdat hy oortuig is dat hy nie op hul kan staatmaak nie. Of so 'n oortuiging geregverdig is, moet afhang van die getuienis wat die inhoud van die sertifikaat weerlê of in twyfel trek. By die besluit of sulke getuienis aanvaar moet word, sou die oorwegings soos gemeld in R v Gill, 1950 (4) SA 199 (K) op bl. 201, wel ter sake kan wees, maar hul is nie die enigste oorwegings nie, en by teenbewys wat die genoemde oortuiging nie wek nie, bly die statutêre prima facie bewys ongeskonde.

Appellant is skuldig bevind aan 'n oortreding van artikel 12 (1) van Wet 25 van 1945, soos gewysig, wat 'n naturel wat nie in die Unie of Suidwes-Afrika gebore is nie, verbied om sonder die voorgeskrewe vergunning, 'n kragtens artikel 23 van die Wet geproklameerde gebied binne te kom of daarin te wees of te bly. 'n Provinsiale Afdeling het sy appèl teen die skuldgbevinding van die hand gewys, en met verlof van daardie Afdeling was hy in hoër beroep.

Beslis, indien al die getuienis tesame oorweeg word, dat daar 'n redelike moontlikheid bestaan het, indien nie 'n sterk waarskynlikheid nie, dat die appellant van inboorlingsafkoms was.

Beslis, gevolglik, dat die bewyslas op hom gerus het om 'n ander afkoms te bewys.

Beslis, verder, daar hy nie daarin geslaag het nie dat die appèl van die hand gewys moes word.

Die oorwegings wat in gedagte gehou moet word in verband met die bewys en vasstelling van ras ingevolge Wet 25 van 1945, soos gewysig, volledig bespreek.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Natives — Urban Areas Act 25 of 1945 — Race — Proof and determination of in terms of the Act — Contravention of sec. 12 (1) — Crown proving a reasonable possibility that accused was of native descent — Accused failing to discharge

1960 (1) SA p436

the onus on him — Births and marriages — Certificates of — Evidential value of.

Headnote : Kopnota

It is incorrect to state that entries on a birth or marriage certificate become almost valueless as soon as they are disputed by evidence. In terms of section 40 (2) of Act 17 of 1923 a properly signed certificate serves in all courts of law as prima facie proof of the particulars mentioned therein. This means that a judicial official must accept the particulars as correct until he is convinced that he cannot rely upon them. Whether such a conviction is justified must depend on the evidence which refutes or throws doubt upon the contents of the certificate. In deciding whether such evidence should be accepted the considerations mentioned in R v Gill, 1950 (4) 199 (C), can well be relevant but they are not the only considerations, and if the evidence to the contrary does not create such a conviction, the statutory prima facie evidence remains undisturbed.

Appellant was convicted of a contravention of section 12 (1) of Act 25 of 1945, as amended, which forbids a native who was not born in the Union or South-West Africa from entering or being or remaining in an area proclaimed in terms of section 23 of the Act without the prescribed permission. A Provincial Division had dismissed his appeal from a conviction, and with the leave of that Division he now appealed.

Held, on a consideration of all the evidence as a whole, that there was a reasonable possibility, if not a strong probability, that the appellant was of native descent.

Held, accordingly, that the onus of proof was on him to prove a different descent.

Held, further, as he had failed to do so, that the appeal had to be dismissed.

The considerations which had to be borne in mind in regard to the proof and determination of race in terms of Act 25 of 1945, as amended, fully discussed.

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die Kaapse Provinsiale Afdeling (HERBSTEIN, WN.R - P., en DIEMONT, R.). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van STEYN, H.R.

H. W. Levy, namens die appellant: The offence of contravening sec. 12 A (2) of Act 25 of 1945, involves two essential elements, viz.: (a) the accused must be a 'native' as defined by sec. 1 and (b) the accused must not have been born in the Union or South West Africa. Before the presumption created in sec. 12 (4) of Act 25 of 1945, as substituted by sec. 6 of Act 16 of 1956, comes into play there must be proof that the B accused is a native within the meaning of sec. 1 of Act 25 of 1945, that is that he is a 'member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa'. There is no provision in the Act which creates a presumption that an accused is a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. If there is no evidence or insufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt, the Crown will have failed to discharge its initial onus; see sec. 1. Both the native commissioner's court and the Provincial Division erred C in placing an onus on the accused to prove that he was not a 'native'. Sec. 1 stops short of placing such an onus on the accused. Allegations in his marriage certificate are prima facie evidence that the accused is a coloured person; see R v Jackson, 1957 (2) SA 201. The qualification of the value of this evidence referred to in R v Gill, D 1950 (4) SA 201, apparently only arises if the 'informant' is not called. The 'informant', that is, the accused was called: Therefore the qualification does not arise for the accused re-affirmed the correctness of the entry. In any event, prima facie evidence does not mean evidence which is valueless when placed in issue. It means, at the least, evidence which can be accepted unless rebutted by satisfactory evidence E to the contrary. The remarks concerning certificates in R v Gill ibid, relate to birth certificates as well as marriage certificates. Therefore the production by the accused of his birth certificate could have taken his case

1960 (1) SA p437

no further than the production of his marriage certificate. The test as to whether a person is a 'native' is his descent. His appearance and habits are evidence of descent; see R v Radebe & Others, 1945 AD at p. 609. This test is also applicable to Act 25 of 1945; see R v Ford, A 1946 (1) P.H. K.60. Where 'coloured person' is defined, further light is thrown on the definition of 'native'; see R v Radebe & Others, supra at p. 604. As to whether there is an onus on the accused, cf. R v Abel, 1948 (1) SA at pp. 662, 663. When the Legislature intended to place an onus on the accused, it did so in clear language as in sec. 12 (4). The Crown must produce some evidence before there can be any onus B on the accused; see R v Mohamed, 1954 (3) SA at p. 321; R v Fakiri, 1938 AD 242. The Crown, by contending that failure to produce the birth certificate warrants the drawing of an inference unfavourable to the accused, equates the position with failure of the accused to call a witness. The inference is proper only...