A legal fallacy? Testing the ordinariness of ‘ordinary meaning’
| Pages | 269-304 |
| Date | 15 May 2020 |
| Published date | 15 May 2020 |
| Author | Carney, T.R. |
| Citation | (2020) 137 SALJ 269 |
269
A LEGAL FALL ACY? TESTING THE
ORDINARINESS OF ‘ORDINARY MEANING’
TERR ENCE R CARN EY†
Senior Lectu rer in Afrikaans Lingui stics, University of South Afric a
The canon th at dictates that words be inter preted according to their ordinar y meaning
has been widely de bated. Many studies have either high lighted the shortcomings of the
ordinary meani ng principle or have tr ied to debunk its existen ce altogether. Despite
eorts to int roduce a new approach to t he interpretation of sta tutes in South Afric a
(through Endumeni), the applicati on of the ordinary-mean ing rule persists and
remains a conte sted issue. Weighing in on the debate by schol ars such as Cowen and
Labuscha gne, this contribution te sts if the phenomenon of ordin ary meaning actua lly
exists. Rooted in th e argument that ordinar y meaning is representa tive of a so-called
reasonable spea ker’s understanding, data wa s collected through a surve y approach.
The surve y tested ten words taken fro m South African ca se law that were interp reted
according to the o rdinary mea ning principle. The result s were then compared with the
meanings assigned b y the respective court s and those appearing in t he iWeb corpus.
Interpreted a gainst the demographic infor mation of 151 participants, the prelim inary
results indicat e correspondence betwee n the courts’ understanding of th e selected words
and that of the resp ondents. Therefore, the n dings cautiously conrm the e xistence of
the ordinary mea ning principle as a phenom enon within a specic spec trum of society.
Corpus l inguistics – int erpretation of statu tes – ordinary me aning of words
– reasonable per son
I INTRODUCTION
(a) Dening ‘ordinary mean ing’
There is no better g uarantee of bindi ng a judge to the law, says Smith, tha n
through t he wording of the law.1 The interpretat ion of a statute usual ly
start s with the words of legis lation themselves.2 T his relationship between
law and lang uage is one of inst rumental ity; ultim ately, law uses langua ge
to accomplish cer tain objectives .3 Bix describe s this instr umentalit y as
† MA (UP) Ph D (UFS). https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8922-5668. I want to
express my g ratitude to the r eviewers, who have ded icated a great dea l of their
time and ener gy in helping me improve my con tribution. I am al so grateful to t he
partic ipants of the sur vey.
1 C E Smith ‘Het woord als g renswachter: F uncties van ta alkundi ge
interpret atie voor de rechtsvind ing’ (2009) 2 Themi s 61 at 61, 63.
2 Frederick Schauer T hinking Like a Lawyer (20 09) 151. According to Sch auer,
many controver sies centre around the ques tion whether words should a lso be the
ending poi nt of legal inter pretation.
3 Ralf Posche r ‘Ambiguity and va gueness in lega l interpret ation’ in Peter
M Tiersma & Law rence M Solan (eds) The O xford Handbook of Langu age and
Law (2012) 133. One such objective is ‘mea ning-ge neration’; a text must be
interpret ed to give it meaning. I n this regard, se e Marius van Stad en & Stefan van
(2020) 137 SALJ 269
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270 (2020) 137 T HE SOUTH AFRIC AN LAW JOURNAL
guida nce: law is guided by lan guage.4 One such guid ing instr ument is the
ordinar y-meaning r ule. The rule of l aw in many countrie s determines
that when a contested word , phrase or sentence is unde ned within
legislat ion, it must be given it s ‘ordinary mea ning’,5 which means its clea r,
everyday meaning.6 It is i mpractical, i f not impossible, for a legis lator to
dene every word i n an Act. Also, er rors occur in the la nguage used to
enact laws.7 Understandabl y, this leaves plenty of room for inter pretation
and subsequent squabble s. If a word has more than one po ssible ordinar y
meanin g, the relevant context must be st udied for clarit y.8 A court may
veer from the ind icated ordinar y meaning on ly in the event that such a
word is absurd, lea ds to injustice,9 or when the wordi ng is ‘unsuccessfu l
in conveying a per fectly clear mes sage’.10 As such, ordi nary mean ing
function s almost like a super visory bod y, whose task is to explai n what
Eck ‘“Deemed” t o be an employee: Adopting t he teleological i nterpretation of
statute s’ (2018) 30 SA Merc LJ 416 at 419.
4 Br ian H Bix ‘Lega l interpretat ion and the philosophy of l anguage’ in Tie rsma
& Solan (eds) op cit note 3 a t 145.
5 D V Cowen ‘The inter pretation of statut es and the concept of “the intention
of the legis lator”’ (1980) 43 THRHR 374 at 379–80; Lawrence M Sol an ‘Lingui stic
issues and st atutory int erpretation’ in Tier sma & Solan (eds) op cit note 3 a t 94.
In a diere nt publication, Sola n keenly observe s that the den itions themselves
can be ambig uous and troublesome , seeing as they are a lso formulat ed using words
and struc tured synt actically ; see Lawrence M Sola n The Language of S tatutes.
Laws and T heir Interpretatio n (2010) 23. However, despite potential t autologies or
obscur ities, a court st ill needs to g ive dened words some mea ning: see Lou rens
du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 20 4.
6 Chr istopher Hutton Word Meaning and L egal Interpretation: An I ntroductory
Guide (2014) 39. One of the assumption s here is that the legi slator does not speak
in ridd les: see David A Strau ss ‘Why plain me aning’ (1997) 72 Notre Dam e LR
1565 at 1573; Du Plessis op cit note 5 a t 103–4.
7 Solan The Lan guage of Statutes op cit not e 5 at 4.
8 J M T Labuschagne ‘G ewone betekenis van ’n woord, woordebo ek en die
organie se aard van uitleg’ (1998) 13 SA Pu blic Law 145 at 145; John Bell & G eorge
Engle Cross Statutory Interpretation (19 95) 49.
9 Cowen op cit note 5 at 380 –1; Labuschagne ibid at 145; Gail- Maryse
Cockram Interpretation of Statutes (1987) 36 –48; Bell & En gle ibid at 49.
The applicat ion of the ordinar y-meaning r ule can al so lead to absurdit y, as
illust rated by the debate bet ween legal philosopher s H L A Hart and Lon Fu ller.
In this re gard, see Schauer op cit no te 2 at 152–5. In the event of obvious absu rdity
and ambig uity, a court may vent ure beyond the text in s earch of clarit y: see
Linda D Jel lum & David Charles H ricik Modern S tatutory Interp retation. Problems,
Theorie s, and Lawyering Strategi es (2006) 73–4, 80; see a lso Du Plessis op cit note 5
at 103 –4.
10 J d e Ville ‘Meani ng and statutor y interpret ation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373
at 387. Also see Peter M Tier sma Legal Language (1999) 126. Tiersma point s out
that the pla in-meaning ru le constrains mea ning withi n statutes to the words and
sentences used b y the legislator, rat her than explori ng the intention of the sp eaker;
Bell & Eng le op cit note 8 at 49; Schauer op cit note 2 at 157.
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TESTING THE ORDINARINESS OF ‘ORDINARY MEANING’ 271
is meant, wit hin reason and w ithin set bounda ries.11 Though ordin ary
meanin g has a function of set ting boundar ies within which inter pretation
should take place a nd expresses the dista nce between the ordina ry and the
legal or techn ical denit ion, it is not easily deduc ible beforehand where
these bound aries must l ie.12 Slocum describes t he ordinar y-meaning ru le
as ‘founda tional’ in the i nterpretation of most leg al text ty pes.13 He goes
furt her by saying that deter minin g ordinar y meaning is oft en the rst
step in the proces s of the interpretat ion of statutes, and usu ally forms t he
basis for the appl ication of a court’s other interpr etive tools.14 The act
of determi ning meani ng happens along side jurisprudent ial debate, and is
often lin ked to the purpose of the leg islation.15
Ordina ry meanin g, as a legal ru le, remains a contes ted issue and is an
elusive concept to many people. Synony ms used to descr ibe it, such as
‘everyday’, ‘grammat ical’, ‘literal ’ or even ‘natural mea ning’,16 are often
as problematic a s the term itself.17 The f act that words such as ‘everyd ay’,
‘gramm atical’ and ‘nat ural mean ing’ remain u ndened in many lega l
systems18 only beg s the question: who determ ines what these words mean?
Therefore, what const itutes an everyd ay word may dier great ly from
one person to the next.19 Th is becomes apparent when we real ise that,
11 R alph Chris tensen & Chris tian Kübbeler ‘Wortl autgrenze und Wör terbuch’
(2011) 2 Zerl 1 at 1; F T Groenewegen ‘De relatieve w aarde van de gr ammaticale
interpret atiemethode’ in E T Fet eris, H Kloos terhuis, H J Plug & J A Pontier
(eds) Alle s Afwegende: Bijdragen aan he t Vijfde Symposium Jur idische Argumentatie,
22 Juni 2007 te Rotte rdam (2007) 243; Dietr ich Busse ‘Was ist die Bede utung
eines Geset zestextes? Sprachwi ssenschaftliche A rgumente im Methoden streit der
Jurist ischen Auslegun gslehre — Ling uistisch G esehen’ in Friedr ich Müller (ed)
Untersuchung en zur Rechtslinguistik. Int erdisziplinäre Studien zu Prakt ischer Semantik
und Struktur ierender Rechtsleh re in Grundfragen der Ju ristischen Methodik (19 89) 132 .
12 Hutton op cit note 6 at 42.
13 Brian G Slocum ‘Li nguistic s and “ordinar y meaning” de terminat ions’
(2012) 33 Statute LR 39 at 4 0; Van Staden & Van Eck op cit note 3 at 418.
14 Slocum ibid at 40; St rauss op cit note 6 at 1565, 1566 –7.
15 Bell & Engle op cit not e 8 at 31–2.
16 Cowen op cit note 5 at 379; Labuscha gne op cit note 8 at 145; Smith op cit
note 1 at 62–3; Du Plessi s op cit note 5 at 108, 199.
17 The complexity is exa cerbated when dist inctions are m ade between words
such as ‘ordina ry’ and ‘l iteral’, for insta nce. These dist inctions are not ad hered
to by everyone; somet imes these words a re used intercha ngeably. This is al so
visible in S outh Africa n case law (see note 73 below). For typic al synonym s, see
Brian G Sloc um Ordinary Meaning (2015) 287–8. F or distinct ions, see Robert S
Summers & G eorey Mars hall ‘The ar gument from ord inary mea ning in
statutor y interpret ation’ (1992) 43 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 213 at 215–16.
Further d istinction s are made by Bell & E ngle (op cit note 8 at 63– 8), between
‘ordinar y’, ‘prima ry’, ‘secondary’ and ‘fr inge’ meanings.
18 R M Klopper & N J C van den Ber gh ‘Die toepasbaa rheid van die modern
ling uistiese bena dering op wetsu itleg’ (1980) 5 JJS 1, in general .
19 Hutton op cit note 6 at 56.
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