Legal Aid Board v the State and Others

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Mpati P, Lewis JA, Ponnan JA, Bosielo JA and Tshiqi JA
• Judgment Date: 22 September 2010
• Citation: 2011 (1) SACR 166 (SCA)
• Docket Number: 363/09
• Hearing Date: 16 August 2010
• Counsel: GM Budlender SC (with L Crouse) for the appellant, instructed by Legal Aid Board, Braamfontein and the Justice Centre, Bloemfontein [Mr Budlender and Ms Crouse were only instructed to represent the LAB after the matter was postponed by this court on 13 May 2010.They thereafter filed supplementary heads of argument dated 23 July 2010 and argued the appeal on behalf of the LAB on 16 August 2010].EM Coetzee SC (with JM Ferreira) (NDPP, Johannesburg and Bloemfontein) for the first respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Appeal

Ponnan JA (Mpati P, Lewis JA, Bosielo JA and Tshiqi JA concurring):

[1] It is hardly necessary to dwell on the advantages to an accused person of legal representation. They are well documented and recognised. C I assume of course that the representation is competent. Trial judges have on occasion had the experience of a litigant in person who seems able to conduct proceedings with skill and sometimes to a successful conclusion. But that is usually the exception. Any litigant in person is generally at a disadvantage, more especially one facing a serious criminal charge. The adversarial system that prevails in this country assumes D a forensic contest that is more or less evenly matched. The sad reality is that all too frequently it is not. An unrepresented accused is usually disadvantaged, first, by a lack of legal knowledge and skill, and, second, because he or she suffers the disability of not being able to dispassionately assess and present his or her case as well as trained counsel for the State can. E

[2] It cannot therefore be doubted that a criminal trial is most fairly conducted when both prosecution and defence are represented by competent counsel. The entitlement of a person charged to be represented, if necessary, by a legal practitioner at public expense is an F important safeguard of fairness in the administration of criminal justice. An entitlement to legal aid is a measure which reduces the possibility of an injustice and enhances the prospects of a fair trial. Our Constitution recognises both the practical and logical nexus between legal representation and a fair trial. Thus s 35(3) of our Constitution guarantees to every accused person his or her right to a fair trial, which includes the G right in ss (g) to have a legal practitioner assigned, if substantial injustice would otherwise result.

[3] In S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis [1] Didcott J lamented the fact that insufficient had been done by the State to give meaningful content to the constitutionally entrenched right to legal representation. Whilst accepting H that there were multifarious demands on the public purse, he stated that 'the Constitution does not envisage, and it will surely not brook, an undue delay in the fulfilment of any promise made by it about a fundamental right'. Against that backdrop s 3 of the Legal Aid Act [2] came to be amended [3] by the insertion of the following italicised phrase: '(t)he I

Ponnan JA

A objects of the board shall be to render or make available legal aid to indigent persons and to provide legal representation at State expense as contemplated in the Constitution. . .'. The board to which reference is made is the appellant, the Legal Aid Board of South Africa (the LAB), an independent body corporate, established by s 2 of the Act.

B [4] The annual parliamentary grant of the LAB for the 2007/8 financial year was in the region of R581 m. During that period it employed 2193 members of staff and finalised approximately 400 000 cases. In essence the LAB uses public funds to provide legal representation to indigent persons on a fairly large scale across the country. Given its fiscal C constraints, it is obviously unable to provide a full suite of legal-aid services to those genuinely in need. It does, on occasion, instruct legal practitioners in private practice to defend accused persons. When it does, those practitioners are remunerated in accordance with tariffs prescribed by its Legal Aid Guide.

D [5] The second respondent, Gary Patrick Porritt (Porritt), and the third respondent, Susan Hilary Bennett (Bennett) (the respondents), have been indicted together with various companies that they represent on a total of 3160 fraud charges in the South Gauteng High Court. Both are on bail. Porritt's bail was fixed at R1 m, an amount subsequently E reduced, on application by him, to R800 000. He states that his bail had been paid by a trust of which he is a beneficiary and that he is currently indebted to it in that sum. Bennett's bail of R100 000 was secured by way of a mortgage bond in favour of the State over a property in Knysna which is registered in the name of a company of which she is the sole F director.

[6] Although the respondents first appeared before Borchers J during January 2006, the criminal trial proper is yet to get under way. When they initially appeared in the High Court they were legally represented by counsel and an attorney of their choosing. Since May 2007 they have been without representation. Until then, they spent some R23 m on G various preliminary legal skirmishes. That, according to Porritt, was funded by certain trusts of which, as he puts it, he was 'a discretionary beneficiary'. Those trusts, so he says, have resolved to withdraw their financial support and to distance themselves from the criminal trial.

H [7] The respondents thus made application to the LAB for legal representation at State expense. Each was required to complete a standard form briefly setting out their respective financial positions. They declined to do so. Their applications were accordingly refused. Although it initially did so on some other erroneous basis, it is hard to fault the LAB's ultimate conclusion that neither had satisfied it that they were indigent and therefore did indeed qualify for legal representation at State I expense.

[8] The respondents, having been advised that they had two rights of internal appeal to higher echelons within the LAB, exercised the first to the Regional Operations Executive. Unsurprisingly, given their failure to J furnish the required information, it failed. Each was nonetheless advised

Ponnan JA

by the Regional Operations Executive of a further right of appeal to the A National Office Executive, and informed:

'Should you wish to appeal my decision, please provide the following:

1.

A signed means test

2.

Details of all your: —

•

Assets B

•

Income

•

Liabilities

•

Expenditure

3.

Your personal circumstances — eg where do you reside, what is the value of your right of occupation, who provides for your food, clothing, health etc, needs and at what cost. C

4.

Your background and education.

5.

Your ability, if any, to contribute to the costs of your defence.

6.

In the light of the statement I am a beneficiary of certain trusts with substantial assets in SA'', details of all trusts of which you, your spouse or your children are beneficiaries, the trust deed and financial statements as well as particulars of the assets of the trust. D

7.

Details of any property owned by you, your spouse or your children or any trusts of which any of you are beneficiaries and the value of the said property.'

The response of the respondents was to direct a request for information to the LAB, ostensibly on the basis that it was required to prosecute their further appeal. When the matter came before Borchers J on 24 October E 2007 they were informed by an official of the LAB that they were not precluded, even at that stage, from supplying the information sought and that by doing so the prospects of their appeal succeeding would be enhanced. Once again they declined. Instead, contending that not all of the information sought by them had been supplied by the LAB, they launched an application to compel the LAB to supply the information F sought. That application was dismissed by Sapire AJ.

[9] In September 2008, no further progress having been made, Borchers J decided to proceed in terms of s 3B of the Act. Section 3B provides:

'(1) Before a court in criminal proceedings directs that a person be G provided with legal representation at State expense the court shall —

(a)

take into account —

(i)

the personal circumstances of the person concerned;

(ii)

the nature and gravity of the charge on which the person is to be tried or of which he or she has been convicted, as the case H may be;

(iii)

whether any other legal representation at State expense is available or has been provided; and

(iv)

any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account; and

(b)

refer the matter for evaluation and report by the board. I

(2)(a) If a court refers a matter under subsection (1)(b), the board shall, subject to the provisions of the Legal Aid Guide, evaluate and report on the matter.

(b) The report in question shall be in writing and be submitted to the registrar or the clerk of the court, as the case may be, who shall make a copy thereof available to the court and the person concerned. J

(c) The report shall include —

Ponnan JA

(i)

A a recommendation whether the person concerned qualifies for legal representation;

(ii)

particulars relating to the factors referred to in subsection (1)(a)(i) and (iii); and

(iii)

any other factor which in the opinion of the board should be taken into account.'

B [10] The learned judge requested the LAB to furnish her with a report contemplated by s 3B(1)(b). In that report the LAB asserted that accused persons who apply for legal aid are subject to a means test, which is calculated in accordance with a formula prescribed by its Legal Aid Guide. Applying that formula, according to the LAB, an accused person with a calculated income of less than R2000 per month qualified C for legal aid. The LAB contended in its report that:

'[Porritt and Bennett] have a right to a further internal appeal against the decision to refuse legal aid. [They] have not yet exercised such right, but if [they] continue to refuse to provide the information and documentation requested by the LAB, the result of any further appeal is D likely to be unfavourable to [them].'

And submitted that:

'(I)t is obliged to implement the provisions of the Legal Aid Guide, which is a document approved by Parliament. For the...