Leaders and Tenures in Sub‐Saharan Africa

Published date01 September 2020
Date01 September 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/saje.12255
AuthorCarolyn Chisadza
South African Journal of Economics Vol. 88:3 September 2020
doi: 10.1111/saje.12255
323
© 2020 Economic Society of South Africa
LEADERS AND TENURES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
CAROLYN CHISADZA*,†
Abstract
While there has been extensive evidence provided on the varying effects of leaders’ extended
tenures on economic growth, political institutions and conflict, little attention in the empirical
literature has been given to the determinants that may contribute to long tenures. Without being
cognisant of these underlying factors, any efforts aimed at limiting tenures to progress economic
development and democratic institutions will have little effect, as evidenced by several leaders’
attempts to subvert constitutional laws in this regard. Using panel data analysis for sub-Saharan
African countries between 1960 and 2015, this study looks at the likely determinants (both at
individual and country level) that can increase or decrease political survival. The preliminary
results suggest that at an individual level, the leader’s age, political career and rebel experience
increase the likelihood of extended tenure, while the leader’s education reduces the probability
of extended tenure. At a country level, the country’s wealth is likely to increase tenures, while
increased conflict and strong institutions decrease a leader’s tenure.
JEL Classification: I25, C23, O43, 055
Keywords: Institutions, education, panel data, sub-Saharan Africa
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent Afrobarometer survey indicates that over three quarters of citizens in 34
African countries are in favour of two term limits for presidents (Dulani, 2015). Yet this
sentiment has gone unheeded by long-standing leaders in Africa where some have served
for over 20 years and are still in power, or have had to be forcibly removed. Examples
include Presidents dos Santos in Angola (37 years), Campaore in Burkina Faso (27 years),
Mobutu in The Democratic Republic of Congo (32 years), Biya in Cameroon (34 years),
Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea (37 years), Bongo in Gabon (42 years), Al-Bashir in
Sudan (27 years), Eyadema in Togo (38 years), Museveni in Uganda (30 years) and
Mugabe in Zimbabwe (36 years). During the 1990s, which was the period of significant
improvements in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of growth and institutions, most reforming
countries inserted term limit clauses in their constitutions (Dulani, 2015). According to
a report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2017), only 14 out of 54 African
countries1 do not have two-term limits in their constitutions. However, over the years
leaders in sub-Saharan Africa have extended their terms of office indefinitely, as indicated
by the increasing trend observed in Figure 1. Of the 40 African countries with two-term
1 Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritius,
Morocco, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Swaziland.
* Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Pretoria, Lynnwood Road,
Pretoria, 0002, RSA. E-mail: carolyn.chisadza@up.ac.za
Department of Economics, University of Pretoria
South African Journal
of Economics
324 South African Journal of Economics Vol. 88:3 September 2020
© 2020 Economic Society of South Africa
limit clauses, 16 of them had leaders attempt to modify or eliminate the term limits with
10 successful attempts2 (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2017).
By 2012, at least 30 leaders had tried (some succeeding) to extend their presidential
term limits, either getting courts to repeal or amend the clauses. Rarely have they va-
cated office after free elections, instead threats of coups or actual coups have been the
most successful means to date of removing strongmen from their positions (e.g. President
Campaore in Burkina Faso had to be forcibly removed from power in 2014, an attempted
coup in Burundi was unsuccessful in discouraging President Nkurunziza from extend-
ing his term in office in 2015, a successful military overtake finally managed to topple
President Mugabe in 2017). While President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) clung to power to the detriment of his country, it took the intervention of armed
forces from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries to re-
move President Jammeh of the Gambia from office after his opponent defeated him at the
elections. Such violations of tenure limits reverse democratic gains and are a cause of con-
flict within countries, not to mention the possible adverse effects on policy outcomes such
as investing in health, education, and physical capital. These effects in turn can delay eco-
nomic growth in the region. This is on the back of Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy during
Mugabe’s tenure, the DRC’s rising inflation during Kabila’s tenure, and the lack of foreign
currency in Sudan during Al-bashir’s tenure (Felter, 2019), to name a few examples.
2 Succesful attempts at modifying or eliminating two-term limits: Togo (Eyadema, 2002), Gabon
(Bongo, 2003), Uganda (Museveni, 2005), Chad (Deby, 2005), Cameroon (Biya, 2008), Djibouti
(Guellah, 2010), Rwanda (Kagame, 2015), Burundi (Nkurunziza, 2015), Republic of Congo
(Nguesso, 2015), DRC (Kabila, 2016).
Figure 1. Average number of years in leadership role
Source: Archigos dataset v4.1, March 2016. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
0510 15
ave. no. of yearsinpower
1960 19802000 2020
year

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