Kleynhans v Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Schreiner ACJ, Steyn JA, De Beer JA, Malan JA and Hall AJA
• Judgment Date: 13 June 1957
• Hearing Date: 20 May 1957
• Court: Appellate Division

Schreiner, A.C.J.:

The facts appear from the judgment of STEYN, J.A. I C have arrived at a different conclusion for the reasons which follow.

In regard to the appellant's contention that the issue, as opposed to the service, of the summons put an end to the running of prescription, I do not find the wording of sec. 11 (2) of Act 29 of 1942 of assistance D The words 'The right to claim compensation' ('Die reg om . . . skadevergoeding te eis') seem to me to be only a way of referring to the right of action given by sub-sec. (1), and I do not find that they bear upon the question whether the issue of a summons, without service, ends the running of prescription. But I agree with STEYN, J.A., that, apart from the wording of sub-sec. (2), the mere issue of a summons has no E effect on prescription. Sometimes the word 'issue' is used loosely when there is no necessity to distinguish it from service. That, I think, explains what was said in the passage in Giddy, Giddy and White's Estate v Robinson, 1940 E.D.L. 191, mentioned by STEYN, J.A. The only case, so far as I know, in which issue as opposed to service has been held to end the running of prescription is Tarvey v Leach, 16 E.D.C. 6, and I agree that that case was wrongly decided.

F In regard to the question whether the service of the summons on the 6th March, 1956, came in time, I do not find that the words 'upon the expiration of a period' ('na verloop van 'n tydperk') show that the Legislature intended that the ordinary civil rule as laid down in Joubert v Enslin, 1910 AD 6, should not apply. It seems to me that G the important words are those that fix the commencement of the period, which here are 'as from' ('vanaf') the date on which the claim arose. Those words are the typical words of commencement that bring the ordinary civil method of computation into operation. It is unnecessary to examine the effect of other words or combinations of words. Notably H the word 'after' has given rise to differences of view in some contexts. The clear wording of a statute or contract may of course lead to the rejection in any particular case of the ordinary civil rule in favour of the natural de momento in momentum rule or in favour of the exceptional civil rule, which includes both the first and the last days. But I agree with what HATHORN, J.P., said in Nair v Naicker,

Steyn JA

1942 NPD 3 at pp. 11 and 12, on the desirability of certainty in these matters.

Coming back to the words 'upon the expiration of a period of two years' or 'na verloop van 'n tydperk van twee jaar', the reason why I cannot A draw from them an inference that the ordinary civil rule is to be excluded is that they seem to mean nothing more than that the period of prescription is to be two years from the date when the claim arose. Different expressions having identical meanings would be 'at the end of a period of two years' or 'after a period of two years' or 'after two B years' or even simply 'two years'. Similarly in the Afrikaans, the unsigned, text equivalent expressions would be 'na 'n tydperk van twee jaar' or 'na twee jaar' or simply 'twee jaar'. I do not think that the fact that Matthaeus used an expression practically identical in Nederlands with the Afrikaans text of the sub-section provides a good basis for interpretation at the present day. In Matthaeus's time there C were doubts and distinctions which the judgments in Joubert v Enslin sought to remove, as far as possible, for the future. I do not think that we should depart from the ordinary civil rule unless from the language it is clear, certainly far clearer than in this case, that such departure was intended by the contracting parties or the lawgiver.

D In my view the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

MALAN, J.A., and HALL, A.J.A., concurred.

Judgment

Steyn, J.A.:

In die Hof a quo het die appellant die respondent E aangespreek vir vergoeding van skade wat hy na bewering gely het as gevolg van 'n botsing op 6 Maart 1954 met 'n motorvoertuig ten aansien waarvan die respondent die versekeraar ingevolge die Motorvoertuigassuransiewet van 1942 was. Die dagvaarding is op 1 Maart 1956 uitgereik maar is eers op 6 Maart deur die adjunk-balju aan die respondent besorg. Die respondent het die verweer geopper dat die appellant se reg om skadevergoeding van hom te eis kragtens art. 11 (2) F van genoemde Wet verjaar het. Hierteen het die appellant eksepsie aangeteken op grond daarvan dat dit geen verweer inhou nie, maar die eksepsie is van die hand gewys. Vandaar die appèl.

Art. 11 stel in sub-art. (1) die geregistreerde maatskappy wat die versekeraar is aanspreeklik teenoor derde partye, en bepaal dan in G sub-art. (2):

'Die reg om kragtens sub-art. (1) van 'n geregistreerde maatskappy skadevergoeding te eis, verjaar na verloop van 'n tydperk van twee jaar vanaf die dag waarop daardie eis ontstaan het.'

Die eerste vraag is of deur die blote uitreiking van die dagvaarding op 1 Maart 1956 skadevergoeding luidens genoemde sub-artikel van die H respondent geëis is. Indien wel, dan was die eis betyds ingestel, indien nie, dan ontstaan die verdere vraag of die diening van die dagvaarding op 6 Maart nog binne die verjaringstermyn geval het.

Wat die eerste vraag betref moet dit, as bloot op die bewoording van die sub-artikel afgegaan word, na my mening duidelik wees dat 'n...