Jurisdictional fiction? A dialectical scrutiny of the appellate function of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Published date: 11 August 2020
• Date: 11 August 2020
• Author: Adjolohoun, S.H.
• Pages: 1-31

1

JURISDICTIONAL FICTION? A DIALECTICAL

SCRUTINY OF THE APPELLATE COMPETENCE

OF THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND

PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

Sègnonna Horace Adjolohoun*

Abstract

It is established case-law of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights that

it does not assume appellate jurisdiction over national courts. In several decisions

rendered since its inception, the Court has consistently held that, when it examines

cases of alleged violations of rights, it merely acts as an international court of first

and final instance in vetting the conformity of domestic law and the conduct of

municipal organs with international law to which the state concerned is a party. An

overview of its jurisprudence however reveals a consistent challenge to the Court’s

jurisdiction over cases that Respondent States argue had or should have been

settled by domestic courts. The objections raised in related cases have led to a

confrontational interaction between the Court and the states involved. On an

increasing number of occasions, the ‘interaction crisis’ resulted in a political challenge

to the very mandate of the Court and withdrawals or threats to retract from

acceptance to its jurisdiction over sovereignty of the state and the integrity of

domestic courts. Considering their submissions in respect of this issue, objections

raised by Respondent States are genuine and therefore require principled reflections

that the limited scope of the Court’s reasoning in individual cases or responses from

its Registry do not and have not so far provided. In any event, the dialogue appears

to have stalled as one of misunderstanding on the part of states and dilemmas for

the Court. In this paper, I attempt to take up Sextus Empiricus’ role in assessing

the veracity of both answers to the question whether the African Court exercises an

appellate jurisdiction over courts of the Respondent States.

Keywords: African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, jurisprudence,

international law, appellate competence, margin of appreciation

Résumé

Il est de jurisprudence constante de la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des

peuples qu’elle n'exerce pas une compétence d’appel à l'égard des juridictions

nationales. Dans de nombreuses décisions rendues depuis sa création, la Cour a

conclu de manière constante que lorsqu'elle examine des cas d'allégation de

violation des droits, elle juge seulement, en tant que juridiction internationale de

* BA, LLB (Benin); LLM, LLD (Pretoria). Extraordinary Lecturer and Visiting Professor of

Human Rights and Comparative Constitutional Law (University of Pretoria, Central European

University, Université Gaston Berger); Principal Legal Officer, African Court on Human and

Peoples’ Rights. The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not purport to

reflect the opinions or views of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

(2019) 6(2) Journal of Comparative Law in Africa 1

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2 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN AFRICA VOL 6, NO 2, 2019

première et dernière instance, de la conformité du droit interne et des actes des

autorités nationales au droit international auquel l’État concerné est partie. Un

aperçu de sa jurisprudence révèle cependant une contestation constante de la

compétence de la Cour dans des affaires qui, selon les États défendeurs, auraient

préalablement été ou dû être tranchées par les juridictions nationales. Les objections

soulevées dans les affaires en question ont conduit à une interaction conflictuelle

entre la Cour et les États concernés. Dans un nombre croissant d’affaires, cette «

crise d’interaction » a entraîné une contestation politique du mandat même de la

Cour de même que des retraits ou menaces de retrait de l’acceptation de sa

juridiction pour cause d'empiètement sur la souveraineté des États et l’intégrité des

juridictions nationales. Au regard de leurs conclusions sur cette question, les

objections soulevées par les États défendeurs se révèlent fondées et appellent donc

une réflexion de principe que ni la portée limitée du raisonnement de la Cour dans

des affaires individuelles, ni les réponses de son greffe n’ont jusqu’à présent

entreprise. En tout état de cause, le dialogue semble être suspendu entre des

malentendus de la part des États et des dilemmes pour la Cour. Dans cet article, je

tente de prendre le rôle de Sextus Empiricus dans l’évaluation de la véracité des

deux réponses à la question de savoir si la Cour africaine exerce une compétence

d’appel à l'égard des juridictions des États défendeurs.

Mots-clés : Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples,

jurisprudence, droit international, compétence d'appel, souverainté, marge

d'appréciation

Introduction

The Court notes that it does not have any appellate jurisdiction to receive

and consider appeals in respect of cases already decided upon by domestic

and/or regional and similar courts.1

There lies, as laid down in the case of Ernest Francis Mtingwi v Malawi,

the foundation of what may be termed the ‘jurisdictional fiction’ of the

appellate function of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

(the African Court).

Despite peculiarities, which are marginal in the context of the present

discussion, the role of appellate courts is largely agreed across legal systems.

For the purpose of the discussion, I elect three main features in identifying

appellate competence: powers and function, outcome, and impact. I also

recognise but take an ancillary approach to the different understandings of

appellate jurisdiction as operational within the international and national

realms. Here, I use ‘appellate jurisdiction’ loosely and in the meaning

adopted by the African Court in its jurisprudence.

The common law on the features of appellate courts can be summed

up as follows: in respect of their powers and function, hear appeals from

1 Er nest Francis Mtingwi v Malawi (jurisdiction) (2013) 1 AfCLR 190 para 14.

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