Jansen Van Vuren v Stellenbosch Municipality
| Jurisdiction | http://justis.com/jurisdiction/166,South Africa |
| Judge | Wille J and Nthambeleni AJ |
| Judgment Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 JDR 2870 (WCC) |
| Hearing Date | 28 July 2023 |
| Docket Number | 72/2023 |
Wille J:
2023 JDR 2870 p2
Wille J
Introduction:
This unfortunate civil appeal lies from a local district court. The judicial officer in the lower court set aside an interim spoliation order initially granted to the applicant. This, together with costs. The core issue for determination in the court of first instance was about the interpreting of various regulations in connection with traffic. [1] More specifically, in this case, the alleged illegal parking of a motor vehicle that belonged to the appellant. This then led to a regrettable conflict between a student and the respondent.
Overview:
The legal argument that was presented before us was about the interpretation of specific regulations. The respondent initially submitted that it could never have been the lawmaker’s intention that the sub-criteria of all three sub-regulations (of the regulations) fall to be adhered to together and exist simultaneously to determine if a motor vehicle was abandoned. The respondent says the three sub-regulations provide three discrete occurrences for an infringement to be at play so that the alleged offending vehicle could be deemed abandoned. Thus, for a vehicle to be deemed abandoned, either sub-regulation (a) or (b) or (c) separately or any combination thereof or even all three may find application. The appellant takes a different position and contends that all three of these sub-regulations fall to be present at the same time for any infringement to exist in law. This enquiry and analysis may be interesting and complex but is not necessary or relevant to determine this appeal.
Context:
The appellant conceded that he from time to time illegally parked his motor vehicle on the sidewalk in violation of certain traffic regulations. The appellant resides in an apartment within an apartment block which has a parking space allocated to him for his exclusive use. By way of election, the appellant permitted another resident to use his allocated parking space. Thus, the appellant sometimes illegally parked on the sidewalk.
2023 JDR 2870 p3
Wille J
In as much as it may be relevant (which it is not), the appellant also conceded that his vehicle was illegally parked on the sidewalk for a continuous period of at least fourteen days. [2] The respondent accordingly caused to be impounded the applicant’s motor vehicle, so it says, in terms of the regulations. For the most part, the respondent relied primarily on the regulation below to remove the appellant’s motor vehicle from the sidewalk.
The regulation which the appellant and the respondent were at loggerheads about provides, among other things, that:
(a)
Any vehicle parked in a place where-
(i)
the stopping of a vehicle is prohibited in terms of regulation 304. . .
(b)
left for a continuous period of more than-
(i)
24 hours in the same place on a public road outside an urban area. . .
(ii)
seven days in the same place on a public road within an urban area. . .
(c)
found on a public road and to which—
(i)
no licence number is affixed, or, in the opinion of a traffic officer, a false licence number is affixed; or
(ii)
no other number or anything else is affixed which may, in the opinion of a traffic officer, serve to identify the owner, shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the owner, and such vehicle may be removed by or on behalf of the authority having jurisdiction over the place. . .’
The abovementioned regulation and any debate about it is irrelevant for several reasons. I say this because the core issue in this appeal is whether the appellant’s motor vehicle was legally removed and impounded at the relevant time at the instance of the respondent. I say it was.
2023 JDR 2870 p4
Wille J
Consideration:
The appellant advances that the interpretation adopted by the judicial officer in the lower court needed to be corrected. This may be so, but I have no findings or views on this interpretation. The argument is that on a proper interpretation of the regulations, all three sub-conditions set out in the regulations must be complied with and be present simultaneously to permit the respondent to be entitled to have removed the appellant’s vehicle. In summary, the appellant argues that the respondent acted unlawfully when it dispossessed the appellant of his vehicle because a violation of all the provisions of the sub-regulations was not present at the same time. On the contrary, the respondent argues that on a plain reading of the regulations, the lawmaker of the subject regulations did not include the word ‘and’ between regulations (a), (b) or (c).
Thus, the term ‘and’ was...
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