Jackson v SA National Institute for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of Offenders

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Van Blerk ACJ, Jansen JA, Rabie JA, Hofmeyr AJ and Galgut AJA
• Judgment Date: 31 March 1976
• Citation: 1976 (3) SA 1 (A)
• Hearing Date: 11 September 1975
• Court: Appellate Division

Van Blerk, A.C.J.:

Dit is 'n appèl teen 'n uitspraak waardeur 'n eksepsie deur die verweerder (nou die respondent) teen die eiseres (nou die appellant) se besonderhede van eis gehandhaaf E is.

Die eiseres, 'n akademies onderlegde sosiale werkster, was as sosiale werkster in diens van die verweerder, 'n liggaam wat hom beywer vir die voorkoming van misdaad en vir die rehabilitasie van wetsoortreders. Eiseres was die sekretaresse van die Durban-tak van verweerder, daarbenewens was sy voorsitster van die Durban-tak van die Sosiale Werkers-Vereniging van Suid-Afrika. Volgens die eiseres se F dienskontrak het sy begin 1971 in verweerder se diens getree teen 'n aanvangsalaris van R3 470 per jaar.

Op 20 November 1973 skryf verweerder se werkskomitee-voorsitter 'n brief aan eiseres wat soos volg lui:

'Dear Mrs. Jackson,

After considering, and agreeing to your request for an extension of your leave up to 17 December 1973, the management G committee agreed that your services should be terminated upon two months' notice commencing on 1 January 1974.

This letter serves to give you two months notice terminating your employment on 28 February 1974. The management committee also agreed that you would not be required to attend at Nicro or to perform any service as secretary on or after 18 December 1973 until 28 February 1974.

Your salary will be paid, however, for the months of December H 1973 and January and February 1974 as if you had performed your normal services.

For the sake of your personal record, however, the committee invites upon (sic) you to tender your resignation as secretary with effect from 28 February 1974 on the same terms as stated above. In order to accept your resignation on this basis, it must receive your formal resignation on the enclosed letter by not later than 30 November 1973 otherwise the terms of notice herein will apply.'

Die eiseres het hierdie brief asook die ingeslote bedankingsbrief wat sy moes teken, ontvang.

In haar besonderhede van eis om skadevergoeding voer die eiseres aan dat

Van Blerk ACJ

sy verneder en beledig is deur die inhoud van die briewe. Haar uiteensetting van eis soos aangevul deur nadere besonderhede asook die gronde van eksepsie waarom haar vordering nie ontvanklik is nie, is volledig uiteengesit in die uitspraak van A my Kollega JANSEN, A.R., en word nie hier herhaal nie, behalwe te meld dat die eiseres beweer dat die bestuurskomitee van die verweerder die bedoeling gehad het om haar in haar eergevoel te krenk en dat die innuendo wat sy pleit soos volg gestel word in para. 12 van die besonderhede van eis:

'In amplification of para. 11 hereof the plaintiff avers that in the said factual situation the defendant in its Durban branch represented by the said management committee:

(a)

denigrated the plaintiff as a social worker;

(b)

imputed that the plaintiff in the performance of her obligations under the said contract had been disloyal or incompetent or dishonest or had otherwise had been guilty of reprehensible conduct;

(c)

C conveyed to the plaintiff that her record as a social worker had been besmirched by her conduct, but she could endeavour to avoid the consequence of this by taking advantage of the otherwise unmerited opportunity of rendering her resignation;

(d)

conveyed to the plaintiff that the defendant in its Durban branch represented by the said management committee, required her:

(i)

D to regard herself as wanting in ability and/or dedication and/or integrity as a social worker;

(ii)

to regard herself as unworthy of being afforded the opportunity of resigning;

(iii)

to regard the defendant in its Durban branch E represented by the said management committee as being, beyond her deserving, magnanimous towards her in affording to her the opportunity of resigning;

(e)

imputed that the plaintiff was a person who would not scruple, by means of resorting to the device of a F pretended unilateral resignation, to misrepresent to third parties that she had not been summarily dismissed from her employment or that she had not been invited to resign therefrom, and that accordingly the plaintiff was basically dishonest.'

Dit is duidelik dat die beskermde regsgoed van die eiseres - waaroor sy hier kla dat sy gelaedeer is - haar subjektiewe G eergevoelens is. Begryplik sal sy die enigste getuie wees wat direkte getuienis kan aflê oor die feit dat sy wel gekrenk was. Dit wil voorkom dat daar veel voor te sê is dat die krenking van eergevoelens in die subjektiewe verskyningsvorm daarvan, op eksepsiestadium nie sonder die aanhoor van getuienis, gemeet aan objektiewe standaarde, afgemaak kan word nie. My Kollega H JANSEN verwys na gesag wat neig na 'n subjektiewe benadering wat ook meer realisties skyn te wees. Hoe dit ook al sy, vir die doeleindes van hierdie uitspraak sal die geskrewe stukke en feitlike bewerings waarop die eis fundeer is volgens objektiewe standaarde gemeet word, en volgens dié maatstaf is myns insiens die briewe in die omringende omstandighede wel vatbaar vir die innuendo daarop geplaas. By geskrewe laster is die beginsel - en dis ook hier van toepassing - dat die bedoeling van die skrywer moet blyk uit die taal wat hy gebesig het en as die geskrewe stukke as synde lasterlik uitgelê word dan is die bewys van die injuria voltooi. Maar dit is nie van toepassing waar 'n

Van Blerk ACJ

sekondêre betekenis aan die woorde geheg word nie. (Sien bv. Sutter v Brown, 1926 AD 155 op bl. 163). In laasgenoemde geval kan die gewone beginsel van uitleg nie toegepas word nie, want dan soos INNES, H.R., in voorgenoemde gewysde op bl. 164 sê:

'Proof becomes necessary of the special circumstances within the knowledge of the defaming party which would give to the A words innocent in themselves a defamatory significance appreciated by the hearers. So that the evidence of the latter becomes, notwithstanding the general rule, material and necessary.'

Indien die woorde 'for the sake of your personal record', al die omstandighede inaggenome, nie per se 'n krenking uitspel nie dan behels dit volgens die innuendo 'n verborge angel wat slegs deur getuienis bewys kan word. So, bv., sê CLAYDEN, R., B in Sachs v Werkerspers Uitgewers maatskappy, (Edms.) Bpk., 1952 (2) SA 261 (W) op bl. 272 - 3:

'Leaving quite out of consideration the type of innuendo which sets out a meaning not ordinarily borne by the words, the secondary meaning, the innuendo can be used it seems either to bring out a latent meaning in words, or to paraphrase words and, as it is said, to point the sting of the imputation... and where the plaintiff chooses to set out an innuendo to words C per se defamatory to point the sting of the imputation he says, in effect, that the meaning which he complains of, is the meaning which causes him damage.'

(Sien ook Corrad v Behnsen, 1960 (4) SA 760 (SWA), die uitspraak van HOFMEYR, R.). Waar die feite deur die eiseres gepleit, vatbaar is vir die beweerde krenking, soos dit m.i. wel is, dan moet die eiseres die geleentheid kry om deur D getuienis die innuendo te bewys. (Vgl. ook Van der Merwe v Slabbert, 1921 AD 88). In laasgenoemde saak het die eiser in sy deklarasie die volgende aangevoer:

'The defendant uttered the following false, malicious and slanderous words of and concerning the plaintiff, viz., 'Ek groet jou nie, jij is te vervloeks sleg', meaning, thereby that the plaintiff is a person of disreputable character, and not a E fit and proper person for respectable people to associate with.'

Die Hof a quo het 'n eksepsie op grond daarvan dat die woorde nie lasterlik nie maar slegs 'meaningless abuse' was, gehandhaaf In die appèl na hierdie Hof is in die uitspraak, waardeur die appèl gehandhaaf is, deur SOLOMON, A.R., gesê:

'I am bound to say that I find it very difficult to see on what F ground the exception should have been allowed. For it appears to me to be essentially a case in which the Court should have evidence of all the circumstances in which the alleged words were spoken in order to enable it to determine satisfactorily whether the words were used in a defamatory sense or not. That they are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and of supporting the innuendo which is placed upon them does not, in my opinion, admit of any doubt... they are quite capable of conveying to any person in whose hearing they are spoken the G impression that the plaintiff was a person of bad character and was one with whom respectable people should not associate. And if the words are capable of that construction, then clearly the plaintiff should have had an opportunity of proving by his evidence that this was the meaning which they were intended to convey, and which they in fact did convey, to the person in whose presence they were spoken... I am at a loss to see how it is possible simply from the words themselves to determine whether they were used by way of abuse or otherwise. It may be H that, if evidence were called as to the circumstances in which the words were spoken, and as to the tone of voice, the gestures and the demeanour generally of the defendant, the Court might come to such a conclusion, but in the absence of such evidence it seems to me that it is impossible to infer from the language itself that this was a mere case of meaningless vituperation. On principle, therefore, the Court below should, in my opinion, have declined to decide the case on exception, but should have allowed it to go to trial, and then, after the evidence, it should have been in a position to determine whether its judgment should be given for the plaintiff or for the defendant.'

Dit skyn uit die briewe wat aan die eiseres gestuur is:

Jansen JA

(a)

dat die verweerder deur sy bestuur toe die briewe aan eiseres gestuur is reeds 'n besluit geneem het om eiseres se dienste te beëindigwaarskynlik sal die besluit ook in die notules van verweerder se vergederings genotuleer wees,

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