Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends

JurisdictionSouth Africa
Citation2008 Acta Juridica 47
Published date15 August 2019
Date15 August 2019
Pages47-65
Human Dignity, Right and the
Realm of Ends*
ALLEN WOOD†
Stanford University
I INTRODUCTION
This is my f‌irst trip to South Africa. In fact, it is my f‌irst time on the
continent of Africa, and even my f‌irst adventure south of the equator. I
am honoured to be in South Africa, because I regard this nation as just
about the only one whose history in the past half century might have the
power to inspire us with hope. My own country, for instance, the United
States, has long thought of itself (and has even been thought of by others)
as a defender of human rights and liberty. But during the past f‌ifty years, it
has become the world’s leading imperialist power. It now engages
without hesitation in brutal wars of aggression. It regards its military
power as exempting it from all international law and even from all
recognised standards of human decency. At home as well as abroad, it is
turning into a sham all the conceptions of human rights, and all the ideals
of democracy and freedom, which it still arrogantly thinks of as its
exclusive property.
In South Africa, by contrast, toward the end of the twentieth century
we saw the replacement of a brutal racist regime by a democratic state
founded on political equality for all citizens. Perhaps even more
inspiring, we saw this change happen peacefully, without the black versus
white civil war many in my country believed would inevitably
accompany any change to black majority rule in South Africa. The
leaders of the movement to end apartheid struggled all their lives for this
victory and their triumph was all the more complete because theirs was
not a spirit of rancour or vengeance, but one of justice, mercy, truth and
reconciliation. South Africa still faces an uncertain future and many
problems, some inherited from the economic inequalities present during
the apartheid period, others due to the threat of corruption that seems to
characterise politicians at all times and places. But it is a great honour for
me to be invited to participate, even if only tangentially and for a few
days, in the great things that have been accomplished by South Africa in
the last f‌ifteen years.
* Edited version of a keynote address delivered at the Law, Dignity and Transformative
Constitutionalism Conference, University of Cape Town, 26 and 27 July 2007.
† Professor, Department of Philosophy,Stanford University.
47
2008 Acta Juridica 47
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
II THE MEANING OF ‘HUMAN DIGNITY’
If there is a basic ethical value that lies behind modern culture in the
Enlightenment tradition, then I think that idea is human dignity – the
fundamental worth of human beings, and of every individual human
being. This idea lies at the foundation of the South African Constitution,
section 10 of which provides that ‘[e]veryone has inherent dignity and
the right to have their dignity respected and protected’.
1
Below I will try
to explain the way this value is understood within Kantian ethics, which I
regard as the fullest philosophical articulation of it.
When it is spoken of today, there is a temptation to regard talk about
‘human dignity’ as pompous, platitudinous and empty. One way to see
beyond this temptation is to understand how human dignity was
originally a radical idea, even a subversive idea – which, in my opinion, it
still is. In its origins, ‘human dignity’ is an oxymoronic expression,
bordering on self-contradiction, that poses a radical challenge to all
existing social orders – not only in the early modern period but today as
well. The term ‘dignity’ itself means simply ‘worthiness’or ‘excellence’.
It is any quality of a person entitling them to be regarded, respected and
honoured by others. Originally ‘dignity’ signif‌ied some high off‌ice,
usually an off‌ice of state, carrying with it certain extraordinary privileges
and prerogatives. This older use of ‘dignity’ is also found in the South
African Constitution. Section 165(4) speaks of protecting the ‘dignity’ of
the courts, as well as their impartiality and independence.
2
In early
modern Europe, different ‘dignities’ marked off different levels of
aristocrat from each other, and dignity separated all aristocrats from the
plain and ordinary people who lacked dignity altogether. The claim that
humanity has dignity is therefore the paradoxical, almost nonsensical
assertion that the highest possible social status belongs to each and every
human being simply in virtue of his or her humanity. To speak of ‘human
dignity’ amounts to an impudent declaration that the supreme rank or
quality of honour that any human being could claim is simply their
humanity itself. It is a direct def‌iance of the entire value system
underlying traditional aristocratic society, and indeed of any conception
of human life that gives some human beings a status superior to that of
others in any respect whatever. Since no social order that has ever existed
has been able to do without some forms of social superiority or
inferiority, the concept of human dignity remains a radical concept, one
that challenges fundamentally our conceptions of ourselves and our
society, whoever and wherever we may be.
1
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 10.
2
Constitution, s 165(4): ‘Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must
assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity,accessibility and
effectiveness of the courts.’
48 DIGNITY,FREEDOM AND THE POST-APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER
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