A fundamental law of reason and the constitutional law of elections in Africa

• Date: 30 June 2021
• Pages: 1-41
• Published date: 30 June 2021
• Citation: (2021) 8(1) Journal of Comparative Law in Africa 1
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a1
• Author: Atupare, A.P.

https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a1

1

A FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF REASON AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ELECTIONS IN

AFRICA

Atudiwe P. Atupare*

Abstract

This article attempts a comparative understanding of the constitutional law of

elections in two African countries: Ghana and Nigeria. As a prelude, I argue

that judges should approach the task of interpretation of the constitutional law of

elections based on a non-positivist understanding of legality or the rule of law. Law

is not to be regarded simply as the product of lawmakers’ decisions and intentions

but as embodying fundamental values which gain normative force independently

of what is decided, written or intended by lawmakers. The core of this claim is

anchored on a theory of law, the fundamental law of reason. The identification of

this fundamental law is not a matter of pure moral reasoning. It is a conception

of law as a rule of reason with “reason” here suggesting a uniquely judicial form

of discourse. The particular values that will, under this approach, gain this special

normative force cannot be listed in a fixed catalogue; they are, rather, the values

that are deemed essential to securing the conditions for legality or the rule of law

that are, in turn, necessary for “law” to exist. In light of this, I contend that judicial

decisions on electoral disputes in Ghana and Nigeria should be able to carry

conviction with the ordinary person as being based not merely on legal precedent or

the law-makers’ intentions but also upon acceptable values as understood from the

reason of the fundamental law.

Keywords: constitutional law of elections; constitution law; elections;

electoral disputes; fundamental law of reason; multi-party constitutional

democracy; human rights; rule of law; constitutionalism; judicial reasoning;

interpretation and legality

Résumé

Cet article tente une compréhension comparative du droit constitutionnel des

élections dans deux pays africains : le Ghana et le Nigéria. En guise de prélude,

l’auteur soutient que les juges devraient aborder la tâche d’interprétation du droit

constitutionnel des élections sur la base d’une compréhension qui ne soit pas

positiviste (de droit positif) de la légalité ou de l’état de droit. Le droit ne devrait

pas être considéré simplement comme le produit des décisions et de l’intention des

législateurs, mais comme l’incarnation des valeurs fondamentales qui acquièrent

une force normative de manière indépendante de ce qui est décidé, écrit ou voulu par

les législateurs. Le noyau de cet argument est ancré sur une théorie du droit: la loi

fondamentale de la raison. L’identification de cette loi fondamentale n’est pas une

question de raisonnement moral pur. C’est une conception du droit sur la base de la

* BA, LLB (UG), M.A. (Brock), LLM, PhD (Queen’s University).

(2021) 8(1) Journal of Comparative Law in Africa 1

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2 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN AFRICA VOL 8, NO 1, 2021

https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v8/i1a1

raison, le mot «raison» ici pris comme une forme d’argumentaire juridique unique

dans laquelle les valeurs particulières, sous cette approc he, vont acquérir cette force

normative spéciale qui ne peut être inscrite dans un répertoire fixe ; ce sont plutôt

des valeurs jugées essentielles à la sécurisation des conditions de légalité ou de l’état

de droit qui sont à leur tour nécessaires à l’existence même du «droit». À la lumière

de cela, l’auteur soutient que les décisions judiciaires sur les différends électoraux

au Ghana et au Nigéria devraient être en mesure de poursuivre la condamnation

des personnes ordinaires comme étant fondée non seulement sur la jurisprudence

ou l’intention des législateurs, mais également sur des valeurs acceptables comme

découlant de la loi fondamentale de la raison.

Mots-clés : droit constitutionnel des élections; droit constitutionnel;

élections; litiges électoraux; loi fondamentale de la raison; démocratie

constitutionnelle multiparti; droits de l’homme; état de droit;

constitutionnalisme; raisonnement judiciaire; inter prétation et légalité

Introduction

In the current century, the value of multi-party constitutional democracy

is not in serious doubt. Constitutional democracy is not only essential for

political stability, but the democratic experience is, we may say, a living

leverage for the actualisation of constitutionalism, rule of law, human

rights and fundamental freedoms. This is particularly the case for those

people emerging or transitioning from depressing military dictatorships

or one-party authoritarian r ule, a situation not uncommon for some

countries in Africa. Multi-party constitutional politics provide an ideal

way for the plurality of voices in the body politic of a nation to be

heard.1 Far from being “worms at the entrails” of the nation’s political

organisation, multi-party politics may exemplify a positive conception

of an open political space for competing interests in a nation’s political

life. In fact, both established and transitional constitutional democracies

regard “multi-partism” as a sine qua non for open competitive politics,

good governance and a culture of respect for human rights.2

At the core of multiparty constitutional democracy is the electoral

process.3 There must be periodic, free and fair elections. Elections in a

constitutional democracy represent the people’s voices backed by their

votes, their expression of what their interests are and who they wish

to pursue and defend those interests on their behalf. The basic point of

1 See Baylies, C. & Szeftel, M. ‘The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia’ (1992) 19

Review of African Political Economy 75; Makinda, S.M. ‘Democracy and multi-party politics in Africa’

(1996) 34 The Journal of Modern African Studies 555.

2 See Schattschneider, E. E. Party Government (1942). See also Schmitter, P.C. ‘Parties are not

they once were’ in Diamon, L. & Gunther, R. (eds) Political Parties and Democracy (2001).

3 See Har rison, G. ‘Democracy in Mozambique: The significance of multi-party elections’

(1996) 23 Review of African Political Economy 19.

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A FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF REASON AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW OF ELECTIONS IN AFRICA 3

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an electoral system, it seems to me, is to ensure that the ultimate end

of governance is to promote and protect the well-being of the people.

Many of the constitutions of African states, especially Ghana and Nigeria

recognise the importance of elections by providing for the citizens’ r ights

to vote.4

But the exercise of such a right has not always been without trouble.

Violence, vote-rigging, and logistical problems often characterise elections

in these countries.5 Achieving the aspiration of elections that are entirely

free from the grip of these problems seems an arduous task. The solution

to such troubling events will, in the end, involve an acceptable resolution

between the contending parties in accordance with the “conscience” of

the constitutions. While these problems are often addressed politically, the

courts in Ghana and Nigeria since their independence, have routinely

been involved in the electoral process as well.

The courts have become involved in settling disputes brought about by

the conduct of elections, and ensuring that the rule of law and the values

of constitutionalism inform the electoral processes in a meaningful way.6

For example, issues of candidates’ qualifications7 have made their way to

the courts and so have legal disputes on whether or not a person has been

validly elected into a particular office; or whether the name of a particular

nominee has been lawfully substituted before the conduct of an election.8

The legal relevance of these cases, in context, is to underscore the value

of political participatory rights in a constitutional democracy.9

But beneath these broad generalities in this age of rights,10 is the burning

normative and factual question as to the specific role of electoral disputes

through judicial reasoning in understanding law as a moral aspiration of

the citizens’ of these countries. How are the courts in Ghana and Nigeria

able to conceive the constitutional law of election in a manner that reflects

the citizens moral authorship of such a law? Is judicial interpretation of

the constitutional law in Ghana and Nigeria consistent with the tenets of

the fundamental law of reason?

4 Article 42 of Ghana’s Constitution, 1992 and s 7(4) of Nigeria’s Constitution, 1999.

5 See Wilkinson, S.I. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (2006);

Teshome, W. ‘Electoral violence in Afr ica: Exper ience from Ethiopia’ (2009) 3 International Journal

of Humanities and Social Sciences 176.

6 Weinberg, L. ‘When courts decide elections: the constitutionality of Bush v. Gore’ (2002) 82

Buffalo University Law Review 609; Funston, R. ‘The Supreme Court and critical Elections’ (1975) 69

The American Political Science Review 795.

7 In Re Parliamentary Election for Wulensi Constituency; Zakaria v Nyimakan (2003-2004) 1 SCLR

1; Yeboah v J.H. Mensah 1998–99) SCLR 492.

8 Ugwu v Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 367; Amaechi v INEC (2008) 1 S.C. (Pt.1) 36.

9 S ee Hassi m, S. ‘Represe ntation, pa rticip ation and demo cratic ef fectivene ss: Femin ist

challe nges to repre sentative d emocracy i n South Af rica’ in Goe tz, A.M. & Ha ssim, S .

No Shortc uts to Power: Africa n Women in Politics and Polic y Making (2003 ).

10 See Bobbio, N. The Age of Rights 1 ed (1991).

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