Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Chaskalson P, Mahomed DP, Ackermann J, Didcott J, Kentridge AJ, Kriegler J, Langa J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O'Regan J and Sachs J
• Judgment Date: 15 May 1996
• Citation: 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC)
• Docket Number: CCT 8/95
• Hearing Date: 07 November 1995
• Counsel: G J Marcus (with him M Chaskalson) for the appellants. T J Kruger SC (with him J van der Westhuizen and N Davis) for the respondents.
• Court: Constitutional Court

G Kentridge AJ:

[1] The Pretoria News is a daily newspaper published in Pretoria. The first appellant is the editor of the Pretoria News, the second appellant is the owner and publisher of the newspaper, the third appellant is a journalist employed on the newspaper and the fourth appellant is its distributor. During February and March 1993, the newspaper published a series of six articles dealing with the supply by air of arms and H other material to the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. The tenor of the articles was that South African citizens were engaged in these operations, that the operations were covert, and that they entailed the evasion of South African air control regulations. The flights were described in the articles as 'illegal' and as 'pirate flights'. The articles suggested I that those responsible for the flights were 'fuelling the war in Angola', and were doing so for motives of personal gain, notwithstanding the disastrous effect of the Angolan civil war on the inhabitants of that country. The articles were published under the by-line of Dale Lautenbach, the third appellant.

J [2] The last two in the series of articles, published on 9 and 11 March

Kentridge AJ

A 1993, mentioned by name Mr Gert de Klerk, the first respondent herein, and his company Wonder Air (Pty) Ltd, the second respondent. The article published on 9 March stated that the Department of Foreign Affairs had been calling in a number of private air operators, 'following suspicions that individual companies might be fuelling the B war in Angola with supplies'. The first respondent was named as one of those summoned. The article published on 11 March, again in the context of illegal flights to supply the UNITA rebels, referred to 'the mystery airstrip' owned and operated by the respondents. In consequence of these publications the respondents issued a combined summons out of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court claiming damages C for defamation against the appellants jointly and severally. The first respondent claimed damages of R750 000 for injury to his reputation and his feelings; the second respondent claimed R5 million for loss of business and damage to its commercial reputation. I shall hereafter refer to the respondents as 'the plaintiffs' and to the appellants as 'the D defendants'.

[3] On 25 May 1993 the defendants filed a joint plea. The defendants admitted publishing the articles, but denied that they meant that the plaintiffs were involved in illegal activities, E or that the articles were defamatory of the plaintiffs. In the alternative, the defendants alleged that the general subject-matter of the articles was a matter of public interest. On this basis they pleaded a 'rolled-up' defence of fair comment [1] - namely that, insofar as the references to the plaintiffs were expressions of opinion, those opinions constituted fair comment made in good faith on matters of public interest and were based on facts truly F stated in the articles themselves; and that, insofar as the articles contained allegations of fact, those allegations were true and were matters of public interest. There was a further allegation by way of defence that the defendants had published the articles in good faith in pursuance of a duty to its readers and to the public in general to keep them informed of G 'facts, opinions and allegations' concerning the civil war in Angola, that its readers had a corresponding right to be so informed and that, in the premises, the publication of the articles 'was not unlawful'. [2] All allegations of damage were denied.

[4] I have given only a brief and simplified summary of the defendants' plea because it is H not in issue in the proceedings in this Court. What has brought the defendants, as appellants, to this Court is the fate of an application to amend their plea by adding a further defence. Notice of intention to amend the plea was given by the defendants on 7 October

Kentridge AJ

A 1994. The significance of this date is that it was subsequent to the coming into force of the interim Constitution on 27 April 1994 in terms of s 251(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. The plaintiffs objected to the proposed amendment, and it is necessary to set out in full both the proposed amendment and the B grounds on which the plaintiffs objected to it.

[5] The notice of intention to amend read as follows:

'Kindly take notice that the defendants intend to amend their plea in the following way:

By the insertion after para 12.14 of the following:

"12.15

C In addition to the aforegoing, the publication of the article was not unlawful by reason of the protection afforded to the defendants by s 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 which provides:

'(15)(1)

Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and D expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media, and the freedom of artistic creativity and scientific research.'

More particularly:

12.15.1

E The articles in question were published against the background and in the circumstances described in paras 12.1-12.9 hereof in good faith and without the intention of defaming the plaintiffs.

12.15.2

F The articles concern matters of public interest and were published pursuant to a duty to keep members of the public informed of facts, opinions and allegations concerning the on-going civil war in Angola and a corresponding right or G legitimate interest on the part of readers of the Pretoria News to be informed of such facts, opinions and allegations.

12.16

By virtue of the facts and contentions set out in para 12.15, the publication of the said articles were not unlawful and such H publication is protected by s 15 of the Constitution."'

The grounds of objection were the following:

'The plaintiffs object to the proposed amendment on the following grounds:

(1)

that the proposed amendment would render the defendants' plea excipiable;

(2)

I the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 was at no relevant stage in force when the defendants published the defamatory material of and concerning the plaintiffs;

(3)

the damage caused to the plaintiffs consequent upon and as a result of the publication of the defamatory material was caused prior to the promulgation J introduction of Act 200 of 1993;

Kentridge AJ

(4)

A the South African Constitution is not retroactive;

(5)

in the alternative, the Constitution has no application horizontally, alternatively does not apply to disputes of the present nature;

(6)

further alternatively, s 15 of the Constitution does not grant any of the defendants leave and licence to publish defamatory material, either as alleged B or at all;

(7)

in particular, chapter 3 of the Constitution protects the plaintiffs' right to their physical and emotional integrity, reputation, unrestricted participation in public and commercial affairs and their right to an untarnished reputation;

(8)

these rights, inasmuch as they may come into conflict with the defendants' right C to publish defamatory material (the existence of which right is denied), takes precedence over any right claimed by the defendants; alternatively

(9)

the defendants' right to publish defamatory material (which is denied) is limited D in terms of s 33 of the Constitution and the common law by the plaintiffs' rights as aforesaid;

(10)

consequently, the proposed amendment of the defendants' plea does not disclose a defence and should not be granted.'

(I have not corrected the grammatical errors in the two documents.)

[6] The opposed application to amend the plea was heard by Van Dijkhorst J in the E Transvaal Provincial Division. On 10 November 1994 he gave judgment refusing the application for amendment. [3] The learned Judge's approach to the application was that an amendment which would render a pleading excipiable should not be allowed, and he held that the proposed amendment would be excipiable on two separate grounds. The first F ground was that the proceedings before the Court were 'proceedings which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were pending before any court of law . . . exercising jurisdiction in accordance with the law then in force . . .', in terms of s 241(8) of the Constitution, and therefore had to 'be dealt with as if this Constitution had not been G passed'. This meant, according to the learned Judge, that the provisions of the Constitution could not be invoked by any party to the pending proceedings. He followed his own judgment in Kalla and Another v The Master and Others, [4] in which he had given extensive reasons for the conclusion 'that s 241(8) precludes retrospective operation of the Constitution'. [5]

H [7] The second ground on which Van Dijkhorst J held the proposed amendment to be excipiable was that set out in para 5 of the plaintiffs' notice of objection, viz:

'In the alternative the Constitution has no application horizontally, alternatively does not apply to disputes of the present nature.'

I [8] The question whether chapter 3 of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights) has only a 'vertical' application or has in addition a 'horizontal'

Kentridge AJ

A application has been the subject of considerable debate by commentators on the Constitution. There have been similar debates, both academic and judicial, in other countries with constitutional bills of rights. The term 'vertical application' is used to indicate that the rights conferred on persons by a bill of rights are intended only as a protection B against the legislative and executive power of the State in its various manifestations. The term...