Die Prokureursorde van die Oranje-Vrystaat v Schoeman

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1977 (4) SA 588 (O)

Die Prokureursorde van die Oranje-Vrystaat v Schoeman
1977 (4) SA 588 (O)

1977 (4) SA p588

Citation	1977 (4) SA 588 (O)
Court	Oranje-Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling
Judge	MT Steyn R en Brink R
Heard	June 2, 1977
Judgment	July 28, 1977

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Prokureur — Wangedrag — Wet 23 van 1934 en Prokureurs-verordeninge (O) — Praktiserende Prokureurs behoort met bepalings daarvan vertroud te wees — Onkunde van — Effek — Skrapping van prokureur van die rol — Wanneer dit beveel moet word — Faktore wat in aanmerking geneem moet word — Versuim om bepalings van art. 33 van Wet 23 van 1934 en Prokureurs-verordeninge (O) streng na te kom — Het nie noodwendig skrapping van die rol tot gevolg nie — Verbod teen die gee van lesings aan leke-gehore kragtens Reël 43 (11) van Prokureurs-verordeninge (O) — Prokureur se plig aangaande — Respondent skuldig aan oortredings in verband met trustgelde en dat hy 'n verbod van die Prokureursorde teen die gee van lesings nie gehoorsaam het nie — Sy hantering van trustgelde roekeloos — Respondent van die rol geskrap.

Headnote : Kopnota

Die bepalings van die Toelating van Prokureurs, Notarisse en Transportbesorgerswet, 23 van 1934, en van die Vrystaatse prokureurs-verordeninge is lank reeds gevestigde gedragskodes en handelings-opdragte. Elke praktiserende prokureur behoort daarvan bewus en daarmee vertroud te wees. Onkunde daarvan is geen verskoning nie en is meestal strafverswarend eerder as versagtend. 'n Prokureur wat hom nie die moeite troos om met sy verpligtinge, soos daarin vervat en uiteengesit, vertroud te raak nie en gevolglik die pad byster raak, verdien nie veel simpatie by tugtiging nie. Nog minder as hy sy Orde se verordeninge willens en wetens verontagsaam.

'n Hof sal sekerlik nie ligtelik die skrapping van 'n praktisyn se naam van die rol waarop dit verskyn beveel nie, maar behoort nie te huiwer om dit te doen in gevalle waar die omstandighede dit verg nie. Daar moet ongetwyfeld gekyk word na die oortreder as persoon, en die omstandighede wat hom as indiwidu aankleef moet sorgvuldig oorweeg word, maar daar moet ook verder gekyk word, en breër

1977 (4) SA p589

belange - dié van die betrokke Orde, van die gemeenskap en van die regsbedeling - moet ook in ag geneem en oorweeg word. Daarbenewens moet die houding van 'n oortreder se beroepsgenote wat deur middel van die Orde of beherende liggaam waarvan hy lid is aan die Hof meegedeel word, ook in ag geneem word. En waar so 'n Orde meen dat die besondere oortreder nie langer as lid daarvan deug nie, en verhoed moet word om die betrokke professie verder te beoefen, moet ernstige aandag aan daardie sienswyse geskenk word. Maar 'n Hof is nie daaraan gebonde nie en is verplig om sy eie oordeel op al die relevante bewysmateriaal en feite te vel en daarvolgens te handel.

Die gevolge van 'n bevel ter skrapping is fel en verrykend. Maar die feite bepaal gewoonlik die straf. En selfs aansuiwering van 'n tekort in trustgelde, diepe herou en onkunde betreffende boekhouding en basiese sake-beginsels is nie opsigself genoeg om 'n skrappingsbevel in alle gevalle af te weer nie. Daardie is egter almal faktore wat ter strafversagting in die weegskaal geplaas moet word.

'n Versuim om die bepalings van artikel 33 van Wet 23 van 1934 of die Vrystaatse Prokureurs-verordeninge streng na te kom het weliswaar nie noodwendiglik skrapping van die rol tot gevolg nie. Maar 'n prokureur, en vernaamlik 'n praktiserende prokureur, verkeer in 'n besonder verantwoordelike posisie wat verg dat hy hom aan sy gehele taak moet toewy en dat hy besonder aandagtig moet wees, nie slegs aan die belange van sy kliënte nie, maar ook aan dié van sy amp en van sy Orde. Hy is lid van 'n eerbare, gesiene en geleerde professie wat slegs behoorlik kan funksioneer as dit onvoorwaardelike vertroue by die publiek inboesem. Daardie vereistes en verpligtinge geld te meer by die hantering van trustgelde, want die essensie van 'n trustfonds is die afwesigheid van risiko en die vertroue daardeur geskep.

Alhoewel 'n prokureur sekerlik waardevolle bystand met regsopleiding deur middel van lesings kan verleen, is sy eerste plig en trou onteenseglig teenoor sy praktyk en Orde, en moet hy voorkeur gee aan sy professionele verpligtinge bo ander, selfs prysenswaardige, aktiwiteite. 'n Prokureur wat dit nie insien nie, het geen behoorlike

1977 (4) SA p590

begrip van die aard van sy amp of besef van sy verantwoordelikhede as regspraktisyn nie. Dit is sy plig om die verordeninge van sy Orde (in hierdie geval Reël 43 (11) daarvan wat die gee van lesings aan leke-gehore sonder die toestemming van die Prokureursorde verbied) te ken en te eerbiedig.

Die respondent is van die rol van prokureurs, notarisse en transportbesorgers geskrap toe hy deur die Hof skuldig bevind is aan sekere oortredings van artikel 33 van Wet 23 van 1934 in verband met trustgelde en aan 'n oortreding van Reël 43 (11) van applikant se verordeninge deurdat hy lesings aan leke-gehore gegee het sonder applikant se toestemming. Die Hof het bevind dat respondent roekeloos opgetree het met die hantering van sy trustgelde, dat hy die Vrystaatse Prokureurs-verordeninge in die wind geslaan het, òf hom nie die moeite getroos het om homself met hulle bepalings vertroud te maak nie, en dat hy leuens vertel het.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Attorney — Misconduct — Act 23 of 1934 and Attorneys' Rules (O) — Practising attorneys ought to be conversant with the provisions thereof — Ignorance of — Effect — Striking attorney off the roll — When to be ordered — Factors which should be taken into account — Failure to comply strictly with the provisions of sec. 33 of Act 23 of 1934 and Attorneys' Rules (O) — Does not necessarily result in striking off the roll — Prohibition against the giving of lectures to lay audiences under Rule 43 (11) of Attorneys' Rules (O) — Attorney's duty concerning — Respondent guilty of contraventions in connection with trust moneys and of disobeying a prohibition of the Law Society against the giving of lectures — His handling of trust moneys reckless — Respondent struck off the roll.

Headnote : Kopnota

The provisions of the Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers Admission Act, 23 of 1934, and the Free State Attorneys' Rules are already long established codes of conduct and action instructions. Every practising attorney ought to be aware thereof and be conversant therewith. Ignorance thereof is no excuse and is mostly aggravating of punishment rather than mitigating. An attorney who does not take the trouble to become conversant with his obligations, as therein contained and set out, and consequently goes astray, does not deserve much sympathy in his punishment. Even less so if he deliberately disobeyes the Rules of his Society.

A Court will certainly not lightly order the removal of a practitioner's name from the roll upon which it appears, but should not hesitate to do so in cases where the circumstances require it. Undoubtedly, the offender as a person should be considered, and the circumstances attaching to him as an individual should be carefully considered, but one should look further, and wider interests - those of the Society concerned, of the community and of the administration of justice should be taken into account and considered. In addition, the attitude of the offender's professional colleagues, of which the Court is informed by the Society or controlling body of which he is a member, should be considered. And where such a Society is of the opinion that the particular offender is no longer suitable as a member thereof, and should be prevented from further practising the profession concerned, serious attention should be given to that opinion. But a Court is not bound thereby and is obliged to come to its own conclusion on all the relevant evidential material and facts and to act accordingly.

The consequences of an order of striking off are serious and far-reaching. But the, facts unsually determine the punishment. And even the making up of a deficiency in trust moneys, deep remorse and ignorance concerning bookkeeping and basic business principles are not in themselves sufficient to avoid a striking off order in all cases. Those are, however, all factors in mitigation of punishment which should be placed in the scales.

A failure to comply strictly with the provisions of section 33 of Act 23 of 1934 or the Free State Attorneys' Rules admittedly does not necessarily result in a striking off the roll. But an attorney, and particularly a practising attorney, occupies a particularly responsible position which requires that he devotes himself to his entire task and that he should pay particular attention, not only to the interests of his clients, but also to those of his office and his Society. He is a member of an honourable, respected and learned profession which can only function properly if it inspires the unconditional confidence of the public. Those requirements and obligations apply the more so in the handling of trust moneys as the essence of a trust fund is the absence of risk and the trust created thereby.

Although an attorney can certainly give valuable assistance in legal training by means of lectures, his first duty and allegiance is unquestionably to his practice and Society, and he should give preference to his professional obligations above other, even laudable, activities. An attorney who does not understand this does not have a proper understanding of the nature of his office or realisation of his responsibilities as a legal practitioner. It is his duty to know and obey the Rules of his Society (in this case Rule 43 (11) thereof which prohibits the giving of lectures to lay audiences without the consent of the Law Society).

The respondent was struck off the roll of attorneys, notaries and conveyancers when he was found guilty by the Court of certain contraventions of section 33 of...