Die bekende spermskenker se reg op kontak met die kind : tendense in die Nederlandse en breër Europese familiereg : aantekening

• Author: A. Van der Linde
• Date: 01 January 2014
• Pages: 338-354
• Published date: 01 January 2014
• DOI: 10.10520/EJC166186

338 2014 De Jure

the liquidation order would be at liberty to make out a case for liquida tion

and the court would be able to consider the merits of the business rescue

application before it has a significant impact on liquidation proceedings.

Finally, the much talked about failure of 1Time Airlines early in 2013,

following unsuccessful business rescue proceedings, emphasises the

stark reality that the business rescue regime introduced by the Act is no

silver bullet. Although heralded as an improvement on its predecessor,

there will likely be numerous companies who will not survive in spite of

attempted rescues. It is for this reason that it is perhaps wise to

remember one of the underlying principles of the law of insolvency, and

to consider the impact that the current position might have in the light

thereof. Innes CJ explains the concept of a concursus creditorum as

follows:

“The object of the [Insolvency Act] is to ensure a due distribution of assets

among creditors in the order of their preference ... The sequestration order

crystalizes the insolvent’s position; the hand of the law is laid upon the estate,

and at once the rights of the general body of creditors have to be taken into

consideration. No transaction can thereafter be entered into with regard to

estate matters by a single creditor to the prejudice of the general body. The

claim of each creditor must be dealt with as it existed at the issue of the

order” (Walker v Syfret NO 1911 AD 141166).

Once the hand of the law is laid upon the estate, surely a mere

application should not be able to dislodge it? It is submitted that the

current interpretation of section 131 should be reconsidered to ensure

that the existing dissonance is better addressed. It is respectfully

submitted that the conclusion reached by Bam J in Richter v Bloempro CC

and Others appears to be the correct one.

H STOOP

University of Cape Town

Die bekende spermskenker se reg op kontak met

die kind: Tendense in die Nederlandse en breër

Europese familiereg

1 Inleiding

In ’n vroeëre bydrae (Van der Linde “Right of contact of known sperm

donors in case of artificially conceived children” HR 11 April 2008 2010

THRHR 690) word die regsposisie in die Nederlandse en breër Europese

reg ingevolge artikel 8 van die Europese Verdrag vir die Regte en Vryhede

van die Mens, 1953 (hierna EVRM), rakende die bekende spermskenker

Aantekeninge/Notes 339

se reg op kontak met die kind wat deur kunsmatige inseminasie verwek

is, bespreek. In daardie bydrae word gefokus op die regsposisie van die

bekende spermskenker wat “noue persoonlike bande”, oftewel ’n

“gesinslewe”, met die kind gehad het. Die skrywer huldig die mening dat

daar in Suid-Afrika voorsiening gemaak moet word vir die bekende

spermskenker om “outomatiese” ouerlike verantwoordelikhede en regte

te bekom indien hy aan artikel 21(1)(a) van die Kinderwet, 38 van 2005

voldoen. Alternatiewelik moet dit ook vir hom moontlik wees om die

kind te “erken” en geïdentifiseer te word as die kind se biologiese vader

ingevolge artikel 26 van die Kinderwet, sou daar “gesinslewe” tussen

hom en die kind bestaan (2010 THRHR 690694). Dit sou in

ooreenstemming wees met ontwikkelinge in die Nederlandse reg. Die

stelling word egter gemaak dat die argumente ten gunste van sodanige

erkenning gebaseer op “gesinslewe” nie sal stand hou indien die

bekende spermskenker nooit die geleentheid gehad het om ’n

gesinslewe met die kind op te bou nie, omdat die moeder hom die

geleentheid om dit te doen, ontsê het (2010 THRHR 690695). Híerdie

aspek word hieronder (par 5) verder bespreek.

In ’n verdere bydrae (Van der Linde “Weerlegging van die vermoede

van vaderskap en die beskerming van ‘beoogde gesinslewe’ binne

konteks van die ongetroude biologiese vader se reg op kontak met sy

kind” 2013 LitNet Jaargang 10(2) 45) word die regsposisie van die

ongetroude biologiese vader (waar die kind op natuurlike wyse verwek

is) bespreek. Gemelde bydrae fokus op daardie geval waar die biologiese

vader nie in staat was om ’n “gesinslewe” met die kind te ontwikkel nie,

vanweë die feit dat die moeder (of bepaalde wetgewing) hom verhinder

het om dit te doen. Die vraag of sy “beoogde gesinslewe” beskerming

verdien ingevolge artikel 8 EVRM word soos volg deur die Europese Hof

vir die Regte van die Mens (hierna EHRM) beantwoord (Schneider v

Germany aansoek no 17080/07 van 15-09-2011 par 81):

“[I]ntended family life may, exceptionally, fall within the ambit of Article 8,

notably in cases where the fact that family life has not yet fully been

established is not attributable to the applicant ... In particular, where the

circumstances warrant, ‘family life’ must extend to the potential relationship

which may develop between a child born out of wedlock and the natural father”.

En verder (par 90):

“In view of the foregoing, the Court does not exclude that the applicant’s

intended relationship with F. fell within the ambit of ‘family life’ under Article 8.

In any event, the determination of the legal relations between the applicant

and F. – that is, whether the applicant had a right of access to F. and

information about his personal circumstances – even if they fell short of family

life, concerned an important part of the applicant’s identity and thus his ‘private

life’ within the meaning of Article 8(1). The domestic courts’ decision to refuse

him contact with and information about F. thus interfered with his right to

respect, at least, for his private life”. (Eie beklemtoning).

Indien die “beoogde” of bedoelde verhouding tussen die biologiese

natuurlike vader en kind dus nie onder die vereistes vir ’n “gesinslewe”