Dempster v Addington Football Club (Pty) Ltd

• Jurisdiction: South Africa

Dempster v Addington Football Club (Pty) Ltd
1967 (3) SA 262 (D)

1967 (3) SA p262

Citation	1967 (3) SA 262 (D)
Court	Durban and Coast Local Division
Judge	Caney J
Heard	May 15, 1967
Judgment	May 24, 1967

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde A

Master and servant — Remuneration — Construction of contract — Professional football player to receive specified minimum monthly B remuneration during playing season — Undertaking to find him employment — Remuneration received from such employment not deductible from monthly remuneration.

Headnote : Kopnota

The plaintiff, a professional football player, had entered into a contract with the defendant, under which it undertook '(d) to guarantee the player a minimum wage per month of R220 during the playing season C - March to October of each year' and '(e) to use its best endeavours to obtain employment for the player and, if necessary, for the player's wife'. Plaintiff earned remuneration from employment other than his services for the defendant and a dispute arose whether he was entitled to receive the remuneration stated in (d), regardless of remuneration from other employment, or whether he was obliged to submit to the reduction of the remuneration by the amount of remuneration received from other employment.

Held, that the dispute could be resolved without the hearing of extrinsic evidence.

D Held, further, that under (d) the defendant had to remunerate the plaintiff by paying him not less than R220 a month, irrespective of whether or not he earned other remuneration from any other employment.

Case Information

Action claiming the payment of an amount under a written contract. The facts appear from the reasons for judgment.

J. M. Didcott, for the plaintiff. E

D. B. Friedman, for the respondent.

Cur adv vult.

Postea (May 24th). F

Judgment

Caney, J.:

The plaintiff, who is a professional football player, claims payment of R3,014.70 by virtue of a contract made between him and the G defendant, a limited liability company which conducts the business of a football club. The contract was made in Scotland on 12th January, 1965; counsel before me agreed that the questions for determination, relating to the interpretation of the contract, were to be decided by the principles of our law. These questions were ordered by this Court, on 21st April last under the provisions of Rule 33 (4), to be decided H without oral evidence, in advance of the trial. I have to decide whether a certain clause in the contract can or cannot be interpreted by reference only to its language and to that of the other provisions of the contract, so that its meaning is revealed with a sufficient degree of certainty to preclude the Court from taking into consideration evidence of facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the contract; if it can be so interpreted, then I have to decide whether the plaintiff's primary contention, or that of the defendant, of the meaning of the clause is the correct interpretation or

1967 (3) SA p263

Caney J

whether some other meaning is the correct interpretation, and if so, what it is.

The plaintiff's case, as made in his particulars of claim, is that he is entitled to recover the sum claimed upon an interpretation of the contract without resort to extrinsic evidence of the surrounding facts A and circumstances, or, alternatively, he is entitled to have extrinsic evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances averred by him to be heard in aid of the interpretation; he avers the meaning he gives to the clause. In a final alternative, he claims a lesser sum upon the basis of the interpretation the defendant places on the clause. The defendant B in its plea denies these averments and contentions and also pleads that by oral agreement made in April, 1965, the contract was cancelled with immediate effect. A copy of the contract is attached to the plea. The defendant neither, in its plea, makes any averment as to its meaning nor avers any facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the contract as a basis for any contention as to the meaning of the clause.

C The contract is expressed to be made between the defendant and the plaintiff, who is referred to in it as the 'player' of a stated residential address in Glasgow, Scotland. It proceeds to record that in consideration of the player obtaining a clearance from his club 'St. Mirren F.C.' (presumably a football club) and also from the Scottish D Football Association, and provided the player signs professional soccer forms of the defendant's club, the defendant makes certain undertakings. The first of these is: (a) the defendant undertakes to 'pay the said player a signing-on fee of' £250 (R500) by two instalments; clauses (b) and (c) relate to the defendant providing transport for the plaintiff E and his wife and two children from Scotland to Durban. Then follows the clause in dispute, namely (d), in which the defendant undertakes to

'guarantee the player a minimum wage per month of one hundred & ten pounds (R220), during the playing season - March to October of each year'.

Finally, the defendant undertakes to

'(e) use its best endeavours to obtain suitable employment for the F player and, if necessary, the player's wife'.

Then follow undertakings on the part of the plaintiff, namely (a) he is to

'apply his mind and body diligently to the art of association football',

and (b)

'attend all training sessions and matches and all other functions as directed, and at the sole discretion of the team manager, in regard to professional soccer'.

G Finally, in clause (c) he undertakes to arrive in Durban not later than the first week in February.

I should say at this point that it is common cause that the plaintiff did sign the required professional soccer forms for the defendant; what they are and what they contain or represent does not appear in the H papers, but counsel assured me that, even if they formed part of the contract, their contents were irrelevant to the decision of the questions before me.

No assistance is to be got from observing upon the curious construction and language of the contract. The essence of the question presently at issue between the parties is whether, the plaintiff having earned remuneration from employment other than his services for the defendant, he is entitled to receive from the defendant the remuneration

1967 (3) SA p264

Caney J

stated in clause (d), regardless of remuneration from other employment, or whether the plaintiff is obliged to submit to the reduction of the remuneration stated in that clause by the amount of remuneration A received by him from other employment. In...