A comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the Companies Act 71 of 2008

JurisdictionSouth Africa
Date15 August 2019
Pages290-305
AuthorLindi Coetzee
Citation2010 Acta Juridica 290
Published date15 August 2019
A comparative analysis of the derivative
litigation proceedings under the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
LINDI COETZEE*
Very little protection was afforded to the protection of minority rights in the
common law of companies. The motivation for the lack of protection was that
a company is a legal person that exists separate from its members. The proper
plaintiff principle as mentioned in Foss v Harbottle provides that the company is
the proper plaintiff that has to institute legal action where a wrong has been
committed against the company. Both the common law and the Companies
Act 61 of 1973 provided exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule. The common
law provided for a common-law derivative action while section 266 of the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided for a statutory derivative action. Deriva-
tive actions are provided for in section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
This article compares derivative action litigation proceedings under the 1973
Companies Act with the provisions in the new Companies Act 71 of 2008.
The article analyses the unique nature of both the common-law and the
statutory derivative actions. It draws a comparison between the statutory
derivative action contained in section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973
and section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
I INTRODUCTION
In the common law of companies very little protection was afforded to
the protection of minority rights. The motivation for the lack of protec-
tion was that a company is a legal person that exists separate from its
members. In Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd
1
the court held that an
incorporated company must be treated like any other independent
person. It is the bearer of its own rights and liabilities. In Foss v Harbottle
2
the court held that the majority of the members in a company have the
power to bind the minority and that the courts will refuse to interfere in
the running of the company while the majority is acting lawfully.
3
Companies are run according to democratic principles and when a person
* B Juris LLB (UPE) LLM (UNISA), Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law,
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.
1
2
(1983) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 203–4.
3
HS Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) 296.
290
2010 Acta Juridica 290
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
becomes a member of the company such a person agrees to be bound by
the decisions of the majority.
4
Another principle which is based on the rules mentioned in Foss v
Harbottle is the proper plaintiff principle. According to this principle the
company is the proper plaintiff that has to institute legal action where a
wrong has been committed against the company.
5
The members of the
company are, as a general rule, not allowed to institute an action to
recover damages on behalf of the company. A problem arises where the
wrongdoers are the persons in control of the company. It is highly
unlikely that they will approve a decision to institute legal action against
themselves to recover the damages that the company has suffered. Both
the common law and the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided exceptions
to the proper plaintiff rule. The common law provided for a common-
law derivative action while s 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973
provided for a statutory derivative action. Derivative actions are provided
for in s 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This article will compare
derivative action litigation proceedings under the 1973 Companies Act
with the provisions in the new Companies Act 71 of 2008.
II THE RULES IN FOSS v HARBOTTLE
The court in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd
6
held that when
a person becomes a shareholder in a company, that person undertakes to
be bound by the decisions of the majority, even when these decisions
adversely affect his rights as a shareholder (also referred to as majority
rule). The general principle is that the courts will not interfere in the
internal management of a company.
7
In Foss v Harbottle
8
the court held
that a company and its members are not the same thing for purposes of
instituting an action to recover damages suffered by the company. Where
a wrong has been committed against the company the company must
institute an action in its own name against the wrongdoers.
9
According to
Griggs
10
the rules in Foss v Harbottle promoted the interests of the legal
person to the detriment of the minority shareholder.
4
Hahlo’sSouth African Company Law through the Cases 6 ed by J T Pretorius et al (1999) 380;
Cilliers (n 3).
5
HS Cilliers op cit (n 3) 296–7; Wallersteinerv Moir (No 2); Moir v Wallersteiner and Others (No
2) [1975] 1 All ER 849 (CA) at 857d–f; Pretorius (n 4) 382; LGriggs ‘The Statutory Derivative
Action: Lessons that may be learnt from the Past!’ (2002) 4 University of Western Sydney Law
Review para 1.2.
6
7
Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V 7 B 154; 35 ER 61at 62; Yendev Orlando Coal Distributors (Pty)
Ltd 1961 (3) SA314 (W) 316; Maynard v Off‌ice Appliances (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290; Levin v
Felt and TweedsLtd 1951 (2) SA 401 (A) 414–15; Pretorius (n 4) 380–1.
8
Foss v Harbottle (n 2) 491; Pretorius (n 4) 383.
9
Cilliers (n 3) 297; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2All ER 1064 (CA) 1066; Pretorius (n 4) 382.
10
Griggs (n 5) para 2.1.
291DERIVATIVE LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

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