Cattle Breeders Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Veldman

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1974 (1) SA 169 (RA)

Cattle Breeders Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Veldman
1974 (1) SA 169 (RA)

1974 (1) SA p169

Citation	1974 (1) SA 169 (RA)
Court	Rhodesia, Appellate Division
Judge	Beadle CJ, Macdonald JP and Lewis JA
Heard	October 4, 1973
Judgment	October 4, 1973

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Husband and wife — Husband, on behalf of one-man company which he owned, seeking ejectment of wife from matrimonial home — Company having no greater rights than husband — Failure to offer suitable alternative accommodation — Ejectment rightly refused. B

Headnote : Kopnota

In an application by a company, of which respondent's husband was the sole effective shareholder and in complete control as managing director, the company claimed ejectment of his wife and children from the dwelling house on a farm leased by the company and which had been their matrimonial home before the husband had left it after committing adultery. The trial Court having dismissed the application, in an appeal,

C Held, that the company was nothing more than the husband's alter ego and possessed no greater rights to eject respondent than the husband had.

Held, further, that, though a husband might be the defaulting party, he had a right to eject the wife provided he offered her suitable alternative accommodation.

Held, further, as the husband had failed to make a timeous and suitable offer, that the Court a quo had rightly dismissed the application, and also an alternative application for a provisional order. D

Case Information

Appeal from a decision in the General Division (BECK, J.). The facts appear from the judgment of BEADLE, C.J.

R. H. B. Pringle, for the appellant.

C. L. Mercer, for the respondent. E

Judgment

Beadle, C.J.:

In this case the appellant, a private limited liability company, sued the respondent, a married woman, in the General Division of the High Court for an order ejecting her from a certain dwelling house. The Court dismissed the application with costs, and from that order the appellant company now appeals.

F The facts of the case are these. One Obe Veldman, the husband of the respondent, formed the appellant company some time prior to April, 1971. It must be accepted from the papers, as this was an application brought on notice of motion in which no viva voce evidence was given, that the appellant was a one-man G company of which Veldman was the sole effective shareholder and of which company he was in complete control as managing director.

In April, 1971, the appellant company leased a farm known as Melfort Farm which contained a dwelling house, which dwelling house is the subject of these proceedings. Veldman and his H wife, the respondent, two children of the respondent by a former marriage, and a child of the respondent by Veldman lived in this dwelling house as the parties' matrimonial home. They apparently lived together happily until some time in October, 1971, when Veldman committed adultery, and in November, 1971, Veldman left this dwelling house, but he left the respondent, his child and the respondent's children in the house.

In November, 1971, Veldman consulted his attorneys, who wrote the respondent about a divorce. In a reply dated December, 1971, the respondent's

1974 (1) SA p170

Beadle CJ

attorneys said it was by no means obvious to their client that the marriage had no future and should be brought to an end, and they stated that their client, the respondent, did not wish for a divorce. This has consistently been her attitude, although A she has suggested that if she was sued for a divorce by Veldman she would counterclaim for a judicial separation.

In June, 1972, the appellant company through its attorney wrote to the respondent asking her to vacate the house as it was necessary for Veldman as managing director of the appellant B company to live there in order to manage the business of the appellant company on Melfort Farm. She refused to leave.

In August, 1972, Veldman stated that he intended using part of this dwelling house as an office, and he took up occupation of part of the house for office purposes. When he stated he was going to do this, the respondent raised no objection, other C than saying she would object if his object in using the house as an office was to force her to vacate the premises. She stated in her affidavit that she is satisfied that his real object in...