Bilateral investment treaties: Has South Africa chartered a new course?

JurisdictionSouth Africa
AuthorDavis, D.M.
Citation2018 Acta Juridica 1
Published date19 December 2019
Pages1-16
Date19 December 2019
1
Bilateral investment treaties: Has South
Africa chartered a new course?
DENNIS M DAVIS*
This essay explores the history of the South African government’s
conclusion of a series of bilateral investment treaties (BITS) after 1994.
It then examines the reasons why South Africa decided that BITS
subverted a number of critical developmental goals, many of which
were enshrined the Constitution. The legislation that followed revealed
that the government was prepared to eschew certain forms of foreign
investment pressure and to carve out an independent set of investment
policies. This in turn raises the question explored in this paper about the
scope of national sovereignty to trump global demands for a specied
investment framework.
I INTRODUCTION
Rather than neutralising the protectionists, trade agreements may
empower a dierent set of rent-seeking interests and politically
well-connected rms, international banks, phar maceutical com-
panies and multinational rms. They may serve to internationalise
the inuence of these powerful domestic interests. Trade ag reements
could still result in freer, mutually benecial trade, through the
exchange of market access. They could result in the global upgrading
of regulations and standards, for labour, say, or the environment. But
they could also produce purely redistributive outcomes under the
guise of ‘freer trade’. As trade agreements become less about taris
and non-tari barriers at the border and more about domestic rules
and regulations, economists might do well to worry more about
the latter possibility. They may even adopt a stance of rebuttable
prejudice against these new-type trade deals; a prejudice that should
be overturned only with demonstrable evidence of their benets.1
* BComm LLB (UCT) MPhil (Cantab); LLD (hc) (UCT); Judge President of
the Competition Appeal Court.
1 D Rodr ik ‘What do trade agreements really do?’ NBER Working Paper Series:
Working Paper 24344 (2018) 21. Although Rodr ik was writing about multilateral
trade agreements his criticism is equally applicable to the consequences of bilateral
treaties for reasons advanced in this paper.
2018 Acta Juridica 1
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
2 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE LAW
After 1994, as democracy dawned in South Africa, the country
enthusiastically endorsed the idea of entering into bilateral
investment treaties (BITs). By 2012, South Afr ica had concluded 48
foreign investment protection and promotion treaties.2 It is necessary
to contextualise this apparent rush to conclude treaties. When the
African National Congress (ANC) came to power, it was anxious to
ensure that the international community regarded the country as a
sound investment destination. The history of post-colonial African
states that embarked on a course of economic nationalisation,
together with a proclamation of redistribution of economic
growth, had been a problematic one that engendered little investor
condence.3 With this history in mind, it appears that the British
government, under the leadership of then Prime Minister John
Major, was concer ned that the ANC might expropriate Br itish assets
in South Africa. The British government was therefore the rst to
approach the newly installed South African government with a BIT
proposal.4 This initiative was launched during a BIT frenzy: over 3 600
treaties were concluded worldwide during the decade that followed.5
At the very moment that democracy dawned in South Africa, the
so-called Washington Consensus, which encompassed a particular
macro-economic model propagated by both the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, had achieved hegemonic status.
In terms of the Washington Consensus, developing countries were
encouraged to enter into BITs with capital-exporting countries as
a means of ensuring that key economic values were incorporated
into the particular model of economic development chosen by the
developing country. This would ensure that the national regulatory
systems of developing countries were congruent with a dominant
transnational, legal and policy regime fashioned by these key
institutions, together with governments from the developed world.6
At the same time, the Washington Consensus induced a belief that
2 A Langalanga ‘Imagining South Africa’s foreign investment regulatory regime
in a global context’ SAIIA Occasional Paper 214 (2015).
3 Langalanga (n 2).
4 Langalanga (n 2).
5 UNCTAD ‘International Investment Agreements Navigator: South Afr ica’
available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/201/south-
africa (accessed on 10 October 2019).
6 See the letter wr itten by more than 200 academics in law and economics,
including Professors Laurence Tribe and Joseph Stiglitz, to Members of the
US Congress concerning the bias in respect of the implementation of BITs by
arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of Disputes, quoted by
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

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