Are shareholders exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations in South Africa? The role of fiduciary obligations in the 21st Century

JurisdictionSouth Africa
Pages54-81
AuthorBrian Peter Lee Jennings
Citation(2015) 1(2) JCCL&P 54
Date16 August 2019
Published date16 August 2019
54
ARE SHAREHOLDERS EXCLUSIVE
BENEFICIARIES OF FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA?
THE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS IN THE 21st
CENTURY*
BRIAN PETER LEE JENNINGS
Director at ENSafrica
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates and evaluates the existing South African
common law position of to whom directors owe their duties, in
light of the transformative requirements of the Constitution.
Unsurprisingly, the South African legal position largely mirrors
the position found within Anglo-American jurisdictions, on
which our company law is based. But whether this is justified,
or warranted, in a post-constitutional South Africa, which values
equality, dignity and freedom as being paramount, is the subject
of this paper.
This paper will attempt to address the question whether
South Africa’s Constitution, and the recently promulgated 2008
Companies Act, appropriately balances the competing ideological
tensions found within South African society. In undertaking this
balancing act, one will consider whether the Companies Act gives
effect to the most appropriate ideology in the most appropriate
circumstances, to give effect to the constitutional values of dignity,
equality and freedom.
The hypothesis at the forefront of this paper is that the legal
interpretation of the beneficiary of the duties owed by directors
in South Africa must be revisited in a post-constitutional
environment, in the very least. That revisiting must be dependent
* This is the shortened version of the research report prepared in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of LLM under the supervision of Prof Tshepo
Mongalo at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in 2015.
LLB (UKZN), Certificate in Advanced Company Law I (Wits), Certificate in
Advanced Company Law II (Wits). Admitted attorney of the High Court of South
Africa.
(2015) 1(2) JCCL&P 54
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
55
SHAREHOLDERS AS EXCLUSIVE BENEFICIARIES OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
on the company to whom the rule is being applied, and its position
in society. This will, in turn, determine the most appropriate
theory (from a legal, socio-economic and philosophical point of
view) to apply to determine to whom such company’s directors
owe their duties.
I INTRODUCTION
‘I make this state of affairs my excuse to examine the law of directors’
duties not simply as an analysis of the precedents appears to show it
but, rather more radically, as I believe we ought to be beginning to
see it.’1
These words of Sealy are particularly apt in the context of this paper,
which attempts to lay the foundation for a flexible legal theory
underpinning directors’ duties in a post-constitutional South Africa
(SA). One of the pioneering legislative reform exercises in SA has
produced a Companies Act,2 so novel and so flexible3 that it has the
ability to appropriately regulate from the smallest of companies to the
largest. This adaptability, as will be shown, appropriately balances the
competing tensions between the different ideologies of individualism
and communitarianism found within the Constitution4 itself. It is
an immensely powerful and novel tool which we, as legal scholars,
should utilise going forward.
To respond to Sealy, legal society should not merely maintain
the status quo without at least revisiting the foundational legal
principles governing the neo-classical conception of to whom
directors’ duties are owed. In doing so, the writer postulates a theory
of directors’ duties which incorporates the adaptability provided by
the Companies Act, to develop an all-encompassing theory tailor-
made to the myriad of sizes, industries and forms of companies
found within the SA economy.
As this topic has certainly been in vogue for decades, it has
naturally produced an enormous volume of academic material.
Most, if not all, seem limited to justifying either a narrower or wider
set of recipients of the directors’ duties, and have pointed out the
1 LS Sealy ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities — Problems Conceptual, Practical
and Procedural’ (1987) 13 Monash U L Rev 164 at 164.
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (as amended) (Companies Act).
3 Flexibility is a key aim, as set out in s 2 of the Department of Trade and
Industry’s Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies Bill, 2007 (Explanatory
Memorandum).
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

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