Weyer v Estate Weyer

JurisdictionSouth Africa
JudgeDe Wet JA, Tindall JA and Centlivres AJA
Judgment Date25 October 1938
Citation1939 AD 126
CourtAppellate Division

Tindall, J.A.:

The appellant, the eldest son of the late P. W. F.Weyer (whom I shall refer to as Weyer) sued in the trial Court to establish rights claimed by him under a mutual will made by his father and mother in 1893. At the time of Mrs. Weyer's death, which occurred in 1898, eight children of the marriage survived, of whom seven were minors. Weyer, who remarried in 1905. continued to live until April, 1935... The respondents are the executors under a will made by him in March, 1935. The plaintiff's declaration is based on an alleged continuation until Weyer's death of the community which existed between him and his first

Tindall, J.A.

wife, it being stated in para. 9 that on a true construction of the will as well as by reason of Weyer's remaining in possession of the whole of the joint estate until his death, the community was continued (especially as regards all profits) between Mrs. Weyer's heirs and Weyer as the survivor. The precise terms of the prayer are important. In addition to claiming a declaration that the community continued and was dissolved at Weyer's death in 1935, the following claims were made: (c) An order that defendants should sell by public auction all immovable property of the said estate in possession of the said late Philip Wilhelm Ferdinand Weyer at the date of his death; (d) a declaration that plaintiff is entitled to one-ninth of half of the said estate so left on the death of the late Philip Wilhelm Ferdinand Weyer, after all just debts of the estate have been paid, and to payment thereof; (e) alternative relief.

The sentences of the will appointing heirs, which need not be quoted verbatim, are accurately summarised by GANE, J., in his reasons in the following terms: "They mutually appointed the other, that is, the first-dying the longest-living, together with the children of the marriage, born and to be born, or in case of decease their lawful descendants by representation per stirpes, as sole and universal heirs of the first-dying in all his or her property to be left at death (zyne of hare met den dood be worden nagelatene goederen). This appointment was, however, made subject to the express understanding that the survivor should be able to remain in the full, free and undisturbed enjoyment and use of the whole joint estate (der geheelen gemeenschappelyken boedel) during his or her lifetime, should he or she so elect. In that case the survivor was not to be obliged to pay out the minor children, nor to give security for such payment or for the portions of the minors, nor to be answerable for anything whatsoever, nor to make an inventory or frame a liquidation account, but should be entitled to act as though the longest-living were the sole heir of the first-dying (alsof de langstlevende testateur de eenige erfgenaam van den eerststervende ware)." After making certain other provisions which are not material to the present enquiry, the will continued: "Het is verder die expresse wil en begeerte der testateuren dat na den dood der langstlevende al het vaste eigendom den boedel toebehoorende in het boedel zal blyven berusten, en indien het zolide gebeuren dat de langstlevende der testateuren zou komen te over

Tindall, J.A.

lyden en onmondige erfgenaam of erfgenamen nalatende dan en in dit geval is het onze verkiezing dat eenige een onzer meerder jarige erfgenamen, hetzy zonen of dochterf; het voorkeur en recht zullen hebben het vaste eigendom te huuren van den executeur der langstlevende, ten einde zulk executeur in staat te stellen de onmondige erfgenamen behoorlyk te laten opvoeden en onderhouden tot hunne mondige dagen, en de losse goederen zullen binnen drie maanden na den dood des langelevendens per publieke veiling moeten worden verkocht door de executeur der langstlevende.

"De testateuren wenschen verder te bepalen dat zoodra het jongste kind (erfgenaam) zyne of hare mondige dagen heeft bereikt, al het vaste eigendom den boedel toebehoorende behoorlyk gewaardeerd zullen moeten worden door een gezwgrene taxateur, en de zoon of zonen zal of zullen de voorkeur en het recht hebben het gemelde eigendom te koopen of over te nemen tegen het valuatie daarop geplaatst, hetwelk koopschat binnen zes maanden na het iongste kind zyn of hare meerderjarigheid heeft bereikt in den gemeenschappelyken boedel zal moeten worden inbetaald.

"Indien alle de zonen of een zoon zoude weigeren het grond tegen de bepealde of vastgestelde valuatie over te nemen, dan zullen alle de dochters het recht hebben het vaste eigendom tegen. gemelde valuatie over te nemen, en binnen zes maanden de koopschat van het grond in den boedel in te betalen, dat wil zeggen, zes maanden na het jongste kind zyne of hare meerderjarigheid heeft bereikt.

"En indien alle de dochters of zelfs een van hen ook weigeren het grond onder bovengemelde voorwaarden over te nemen dan is het onze verkiezing dat al het vaste eigendom per publieke veiling verkocht zullen worden voor rekening van den gemeenschappelyken boedel door den executeur der langstlevenden.

"Verder verklaren de testateuren elkander over en weder dat is de eerststervende de langstlevende van hen te benoemen en aan te stellen tot executeur of executrice van dit hun testament, boedelhouder of boedelhoudster, administrateur of administratrice hunner, dat is zyner of harer nalatenschap, mitagaders tot voogd of voogdesse over zyne of hare onmondige natelatene kinderen, met macht van assumptie, substitutie en surrogatie tot den uiteinde toe.

"Ingeval de langstlevende der executeuren mag komen te overlyden zonder een testament gemaakt te hebben na overlydein des

Tindall, J.A.

eerststervende, en geen executeur aangesteld te hebben, dan en in dit geval stellen zy by dezen aan de beer Willem Christiaan Naude in zyne betrekking als secretaris van den Uitenhaagische Executeurskamer en Trust Maatschappij (Bpkt.) of den secretaris in der tyd zynde van gemeld Executeurskamer - als executeur en administrateur der boedel der langstlevende, en by wordt hierby als zoodanig aangesteld en benoemd door den langstlevende der testateuren."

The only evidence bearing on the value of the joint estate at the date of Mrs. Weyer's death (which date according to the letters of administration must have been 1898 and not 1899 as stated in other parts of the record), is an inventory signed by Weyer and two other persons on 12th April, 1900. Weyer sent this inventory in June, 1900, to the magistrate, who being of opinion that an inventory was unnecessary, returned the document; apparently it was not sent to the Master until 1909. According to the inventory the value of the joint estate was £26,130 - immovable property at £12,780, movables at £9,350 (including livestock £6,650), and bonds, outstandings and cash at £4,000. It was not contended in the trial Court or on appeal that any penalty ought to be inflicted on Weyer's estate under sec. 15 of Ordinance 104 of 1933 (Cape) by way of forfeiture of accruals after the death of Mrs. Weyer.

Before remarrying in 1905 Weyer took no steps to secure his children's maternal inheritances, but he did so in November, 1909, by passing a general notarial bond in which he undertook that each of his six minor children would be paid £3,408 after his death, as the share due to each child under the mutual will, according to an appraisement dated 12th November, 1909. This valuation showed the value of the estate at £61,359 (after deducting the amount of a bond of £1,565) and included immovable property owned by the estate when Mrs. Weyer died valued at £27,875, immovable property acquired by Weyer after her death and valued at £12,844, livestock valued in October, 1909, at £6,903 and bonds and outstandings as at 30th June, 1909, valued at £15,902 16s. 2d. It will be seen, therefore, that in arriving at the amounts to be secured by the kinderbewys, the children's portions were computed on the footing that the community had continued. The reason for so calculating the children's shares was an opinion obtained by Weyer in July from counsel who advised that he inclined to the view that the joint will provided for a continuance of the community. Had the amounts to be secured by the kinderbewys been arrived

Tindall, J.A.

at on the footing that the community had not continued, each child would have been apportioned £2,290 on the basis of the valuation of the immovables in 1909 and of the movables in 1900.

In June, 1911, Weyer paid out his eldest child (Mrs. Goebel) £3,017 in full settlement of "her share of legacy coming to me under the will of my late mother," and in May, 1912, he entered into an agreement with another daughter (Mrs. Schneider) under which he paid her a like amount and gave her an option conditional on the other children consenting (the minors after reaching majority) and lasting for three months after the latest consent, to buy certain immovable property. As to the amount of £3,017, the learned Judge remarked that the evidence did not show how it was computed but that the two husbands had received considerable assistance in farming or other business from their father-in-law Weyer.

In August, 1914, Weyer, in his individual capacity and as executor in Mrs. Weyer's estate, entered into an agreement with seven of his children (that is, all except Mrs. Schneider) which is referred to as the first family agreement. This agreement purported to deal only with immovable property, and it embraced land acquired both after and before Mrs. Weyer's death (except the property under option to Mrs. Schneider) and gave the children the right to acquire, by paying specified sums into Weyer's estate within three months after, his death, certain joint estate property (valued at £18,300) and certain after-acquired property (valued at £9,000), while it...

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4 practice notes
  • Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd
    • South Africa
    • Invalid date
    ...v Estate Havenga (1929 CPD 368 at p. 372); Weyer v Weyer's Estate (1938, E.D.L. 242 at p. 269) - affirmed on appeal on different grounds (1939 AD 126); Dunbar v Rossmaur Mansions (Pty.), Ltd. (47 P.H.M. 42). The doctrine of laches is not a technical doctrine and its purpose is to prevent th......
  • Crystal Holdings (Pty) Ltd v The Regional Land Claims Commissioner - KwaZulu-Natal The Premier
    • South Africa
    • Natal Provincial Division
    • 2 November 2007
    ...the care, diligence and skills which can reasonably expected of a person who manages the affairs of another. See also Weyer v Estate Weyer 1939 AD 126. In the present case, no proof has been tendered to show that the trustees acted in violation of Section 9 of the Trust Property Control [75......
  • Milne, NO v Singh, NO, and Others
    • South Africa
    • Invalid date
    ...father (Maduray) was under a duty to make a full disclosure to them of all material facts, but had not done so; Weyer v Estate Weyer, 1939 AD 126 at p. 146. The applicant, in any event, was not bound by the signatures of the heirs; he, as executor, was never consulted, and he has duties to ......
  • Dowdle's Estate v Dowdle and Others
    • South Africa
    • Invalid date
    ...and Others (20 S.C. 241); Hiddingh v de Villiers and Others (5 S.C. 298); Major's Estate v de Jager (1944 TPD 96); Weyer v Estate Weyer (1939 AD 126). No reason has been shown why the executors should recover possession from the heir. Alternatively the executors may not recover possession i......
4 cases
  • Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd
    • South Africa
    • Invalid date
    ...v Estate Havenga (1929 CPD 368 at p. 372); Weyer v Weyer's Estate (1938, E.D.L. 242 at p. 269) - affirmed on appeal on different grounds (1939 AD 126); Dunbar v Rossmaur Mansions (Pty.), Ltd. (47 P.H.M. 42). The doctrine of laches is not a technical doctrine and its purpose is to prevent th......
  • Crystal Holdings (Pty) Ltd v The Regional Land Claims Commissioner - KwaZulu-Natal The Premier
    • South Africa
    • Natal Provincial Division
    • 2 November 2007
    ...the care, diligence and skills which can reasonably expected of a person who manages the affairs of another. See also Weyer v Estate Weyer 1939 AD 126. In the present case, no proof has been tendered to show that the trustees acted in violation of Section 9 of the Trust Property Control [75......
  • Milne, NO v Singh, NO, and Others
    • South Africa
    • Invalid date
    ...father (Maduray) was under a duty to make a full disclosure to them of all material facts, but had not done so; Weyer v Estate Weyer, 1939 AD 126 at p. 146. The applicant, in any event, was not bound by the signatures of the heirs; he, as executor, was never consulted, and he has duties to ......
  • Dowdle's Estate v Dowdle and Others
    • South Africa
    • Invalid date
    ...and Others (20 S.C. 241); Hiddingh v de Villiers and Others (5 S.C. 298); Major's Estate v de Jager (1944 TPD 96); Weyer v Estate Weyer (1939 AD 126). No reason has been shown why the executors should recover possession from the heir. Alternatively the executors may not recover possession i......

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