The judicial application of the "interest" requirement for standing in constitutional cases : "A radical and deliberate departure from common law"

• Author: C.F. (Neels) Swanepoel
• DOI: 10.10520/EJC155520
• Published date: 01 January 2014
• Date: 01 January 2014
• Pages: 63-84

63

The judicial application of the “interest”

requirement for standing in constitutional

cases: “A radical and deliberate departure

from common law”

CF (Neels) Swanepoel

BA, LLB, LLM, LLD

Associate Professor: Law of Procedure and Law of Evidence, University of the Free

State

OPSOMMING

Die Geregtelike Toepassing van die Vereiste van “Belang” met Betrekking tot

Verskyningsbevoegdheid in Grondwetlike Sake: “’n Radikale en Doelbewuste

Afwyking van die Gemenereg”

Hierdie artikel ondersoek die geregtelike toepassing van die vereistes vir

verskyningsbevoegdheid (locus standi) in grondwetlike aangeleenthede

sedert die aanvang van die grondwetlike era in Suid-Afrika. In die lig van

die parlement se betreurenswaardige versuim om die aanbevelings van

die Suid-Afrikaanse Regskommissie met betrekking tot klas- en openbare

aksies te implementeer, moes die land se howe stapsgewys hul eie

sekerheid rakende die vereist es en vertolking va n verskyningsbevoe gdheid

skep. In die vorige Westminster-staatsmodel is verskyningsbevoegdheid

beperk tot litigante wat ’n direkte, beduidende belang by die saak en by

die gewenste regsverligting kon toon. Hierdie streng benadering tot

verskyningsbevoegdheid was gegrond op vrese dat ’n liberaler aanslag die

sluise van litigasie sou ooptrek, wat op sy beurt openbare administrasie

sou bemoeilik. Die aanvaarding van die Grondwet van 1996, en artikel 38

in die besonder, het egter ’n era van groot verandering in die bepalings oor

verskyningsbevoegdheid ingelui. Dít blyk duidelik uit presedentereg

sedertdien. Aan die hand van ’n bespreking van die waterskeidingsaak

Ferreira v Levin, die Giant Concerts-aangeleentheid, die Tulip Diamonds-

saak en etlike ander onlangse uitsprake, bied hierdie artikel ’n

uitstippeling van die howe se stelselmatige vertolking en toepassing van

artikel 38 met betrekking tot die vereistes vir verskyningsbevoegdheid in

grondwetlike aangeleenthede. Dit word eerstens vinnig duidelik dat daar,

in teenstelling met destyds, nou van howe verwag word om ’n ruim

benadering tot verskyningsbevoegdheid in grondwetlike litigasie te volg en

só te verseker dat die regte in die Handves van Regte sowel as elders in die

Grondwet verwerklik word. Tweedens blyk dit dat litigante wat in eie

belang optree, verkieslik ook “iets meer” as blote eie belang moet bewys;

’n groter openbare belang wat met die Grondwet strook. Sodanige groter

openbare belang sluit onder meer in die behoefte aan groter regsekerheid

vir behoorlike regspleging, die belang om te verseker dat openbare mag

ingevolge grondwetlike en regsvoorskrifte uitgeoefen word, en die

behoefte om die onafhanklikheid van die regbank te verseker en te

versterk. Die derde en finale gevolgtrekking van hierdie navorsing is dat

artikel 38 van die Grondwet inderdaad ’n radikale en doelbewuste

afwyking van die gemenereg behels, en dat die Grondwet self ’n juiste en

doeltreffende raamwerk bied vir ’n hof om grondwetlike

verskyningsbevoegdheidsvereistes te bepaal. Laastens word die nie

642014 De Jure

implementering van die Suid Afrikaanse Regskomissie se konsep

wetsontwerp vir openbare-en klasaksies betreur omdat regsrekerheid

reeds ‘n geruime tyd gelede oor kwessies van locus standi verkry kon

gewees het.

1Introduction

This article examines the judicial application and development of

standing in constitutional actions since the advent of the constitutional

era in South Africa. In the face of Parliament’s lamentable failure to act

on the recommendations of the South African Law Commission (SALC)

pertaining to class and public actions, the task of the country’s courts has

been a challenging one, as described by Wallis JA with reference to class

actions:1

We are thus confronted with a situation where the class action is given

express constitutional recognition, but nothing has been done to regulate it.

The courts must therefore address the issue in the exercise of their inherent

power to protect and regulate their own process and to develop the common

law in the interests of justice.

This dictum is of course as much applicable to all the other categories

of litigants that are mentioned in section 38 of the Constitution, as well

as litigants in non-constitutional matters – class actions. Was it not for

the regrettable failure of Parliament to implement legislation pursuant to

the SALC’s proposals, litigation in regard to standing could have been

avoided.

In Ferreira v Levin,2 O’Regan J described the courts’ “new” role in a

constitutional democracy as follows:

This role requires that access to courts in constitutional matters should not be

precluded by rules of standing developed in a different constitutional

environment in which a different model of adjudication predominated. In

particular, it is important that it is not only those with vested interests who

should be afforded standing in constitutional challenges, where remedies may

have a wide impact.

1Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA)

par 223[15+16] C-F. In this case, the Supreme Court of Appeal referred an

application back to the court a quo because the action (an ordinary class

action not related to section 38) was not properly certified as a class action.

Had the draft Bill on Class and Public Interest Litigation proposed by the

SALC been promulgated by parliament, legal certainty would have existed

as the proposed draft Bill extensively provides for the certification process.

(The proposals made by the SALC are discussed infra par 3).Significantly,

Wallis JA’s certification requirements for class actions, are essentially those

that were proposed by the SALC.

2Ferreira v Levin and Vryenhoe k v Powell 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC).