South African competition policy on excessive pricing and its relation to price gouging during the COVID‐19 disaster period
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Author | Willem H. Boshoff |
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/saje.12268 |
South African Journal of Economics Vol. 89:1 March 2021
doi: 10.1111/saje.12268
112
© 2020 Economic Society of South Africa
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION POLICY ON EXCESSIVE
PRICING AND ITS RELATION TO PRICE GOUGING DURING
THE COVID-19 DISASTER PERIOD
WILLEM H. BOSHOFF*,†
Abstract
The declaration of a state of national disaster in South Africa, due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
was followed by excessive-pricing regulations pertaining to certain consumer and medical products
and services. The regulations and their application suggest an intertemporal benchmark to judge
excessive pricing, deviating from previous practice. Intertemporal comparisons assume a structural
shift during COVID-19 that changes competitive conditions, related to changes in consumer
behaviour. Such comparisons must also account for demand and cost changes. While the COVID-19
regulations allow for cost-based price increases, demand-based increases are not explicitly accounted
for, suggesting that the regulations are framed more generally as price-gouging regulations. The
differences between price-gouging and excessive-pricing benchmarks depends on the type of disaster-
period demand shock. They are similar following a transitory demand spike, provided sufficient
time is allowed for dynamic price behaviour, but differ markedly when demand is elevated for the
duration of the disaster period. Applying simple cost-based comparisons in recently concluded cases
against smaller retailers are consistent with excessive pricing, given the presence of a demand spike.
To the extent that these involve persistently higher demand, cases against wholesalers and larger
retailers will be more complicated, as such demand must be reflected in competitive prices.
JEL Classification: D40, L4
Keywords: Excessive pricing, price gouging, competition policy, demand spike, benchmarks
1. INTRODUCTION
Extreme exogenous shocks to the economic system (due to war or natural disaster) may
bring surges in demand for various goods and services and disruption to supply, often
producing sharp acceleration in prices. During such times, regulations against price goug-
ing – especially in relation to basic food and other consumer items – may form part of the
policy response. Accordingly, following declaration of a state of national disaster due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the South African Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition
published regulations pertaining to the pricing and supply of certain consumer and med-
ical products and services1 during the disaster period.
1 The regulations pertain to four broad groups of products and services: (i) basic food and con-
sumer items; (ii) emergency products and services; (iii) medical and hygiene supplies; and (iv)
emergency clean-up products and services.
* Corresponding author: Centre for Competition Law and Economics, Department of
Economics, Stellenbosch University, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602, Republic of South Africa.
Email: wimpie2@sun.ac.za
† Centre for Competition Law and Economics, Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University
South African Journal
of Economics
113South African Journal of Economics Vol. 89:1 March 2021
© 2020 Economic Society of South Africa
While consistent with price-gouging concerns internationally, the COVID-19 pricing
regulations in South Africa focus predominantly on competition policy, and its associated
institutions, as the preferred tool for addressing price gouging concerns. This raises sev-
eral important policy questions. As shown later in this paper, since their promulgation,
the COVID-19 regulations have been widely applied in relation to the conduct of small
firms in narrow geographic markets. This expansive use of the regulations represents a
break with past practice: historically, excessive-pricing enforcement have been limited to
specific settings, usually large corporates including Sasol and Mittal and in markets with
a particular policy history. One of the key implications is that market power is viewed
differently during the COVID-19 period, with competition authorities justifying inter-
vention on the basis of the “temporary” market power wielded by these small players.
Furthermore, the COVID-19 regulations have specific implications for judging when a
price is to be considered excessive. This is the central concern in excessive-pricing investi-
gations and a primary reason for the circumscribed application of this area of competition
law internationally. As argued later, the COVID-19 regulations require a retrospective
comparison of prices during the disaster period with those charged during the pre-
disaster period. While the benchmark allows for cost-based increases, the surge in de-
mand associated with the disaster period raises significant policy questions about the
relationship between excessive-pricing investigations – which traditionally allow for both
demand and cost considerations – and price-gouging investigations – in which policy-
makers explicitly seek to dampen demand-based price increases following a disaster.
This paper studies how both the changes in assessing market power and the subsequent
changes in assessing excessive pricing accord with competition economics principles. The
paper starts with an overview of market power concerns during the COVID-19 disaster
period and a summary of South African competition policy towards excessive pricing, in-
cluding the new regulations. This is followed by a discussion of competitive benchmarks
used in judging excessive pricing, emphasising the utility of intertemporal comparisons,
also in relation to COVID-19 cases. Drawing on an econometric methodology borrowed
from the cartel damages literature, a subsequent section offers simulation evidence that
highlights the differences and similarities between excessive-pricing and price-gouging
benchmarks under different demand conditions. Finally, the paper compares these in-
sights to the approach adopted by the competition authorities in recently concluded
COVID-19 cases in South Africa.
2. MARKET POWER CONCERNS DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Competition policy is concerned with regulating the conduct of firms that enjoy market
power, which is the ability to sustain price above marginal cost (Motta, 2008). Policy
concerns typically centre on so-called exclusionary conduct by a dominant2 firm, which
aims at harming competitors and, indirectly, consumers. Selected jurisdictions also target
exploitative conduct aimed at directly harming consumers, even if no competitor is
2 In competition law, there is often a hierarchical distinction between dominance and market
power. This paper uses the terms interchangeably, as the distinction is not of key concern in deter-
mining benchmark competitive prices, which is the focus of this paper.
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