Small companies and regulatory tiering: a legal and economic analysis of Zambia's new regime

JurisdictionSouth Africa
Date01 June 2023
Pages107-124
AuthorChristopher Phiri
Published date01 June 2023
DOI10.17159/2225-7160/2023/v56a8
Legal and economic analysis of Zambia’s new regime 107
Small companies and regulatory tiering: a
legal and economic analysis of Zambia’s
new regime
Christopher Phiri
LLB (UNZA), MBA (Nicosia), LLM (Lund)
Doctoral Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Turku
SUMMARY
In 2017, Zambia adopted a new Companies Act. The main purpose of the
new Act is to promote the development of Zambia’s economy through
efficient regulation of companies. This article focuses on the small
companies regime that the new Act introduces. More specifically, the
article explores the extent to which the new small companies regime is fit
for purpose by conducting a comparative analysis of that regime with the
United Kingdom’s (UK’s) small companies regime in light of relevant
literature, particularly literature in the field of regulatory economics.
Overall, the analysis suggests that Zambia’s small companies regime is
largely inapt to achieving its intended purpose. The article’s main
argument in this connection is threefold. First, the new Act is somewhat at
odds with its intended purpose insofar as it requires small companies to
appoint a secretary. Exempting small companies from this requirement, as
does the UK Companies Act of 2006, could better serve the purpose of the
new Act. Second, whilst the exemption of small companies from the
requirement to appoint auditors may be desirable, the 50 per cent
shareholding threshold required for shareholders to demand an audit could
inhibit controlling shareholder accountability and thus undermine the
purpose of the new Act. A lower threshold such as the one applicable
under the UK Companies Act, that is to say, ten per cent, could better serve
the purpose of the new Act. Third, the lack of any special treatment for
small companies as such vis-à-vis bookkeeping and financial reporting
requirements could undermine the purpose of the new Act. Imposing
lighter bookkeeping and financial reporting requirements on small
companies, as does the UK Companies Act, could better serve the purpose
of the new Act.
1Introduction
On 17 November 2017, the Zambian Parliament adopted a new
Companies Act (the new Act or the Act)1 which repealed and replaced the
1994 Companies Act (the repealed Act).2 The new Act came into force on
15 June2018.3 According to the Preamble thereto, the new Act seeks “to
promote the development of the economy by encouraging
entrepreneurship, enterprise efficiency, [and] flexibility and simplicity in
1 Companies Act 10 of 2017 (new Act).
2 Companies Act 26 of 1994 (repealed Act). See s 376 of the new Act.
3 Companies Act (Commencement Order) SI 47 of 2018.
How to cite: Phiri ‘Small companies and regulatory tiering: a legal and economic analysis of Zambia’s new
regime’ 2023 De Jure Law Journal 107-124
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2023/v56a8
108 2023 De Jure Law Journal
the formation and maintenance of companies” in Zambia. In other
words, the main purpose of the new Act is to promote the development
of Zambia’s economy through efficient regulation of companies. Whilst
it replicates most of the provisions of the repealed Act, an Act which drew
on English company law as part of the colonial heritage, the new Act does
transform Zambia’s company law in various respects.
Some of the notable reforms which the new Act introduces include the
following. First, the new Act prescribes the qualifications for
appointment to the office of company secretary and codifies the duties
of company directors and company secretaries alike.4 Second, where
applicable, the new Act requires shareholders to disclose the beneficial
owners of the shares they hold in a company at the time of incorporation
and henceforth requires companies to maintain a (share and) beneficial
ownership register and to notify the Registrar of Companies of any
changes made to the register.5 Third, the new Act provides for
mandatory audit firm rotation following the appointment by a company
of one audit firm for a continuous period of six years.6 Fourth, the new
Act introduces a small companies regime with a view to lessening the
regulatory burden on small companies.7
Whether the new Act is indeed apt to promote the development of the
country’s economy through efficient regulation of companies is,
however, still open to question. Even leaving aside the general
drawbacks of the transformative provisions that it introduces,8 the new
Act is laden with apparent drafting errors which could render compliance
difficult and costly as only company law experts may be able to help
companies get around some of those errors.9 This article does not,
4 Part VII of the new Act.
5 Ss 12(3)(e), 21(3), 30, 123, and 195 of the new Act, read together with the
Companies (Amendment) Act 12 of 2020.
6 S 257(3) of the new Act.
7 Ss 82(6), 253(5), 263, and 264 of the new Act.
8 See generally Cameran, Negri and Pettinicchio “The Audit Mandatory
Rotation Rule: The State of the Art” 2015 Journal of Financial Perspectives 1;
Sayne, Westenberg and Shafaie “Owning Up: Options for Disclosing the
Identities of Beneficial Owners of Extractive Companies” 2015 https://
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Beneficial%20Owners2015
0820.pdf (last accessed 2023-05-26); Lakhani “Imposing Company
Ownership Transparency Requirements: Opportunities for Effective
Governance of Equity Capital Markets or Constraints on Corporate
Performance” 2016 Chi.-Kent J Int’l & Comp L 122.
9 For example, ss 29(1)(a), and 81 of the new Act refer to an office called the
“registered records office”, and yet the Act itself requires companies only to
have a “registered office” (s 28). Ss 3, 157, 188, 196, 197, and 199
similarly refer to the “share register”, and yet the Act itself does not require
companies to maintain such a register. Rather, it requires companies to
maintain several registers bearing rather duplicative names, including the
“register of members”, “register of beneficial owners”, and “share and
beneficial ownership register” (ss 30, 195, and 196). S 61(8) also
erroneously refers to sub-s (6) instead of sub-s (7). S 188 similarly makes a
wrong cross-reference to s 194 instead of s 195(3). Worse, s 70 is
unintelligibly ungrammatical.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT