S v Ngoma

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1984 (3) SA 666 (A)

S v Ngoma
1984 (3) SA 666 (A)

1984 (3) SA p666

Citation	1984 (3) SA 666 (A)
Court	Appellate Division
Judge	Corbett JA, Joubert JA, Nicholas JA, Galgut AJA and Smuts AJA
Heard	May 1, 1984
Judgment	May 25, 1984

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde D

Criminal law — Murder — Sentence — Age of offender — Approach to E determination of attainment of age of 18 years — Medical evidence not to be based on dentition alone — X-ray tests to be employed — Other (non-medical) enquiries discussed — Incumbent upon Court to examine all possible sources of evidence as to age in borderline cases and to make a positive finding — Act 51 of 1977 s 277 (2).

Criminal law — Murder — Extenuating circumstances — What constitutes — F Determination of discussed with reference to a youthful offender.

Headnote : Kopnota

Where an accused on a charge of murder is near the critical borderline of 18 years, the correct determination of his age becomes a matter of utmost importance - in the absence of a finding of extenuating circumstances, it may be a matter of G life or death. It would be palpably contrary to public policy and the intention of the Legislature if persons younger than 18 were dealt with, in terms of s 277 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as if they were 18 years or older. Whatever the position may be as regards onus, in such cases the trial Court is under a positive duty to examine as exhaustively as reasonably possible all evidence or possible sources of evidence which may assist it in a proper determination of age and to make a specific finding in that regard. As to medical H evidence, a proper clinical examination of the accused would include not only an observation of his general physical development, with special reference to his teeth, but also X-ray tests - directed, it seems, at determining whether fusion of the epiphyses and the shafts of the long bones have taken place.

The other factors relevant to determination of age set out in detail.

The proper approach to the determination of extenuating I circumstances on a charge of murder reiterated with particular reference to youthful accused.

Case Information

Appeal against a sentence imposed by the Transvaal Provincial Division (HEYNS AJ). The facts appear from the judgment of CORBETT JA.

1984 (3) SA p667

A J J van Zyl on behalf of the appellant at the request of the A Court: Die opsetsvorm hier was opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn en op die getuienis voor die Hof kon die Staat nie bo redelike twyfel bewys dat die appellant met die direkte opset om die oorledene te dood, presies op die oorledene gemik het toe die skoot afgegaan het nie. Die afwesigheid van dolus directus kan wel aanleiding gee tot 'n bevinding van versagtende B omstandighede. Sien Du Toit Straf in Suid-Afrika lste uitg op 30 en Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 3de uitg op 599. Dit was deel van die Staatsaak dat die appellant bo 18 jaar oud was en die Staat het dan ook getuienis in hierdie verband gelei daar die appellant 'n jeugdige persoon bo 18 ten tye van die pleging van die misdaad was. Waar dit deel is van die Staatsaak C soos in hierdie geval waar die Staat die ouderdom van die beskuldigde moet bewys met die oog op 'n voorgeskrewe vonnis, moet die Staat bo redelike twyfel bewys dat beskuldigde wel bo 'n ouderdom van 18 jaar ten tye van die pleging van die misdaad was. Sien Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 3de uitg op 758 en R v Matipa 1959 (2) SA 396. Appellant voer aan dat hy 17 D jaar oud is, maar gee in kruisverhoor toe dat dit maar net 'n skatting was. 'n Persoon kan egter nie oor sy eie ouderdom getuig nie aangesien dit op hoorsê sou neerkom. Sien Schmidt Bewysreg (1972) op 229. Die Verhoorhof het ook geen skatting ten opsigte van appellant se ouderdom gemaak nie, maar meld slegs dat appellant 'n jeugdige persoon is. Waar die E Staatsgetuie sy bepaling in hoofsaak op 'n waarneming van appellant se kiestande gegrond het, het die Staat nie bo redelike twyfel bewys dat appellant jonger is as 18 jaar ne ein moet appellant derhalwe dus die voordeel van die twyfel hier ontvang en behoort hy beskou te word as 'n persoon wat jonger as 18 jaar oud was ten tye van die pleging van die misdaad.

F Met verdere verwysing na die bestaan van versagtende omstandighede, is die Hof verwys na S v Babada 1964 (1) SA op 28D; S v Ndlovu 1965 (4) SA op 691A et seq en Du Toit Straf in Suid-Afrika lste uitg op 13, 17 en 18.

D F de Beer for the State: Die Wetgewer het jeugdigheid van onder 18 jaar alreeds tot 'n outomatiese versagtende G omstandigheid verklaar. Wanneer 'n beskuldigde bo die ouderdom van 18 jaar was toe hy die misdaad gepleeg het, skyn dit noodsaaklik te wees dat daar ander faktore moet bykom, want bo die ouderdom van 18 jaar is jeugdigheid volgens die betrokke wetsbepaling nie meer per se 'n versagtende omstandigheid nie. H Sien Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses derde uitg op 600. Of jeugdigheid 'n versagtende omstandigheid is, sal in elke geval van die feite en ook van die aard van die misdaad afhang. So moet daar na vele faktore gekyk word ten einde te bepaal of 'n beskuldigde se jeugdigheid meegebring het dat hy daardeur moreel gesproke met minder verwyt bejeën kan word. Sien S v Mohlobane 1969 (1) SA op 565C; Du Toit Straf in Suid-Afrika op I 12 en 55. Wanneer oorweeg word of die jeugdigheid van 'n beskuldigde nie as versagting kan dien nie, moet nie alleen die aard van die daad oorweeg word nie, maar ook die motief waarmee die daad gepleeg is, die persoonlikheid van die beskuldigde en ander relevante faktore, om vas te stel of die daad gepleeg is uit inherente boosheid van die

1984 (3) SA p668

A beskuldigde. Sien S v Mapatsi 1976 (4) SA op 724C. Daar is absoluut geen aanduiding uit die oorkonde van die verrigtinge dat die pleging van die onderskeie misdade toegeskryf kan word aan faktore soos byvoorbeeld onvolwassenheid, onrypeid, gebrek aan selfbeheersing of onrype oordeelsvermoë nie. Sy optrede dui eerder daarop dat dit deeglik beplan was en dat hy agterna sy B spore van aandadigheid probeer uitwis het en ook leuens omtrent die herkoms van die oorledene se horlosie aan sy suster vertel het. Die appellant het geensins aanvaarbare getuienis voor die Verhoorhof geplaas wat daarop gedui het dat sy "mental immaturity was such as to serve as extenuation". Sien S v Khumalo and Others 1983 (2) PH H 119 (A). Wat betref appellant C se drankinname: die vraag bly steeds of die bewese drankinname die appellant ten tyde van die doodslag dusdanig beïnvloed het dat hy weens daardie omstandigheid met mindere verwyt bejeën kan word. Sien S v Babada 1964 (1) SA op 27; Du Toit Straf in Suid-Afrika op 13; S v Gola 1981 (2) PH H 164 (A); S v Petrus 1969 (4) SA op 93D - E, 98A; Hiemstra D Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses derde uitg op 598. Wat betref appellant se agtergrond en lae opvoedingspeil, sien Du Toit Straf in Suid-Afrika op 18; S v Phillips 1981 (2) PH H 166 (A).

Van Zyl in reply.

Cur adv vult.

Postea (May 25). E

Judgment

Corbett JA:

The deceased, Mrs G E Uys, lived with her husband, Mr G J C Uys, on the farm Elandshoek in the district of Cullinan. On the evening of Monday, 15 November 1982, the two F of them sat for a while in the lounge of their home watching television. At about 21h00 Mr Uys went to bed. It was their custom to sleep in separate bedrooms when one of them stayed up after the other had gone to bed. Mr Uys rose fairly early the following morning. He went outside into the garden to have a G swim in the swimming pool. In passing the bedroom in which his wife was to have slept he noticed that the bed was undisturbed. Outside he further noticed that a pane of glass in a glass door giving access from the garden into the lounge was broken. He went to investigate and found his wife lying dead in the lounge. She had been shot. It was a clear case of murder. A H wrist-watch which the deceased had been wearing was missing.

The police were summoned. They investigated the crime and three days later the appellant was arrested. In due course he appeared before a Judge and two assessors in the Transvaal Provincial Division on charges of (1) murdering the deceased and (2) robbing the deceased of her wrist-watch or, I alternatively, of breaking into the home of Mr Uys with intent to steal and the theft of the wrist-watch. Upon arraignment the appellant pleaded not guilty to count (1), viz that of murder, and guilty to the main charge under count (2), viz robbery. The Court found him guilty on both counts and in regard to the murder charge held by a majority, one of the assessor members of the Court dissenting, that there were no extenuating circumstances. He

1984 (3) SA p669

Corbett JA

was sentenced to death on count (1) and to three years' A imprisonment on count (2). The trial Judge granted appellant leave to appeal against the finding that in respect of count (1) there were no extenuating circumstances.

As the trial before the Court a quo progressed it became apparent that most of the material facts were not in dispute. The appellant is a young Black man. The determination of his B age is a matter to which I shall allude later. He grew up in Delmas. At the time of the trial both his parents were deceased, but an uncle was evidently alive. At school he did not progress beyond the sub - A standard. He entered the employ of Mr Uys some time during 1982 and worked for him for about three months as an ordinary farm labourer. About six C ...