S v Mhlakaza and Another

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Harms JA, Smalberger JA, Zulman JA
• Judgment Date: 13 March 1997
• Citation: 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA)
• Hearing Date: 25 February 1997
• Counsel: W Viljoen for the State L Berger and I Irmer for the appellant at the request of the Court
• Court: Supreme Court of Appeal

Harms JA:

This appeal concerns the question whether sentences of imprisonment which are cumulatively far in excess of 25 years, are proper. In particular, on a number of counts, appellant No 1 was sentenced cumulatively to 62 years of which 15 years G were suspended; No 2, who was similarly sentenced to 62 years, had 20 years of this sentence suspended and a further two years were ordered to run concurrently. The so-called effective sentences were thus 47 and 38 years respectively.

The facts that gave rise to the convictions and sentences can be stated in fairly simple terms. On a Sunday evening during August 1994, a gang of five men, driving a stolen vehicle, attacked a small police charge office at Delft on the Cape Flats. The object of H the exercise was to get their hands on the firearms and ammunition kept at the office. The office was manned by Constable Fielies. A friend, Miss Yolanda Wakefield, waited in the public area for him. The vehicle stopped in front of the building and three members of the gang, including the two appellants, entered the office. They requested I Fielies to assist them since they were allegedly being molested. As Fielies exited the rear part of the office, he was shot at, first with a hand weapon and then with a machine gun. Wakefield attempted to hide behind the counter, but was also hit by the fire. Fielies fell onto her in an obvious attempt to protect her, and yet further shots were fired at him. The attackers then proceeded to remove a trunk containing an automatic weapon and ammunition from the building. J

Harms JA

Some security guards driving past the scene heard the shooting and decided to stop A and investigate. Members of the gang shot at them, wounding the one guard in the head and another in the leg. The robbers then fled, abandoning the weapons cache. The appellants were apprehended a week later, still driving the stolen vehicle, No 1 in possession of the hand weapon used at the scene, and another occupant of the car in B possession of another firearm. Fielies died as a result of the gunshot wounds. In consequence of these events, the appellants were convicted and sentenced as follows:

Charge	No 1	No 2 C
Murder	25 years	25 years; (7 suspended)
Attempted murder; (three counts)	15 years; (5 suspended)	15 years; (5 suspended)
Attempted robbery	10 years; (5 suspended)	10 years; (5 suspended) D
Possession of firearm and ammunition	2 years	2 years to run concurrently with
Possession of machine gun	10 years; (5 suspended)	10 years; (5 suspended) E

The trial Judge (Van Deventer J) in the former Cape Provincial Division dismissed an application for leave to appeal. Pursuant to a petition addressed to the Chief Justice, F leave to appeal was granted to this Court only in respect of the cumulative effect of the sentences imposed by the trial Court. The individual sentences were thus not the subject of any debate before this Court, and it has to be assumed that they are proper.

As far as the seriousness of the crime is concerned, Van Deventer J expressed himself thus: G

'Deur so 'n voorafbeplande, koelbloedige aanval as wat hierdie bende uitgevoer het, word die Staatsgesag uitgedaag en die gemeenskap geterroriseer.

Die aanvallers stuur die boodskap uit dat hulle geen respek vir die Staatsgesag het nie en dat die owerheid nie in staat is om sy onderdane te beskerm nie. Dit is minagtende en uittartende misdaad teen die gesag van die owerheid. Dit is 'n voorbeeld van die koelbloedige terreur waardeur aanvalle op polisiemanne uitgevoer is en honderde H polisiemanne in die laaste paar jaar vermoor is.

Hierdie aanvalle op die polisiediens behoort gesien te word as 'n oorlog teen wet en orde deur hierdie groep beroepsmisdadigers wat geen agting het vir beskaafde standaarde en demokratiese regstelsels nie; wat geen gewete het nie, geen beskaafde of morele standaarde eerbiedig nie en gewoonlik geen rehabilitasiepotensiaal het nie. I

Van die optredes wat tot die skuldigbevindings van [appellante] gelei het, lei ek af dat hulle misdaad as 'n beroep gekies het en aan die voornoemde groep behoort het, dit is die inherent-bose misdadige wese waarmee die howe deesdae al hoe meer te doen kry, naamlik die soort onmens wat glo dat hy geregtig is om enige mens te vermink of dood te maak om sy goed te vat, selfs al is die buit maar net 'n paar rand werd.' J

Harms JA

It was not submitted that the learned Judge had erred in this assessment of the A seriousness of these crimes. His forceful expression was fully justified in the circumstances of the case. Cf S v Mokoena 1990 (1) SACR 296 (A) at 298i-299c; S v Mungati 1992 (1) SACR 550 (A) at 556.

Concerning the public interest, the learned Judge said: B

'Gewapende roof is ongetwyfeld die mees gevreesde en veragtelike misdaad. 'n Vonnis moet uitdrukking gee aan die wetsgehoorsame gemeenskap se gevoel van verontwaardiging oor 'n bepaalde misdryf. Hoe afskuweliker 'n misdaad in die oë van die ordentlike publiek is, hoe swaarder moet die straf wees. Die gemeenskap moet C kan aanvoel dat dit by die howe 'n saak van erns is om veilige lewenstoestande te handhaaf. As ons die nuwe en brose demokrasie in hierdie land wil laat oorleef, en sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkelingsprogramme 'n kans wil gee om vir ons minderbevoorregte gemeenskappe 'n hoër lewenskwaliteit te skep, om onder andere ekotoerisme, wat ons grootste bedryf kan word te bevorder en deur al hierdie D doelwitte vir die miljoene honger en werklose mense in ons land 'n lewenstog te skep, moet die plaag van wetteloosheid en geweld en die reuse bedryf van diefstal, gewapende roof en bose geweld nou vir eens en vir altyd end kry. Die belange van die gemeenskap moet nou absolute voorkeur verleen word.

Ons het 'n stadium bereik waarin die polisiediens die enigste skans is tussen die gemeenskap en anargie. . . . Misdadigers wat hulself vry voel om geweld teen die polisie, en dus die owerheid, te gebruik moet nou kennis neem dat die howe aanvalle op die polisie met die swaarste vonnisse sal straf wat die Wet toelaat.' E

Although these views, as formulated, cannot be criticised, it is necessary to express a general note of caution. The object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion but to serve the public interest. (Compare Ashworth & Hough 'Sentencing and the Climate F of Opinion' [1996] Crim LR at 776; S v Mafu 1992 (2) SACR 494 (A) at 496g-j.) A sentencing policy that caters predominantly or exclusively for public opinion is inherently flawed. It remains the court's duty to impose fearlessly an appropriate and fair sentence even if the sentence does not satisfy the public. In this context the G approach expressed in S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at 38-9, paras 87-9 (per Chaskalson P) applies mutatis mutandis: public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the court; the court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its duty to act as an independent arbiter by making choices on the basis that they will find favour with the public. That, in the words of Schreiner JA in R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A) at H 236B-C, does not mean that it is

'wrong that the natural indignation of interested persons and of the community at large should receive some recognition in the sentences the courts impose, and it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration of justice may fall into disrepute and injured persons may incline to take the law into their own hands'. I

But, he added, 'righteous anger should not becloud judgment'. A similar point was made in Reg v Sargeant [1974] 60 Cr App Rep at 71.

'. . . There is however another aspect of retribution . . . it is that society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime . . . The courts do not have to reflect public opinion. On the other hand the courts must not disregard it. Perhaps the main...