S v Marais

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Diemont JA, Joubert JA, Viljoen JA, Galgut AJA and Botha AJA
• Judgment Date: 28 May 1982
• Citation: 1982 (3) SA 988 (A)
• Hearing Date: 18 March 1982
• Court: Appellate Division

S v Marais
1982 (3) SA 988 (A)

1982 (3) SA p988

Citation	1982 (3) SA 988 (A)
Court	Appellate Division
Judge	Diemont JA, Joubert JA, Viljoen JA, Galgut AJA and Botha AJA
Heard	March 18, 1982
Judgment	May 28, 1982

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde E

Mines and minerals — Purchasing unwrought gold in contravention of s 4 (1) of Proc 5 of 1938 (SWA) — Unwrought gold bought in police trap — Plea of guilty — Accused convicted — Money declared forfeit to F State in terms of s 35 of Act 51 of 1977 — Regional court had intended forfeiture order to be an additional punishment — Thus bypassing the statutory maximum fine — Misdirection by magistrate — However, court would still have been bound to order forfeiture in terms of s 34 (1) of G Act — Accused would, in terms of s 34 (1) (a) or (b), not have been able to reclaim money.

Criminal procedure — Appeal — In what cases — Forfeiture order by regional magistrate — Such order appealable in terms of s 309 (1) (a) of Act 51 of 1977.

H Criminal procedure — Forfeiture orders — Appealable in terms of s 309 (1) (a) of Act 51 of 1977.

Headnote : Kopnota

The respondent (accused) had pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a contravention of s 4 (1) of Proc 5 of 1938 (SWA) in that he had bought unwrought gold for R10 000 from a police trap. He was sentenced to a fine of R1 000 or one year's imprisonment and 18 months' imprisonment conditionally suspended. The R10 000 was declared forfeit to the State. In an appeal to the Supreme Court it was found that the regional court had intended the forfeiture order to be an additional punishment as the fine provided for was considered to be too low. The Court found that s 35 conferred, in unequivocal language, a free and unconditional discretion on

1982 (3) SA p989

the court in regard to forfeiture. However, it was found that the magistrate had erred in decreeing forfeiture of the money as an additional sentence; that in so doing he had exercised his discretion in regard to forgeiture unreasonably and had misdirected himself; and that A the forfeiture order accordingly had to be set aside. The State noted a further appeal against this decision. On appeal the first point which had to be considered was whether there was a right of appeal from the magistrate's decree of forfeiture. Section 35 of Act 51 of 1977 which empowered a court to declare an article forfeit to the State made no provision for an appeal by the accused against a declaration of B forfeiture by the magistrate. Section 309 (1) (a) of Act 51 of 1977 provided for appeals from any lower courts. The second point which had to be considered was whether the Court a quo erred in allowing the appeal, in setting aside the decree of forfeiture and in ordering the return of R10 000 to the accused. There were two stages in the enquiry - did the magistrate misdirect himself, and, if he did, did the Court a quo err in ordering that the money be returned to the accused.

Held, that in terms of s 309 (1) (a) a forfeiture order was as much an C order resultant from a conviction as a sentence was resultant from a conviction, and that the magistrate's order was therefore appealable.

Held, further, that s 35 (1) was an enabling and not a compulsory provision, and it was a matter within the discretion of the court.

Held, further, on the facts, that the reasoning adopted by the magistrate was manifestly incorrect; by ordering the maximum fine of R1 D 000 which he felt was inadequate and thereupon decreeing forfeiture of R10 000, he in effect imposed a fine of R11 000; in the result he had by-passed the statutory maximum fine in the Ordinance and in so doing increased his own penal jurisdiction; as a result the magistrate had misdirected himself.

Held, however, that, if the court had not exercised its discretion and decreed forfeiture, it would have been bound to rule that the money had E to be forfeited to the State in terms of s 34 (1) of Act 51 of 1977, and in terms of s 34 (1) (a) or (b) the accused would not have been able to claim that the money be returned to him.

Held, therefore, that the orders made in the Court a quo had to be set aside and the decree of forfeiture of R10 000 to the State had to be reinstated. (VILJOEN JA dissenting.)

The decision in the South West Africa Division in S v Marais 1981 (4) SA F 202 reversed.

Case Information

Appeal against a decision in the South West Africa Division (STRYDOM J and MOUTON AJ) reported in 1981 (4) SA 202. The facts appear from the judgment of DIEMONT JA.

J L Heyman for the appellant: Verlof om in terme van art 311 van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 te appelleer is toegestaan in terme van art 21 (2) (a) van die Wet op die Hooggeregshof 59 van 1959. Attorney-General, Transvaal v Nokwe and Others 1962 (3) SA te 806D. Die Hof het fouteer deur nie te bevind dat die beginsel ex turpi causa non oritur actio en/of die stelreël in pari delicto potior est conditio H defendentis nie 'n volledige antwoord op die teruggawe van die geld aan respondent is nie en/of dat genoemde beginsel en/of stelreël nie 'n volledige antwoord op respondent se appèl is nie. Die Hof het fouteer deur te bevind dat 'n diskresie tot verbeurdverklaring en 'n absolute belet teen teruggawe in die nuwe benadering van arts 34 en 35 van Wet 51 van 1977 met mekaar onbestaanbaar is. Eerste regsvraag: Die Hof was nie bevoegd om die bevele te maak nie aangesien die aangeleentheid nie behoorlik voor die Hof was nie, want 'n bevel in terme van art 35 (1) G

1982 (3) SA p990

van Wet 51 van 1977 is nie in terme van art 309 (1) (a) van Wet 51 van 1977 appelleerbaar nie en gevolglik moes die Hof die appèl van die hand A gewys het. Artikel 366 van Wet 31 van 1917 is vervang deur art 360 van Wet 56 van 1955. Laasgenoemde artikel is op sy beurt vervang deur arts 34 en 35 van Wet 51 van 1977. Artikel 100 van Wet 32 van 1917 is vervang deur art 103 van Wet 32 van 1944. Laasgenoemde artikel is vervang deur art 309 van Wet 51 van 1977. Artikel 100 van Wet 32 van 1917 is in alle B opsigte dieselfde as art 103 van Wet 32 van 1944. S v Ngubenkomo 1968 (2) SA te 110H. Die woorde 'daaropvolgende' in die Afrikaanse teks en 'following thereupon' in die Engelse teks van art 103 (1) van Wet 32 van 1944 is vervang deur die woorde 'gevolglike' en 'resultant' in art 309 (1) (a) van Wet 51 van 1977. Vir die betekenis van 'gevolglike' HAT - 1965 te 215; Die Afrikaanse Woordeboek - 1957 te 217G C (Staatsdrukker, Pretoria). Vir die betekenis van 'resultant' kyk Groot Woordeboek Kritzinger, Steyn, Schoonees, Cronje 11de uitg te 1322; Tweetalige Woordeboek Bosman, Van der Merwe, Hiemstra 7de verbeterde uitg te 1603. 'The ratio decidendi of the South African decisions is based on the assumption that the words 'following thereupon' govern only D the word 'conviction'. See, eg the remarks of JENNETT JP in S v Ngubenkomo 1968 (2) SA at 110... The same point is made by HERBSTEIN J in R v Khalpy 1958 (1) SA at 293... See also R v Khan 1961 (1) SA 282 where at 283 CANEY J quoted these views of HERBSTEIN J with approval.' R v Stevens 1969 (2) SA te 575F - H. Die argument van BEADLE E CJ te 576 in R v Stevens (supra) kan nie langer opgaan nie aangesien die woorde 'following thereupon' na 'order of the court' in art 103 (1) van Wet 32 van 1944 nou vervang is deur die woord 'resultant' voor die woord 'sentence' te plaas in art 309 (1) van Wet 51 van 1977. Volgens art 35 (4) (a) moet die aansoeker iemand anders as die beskuldigde wees. Volgens art 35 (4) (b) kan die aansoeker appelleer. Die beskuldigde word F dus uitdruklik daarvan uitgesluit om te appelleer. Sien Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 3rde uitg te 51 met betrekking tot art 34 (4) van Wet 51 van 1977. Dieselfde argument geld ook vir art 35 van Wet 51 van 1977. Kyk ook Swift Law of Criminal Procedure 2de uitg te 683 in G verband met art 360 van Wet 56 van 1955. 'n Bevel in terme van art 366 van Wet 31 van 1917 (verbeurdverklaring van 'n motor) is nie appelleerbaar nie maar wel hersienbaar. R v Seperstein 1948 (3) SA te 22. In Ex parte Wooldridge: In re R v Wooldridge 1934 TPD 38 word die vraag of 'n aansoek in terme van art 366 van Wet 31 van 1917 vir die teruggawe van geld in 'n onwettige diamant transaksie appelleerbaar is, H oopgelaat. Die applikant het wel 'n siviele remedie waar die onus dan op die Staat sal wees om te bewys dat die transaksie onwettig was. Daar moet daarteen gewaak word dat die bepalings van art 304 (4) van Wet 51 van 1977 nie as 'n goedkoop vorm van appèl gebruik word nie. S v Matsane 1978 (3) SA te 823D. 'n Bevel dat 'n opgeskorte vonnis in werking gestel word is nie 'n bevel onder art 103 (1) van Wet 32 van 1944 nie en gevolglik is so 'n bevel nie appelleerbaar nie. S v Van Niewenhuizen 1972 (3) SA te 576E; R v Khan 1961 (1) SA 282; S v Venter 1970 (4) SA 420; S v Duiker 1958 (3) SA te 855; S v Helm 1980 (1) PH H92; Hiemstra (supra te 661). 'n Bevel dat 'n opgeskorte vonnis in

1982 (3) SA p991

werking gestel word is egter vatbaar vir hersiening. S v Venter (supra te 421); S v Van Niewenhuizen (supra); R v Duiker (supra te 857F); S v Helm (supra). In R v Ah Paun Son 1927 TPD 946 is beslis dat 'n bevel A gemaak in terme van art 366 (1) van Wet 31 van 1917 (die teruggawe van bewysstukke) nie appelleerbaar is nie. In R v Russell and Kruger 1928 TPD 633 is beslis dat 'n bevel gemaak onder art 366 (2) van Wet 31 van 1917 (verbeurdverklaring) 'n bevel met die karakter van straf is en gevolglik appelleerbaar is in terme van art 100 (1) van Wet 32 van 1917. B Beide hierdie sake word aangehaal in R v Swanepoel and Van Wyk 1930 TPD 214 te 217 en in Attorney-General (Tvl) v Steenkamp 1954 (1) SA te 356B. 'n Verbeurdverklaring, of die moontlikheid van 'n verbeurdverklaring, kan nie 'n straf wees nie, aangesien die verbeurdverklaring eers na vonnis ter sprake kom en ook as gevolg van die regte van 'n derde tersyde...